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RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC FORUM: COURTS MUST STAND
FIRM AGAINST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DISPLACE
DISSIDENCE
Chris Ford*
Dissent is what rescues democracy from a quiet death
behind closed doors.'
I. Introduction
As the twenty-first century gets underway,
governmental authorities appear to be undertaking
increasingly unfriendly measures against citizens who take
to the streets to influence policymaking. In some
jurisdictions, for example, courts have given authorities the
green light to stifle speech by limiting access to public
spaces.2 In one recent case involving the 2004 Republican
National Convention in New York, a district court judge
seemed more worried about the condition of the grass in
Central Park than the right of the citizenry to gather in a
public space and conduct a rally. 3 Particularly in this age
*Civil rights practitioner, Law Office of Chris Ford, www.cfordlaw.net;
J.D., Southwestern University School of Law, 2005; Bachelor of Arts,
Economics, Stanford University, 1984; Editor-in-Chief, Southwestern
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, 2004-2005; former
journalist with the Los Angeles Daily Journal legal trade newspaper.
The author also has written on the right of free expression under
Argentine constitutional and international law for the Supreme Court of
Argentina in an article that will be published in La Ley. The author
wishes to thank Southwestern law professor David C. Kohler for his
'uidance in the preparation of this article.
Lewis Lapham, Foreword to HEIDI BOGHOSIAN, THE ASSAULT ON
FREE SPEECH, PUBLIC ASSEMBLY AND DISSENT: A NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD REPORT ON GOVERNMENT VIOLATIONS OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (The North River Press
2004).
2 See, e.g., United for Peace & Justice v. Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d 255
(N.Y. Gen. Term); Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York,
331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
3 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
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of globalized media outlets and big-money political
campaigns, which in concert tend to considerably constrain
the range of debate,4 an important component of the health
of American democracy is the general public's ability to
make their grievances known by taking to the streets
without undue governmental hindrance. The general public
represents that vast majority who lack the means to convey
their message via the media or directly to lawmakers.5
This escalating government clampdown on free
expression, along with current trends toward privatization
of public functions, 6 governmental secrecy, 7 and gagging
4 Media consolidation recently has drawn criticism. A bid during 2003
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to allow large
media companies to own television and radio stations and newspapers
in the same cities provoked protests in more than a dozen U.S. cities,
with marchers in Los Angeles displaying signs that read "No Choice,
No Voice: Reclaim our Airwaves." Furthermore, 750,000 Americans
phoned, wrote, or e-mailed messages, arguing that the proposed rule
changes would stifle diversity and were fundamentally anti-democratic.
The FCC ignored these messages. Steve Barnett, On Broadcast:
Hurrah for Jowell as She Puts Brakes on Big Media, THE OBSERVER,
June 29, 2003, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Madison Smart Bell, Have You Heard the New Neil Young Novel?,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33 (noting that musician Neil Young is
"not the first or last to notice that if our world is significantly less free
now than in the time of his youth, it's less because of government than
the inert momentum of the increasingly monolithic media.").
5 See infra notes 18, 60-73 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part V.C.
7 This nation now holds some trials in secret. One newspaper
columnist points out that "a tiny group of fringe right-wing lawyers"
created secret and unaccountable military tribunals controlled by the
White House that have proven "totally useless" in the war on terror, but
have "indelibly stain[ed] America's reputation as a leader in democratic
principles and endanger[ed] the lives of American prisoners of war in
current and future conflicts." Robert Scheer, The Man Behind the Oval
Office Curtain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at B 11. Furthermore, the
federal government has been operating under ever-greater secrecy in
recent years, especially since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
in New York and Washington, D.C. For example, the number of
classified government documents has jumped forty percent between
2001 and 2003. Moreover, in 2003 only one fifth as many documents
were declassified as in 1997. Edward Epstein, White House Takes
Secrecy to New Levels, Coalition Reports, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 2004,
at A7.
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of citizens, 8 should give anyone who favors governance by
open democracy serious pause. Though perhaps not
fashionable to emphasize in this era of magnified terrorism
fears, evidence is abundant that the polity's rights are
steadily eroding. "The war on terrorism threatens to
destroy the very values of a democratic society governed
by the rule of law." 9 In light of recent mass arrests and
secret detentions by the federal government, Judge
Tashima, who was imprisoned in an internment camp in
Arizona along with other Americans of Japanese ancestry
during World War II, said, "It's happening all over
again.' 0  Professor Don Mitchell argues that the
[President George W.] Bush has.., presided over one of the
most closed administrations in modem history, increasing the
classification of documents and defending against any
challenges to its secrecy. Early in his tenure, [former Attorney
General John] Ashcroft issued a memorandum to other
agencies of government promising to stand by any plausible
refusal of a Freedom of Information Act request.
Editorial, Administration Unbound, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 2,
2004, at 16A. In addition, hearings for immigrants caught up in the
sweeps following the September 11, 2001 attacks were closed to not
only the news media and the public, but even the detainees' relatives.
Adam Clymer, Government Openness At Issue as Bush Holds On to
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al. The details of their arrests
and even the number detained have been kept secret. Id. Bush also has
kept under wraps presidential papers pertaining to his father, George
H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan, robbing scholars and the public of
valuable information. Id. In general, the Bush Administration's
"penchant for secrecy ... has been striking to historians, legal experts
and lawmakers of both parties." Id.
8 See infra Part III.
9 Steve Hymon, Rights a Victim of Terror War, U.S. Judge Says, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004, at B3 (quoting United States Court of Appeals
Judge A. Wallace Tashima, speaking at a conference on the civil rights
cases challenging the World War H-era internments) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Tashima also criticized
the government for interrogating people based only on race and for
conducting searches of Internet, library, and university records without
probable cause. Id. Another former detainee at an internment camp
told the newspaper, "A lot of people now are governed by fear. There
are friends of mine who say racial prejudice can be justified .... They
really believe it. It's scary the way things are going. But I think people
9
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intersection of the new repressive state apparatus spawned
by the September 11, 2001 attacks on American soil, along
with jurisprudence that defines where free speech may take
place, "portends a frightening new era in the history of
speech and assembly in America."'"
Protecting core rights such as free expression is
vital because "[s]ometimes a right, once extinguished, may
be gone for good."' 12 Recognizing that the right to free
speech for dissidents is increasingly at risk in the United
States, this article catalogs manifold methods the
government has employed to constrain free speech. It
urges that courts not only serve as a bulwark against further
erosion of public expression of dissent but endeavor to
restore access to the public forum that recently has been
lost. Part II surveys the background of the right of free
expression, examining the traditional limits on the public
forum. Part III provides details and examples of the
government's increasing tendency to suppress dissident
expression by deploying heavily-armed police in
demonstrations, committing violent acts against peaceful
protesters, engaging in mass arrests, exaggerating the
criminal charges against detained demonstrators, and
holding demonstrators in ignominious conditions for
unreasonably long periods of time. Part IV examines how
such government actions violate constitutional protections
of speech by deterring participation in public debate. In
recent years, the government has gone beyond such street
tactics and has placed public fora off-limits by forcing
dissenters into protest pens, determining, based on
viewpoint, where they may engage in political expression
and limiting the landscape of free speech via privatization
schemes. Part V analyzes the First Amendment
are going to be outraged sooner or later." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11 Don Mitchell, The Liberalization of Free Speech: Or, How Protest in
Public Space is Silenced, 4 STAN. AGORA 1, *45 (2004).
12 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
10
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implications of such developments, and Part VI concludes
that courts must defend the right to free expression by
limiting or disallowing these governmental schemes that
have the effect of restricting access to the public forum.
II. Background
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution 3 represents "nothing less than a celebration of
the value of intellectual and moral autonomy."' 14  Our
nation's founders believed that democratic government
would only be possible with the widest access to
information. 15  This belief reflects the self-governance
theory underlying the First Amendment tradition, whereby
free speech is viewed as an indispensable tool for
governing a democracy. Because it facilitates the spread of
political truth, free speech receives heightened protection. 16
13 The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend. I.
14 Sheila Suess Kennedy, Introduction to FREE EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xviii (Sheila Suess Kennedy ed.,
Greenwood Publishing Group 1999).
15/d.
16 According to one author,
The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One
of the most important purposes of society and government is
the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general
concern. This is possible only through absolutely unlimited
discussion, for ... once force is thrown into the argument, it
becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false
side or the true, and truth loses all its natural advantage in the
contest.
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31
(Harvard Univ. Press 1948); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY 12 (Random House 1992). Professor Smolla lists five
ways in which free speech is related to self-governance: (1) through
participation (debating issues, casting votes, joining decision-making
processes); (2) the pursuit of political truth; (3) augmentation of
11
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A variation on this theory posits that the right of free
expression is needed for citizens to develop the intellectual
tools necessary to assimilate and evaluate a wide range of
viewpoints.17 Additionally, commentators have cited the
marketplace theory as an underlying purpose of free speech
by which truth competes in the marketplace with falsity and
ultimately triumphs. 18 Free speech also is often justified as
an end unto itself, inextricably tied to human autonomy and
dignity. 19 Thus, under this self-fulfillment theory, even
where one's words may lack truth, value, or argumentative
merit, free expression offers the speaker fulfillment through
inner satisfaction and the realization of self-identity.
2 0
Whatever its true raison d'etre, free speech on issues of
public concern has enjoyed protection for hundreds of years
and has as its conceptual progenitor the right to petition
majority rule; (4) restraint on "tyranny, corruption and ineptitude"; and
(5) societal stability. Id. at 12-13. See also New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (declaring that "a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
overnment and public officials").
"By allowing for ambiguity and conflict in the public sphere, the
First Amendment promotes the emergence of character traits that are
essential to a well-functioning democracy, including tolerance,
skepticism, personal responsibility, curiosity, distrust of authority, and
independence of mind." GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 7 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004).
18 "Truth has a stubborn persistence. Persecution may eliminate all
visible traces of a truth, like the scorched earth after a napalm bombing.
Yet truth comes back.... Cut down again and again, truth will still not
be stamped out; it gets rediscovered and rejuvenated, until finally it
flourishes." SMOLLA, supra note 16, at 7. However, Professor Smolla
argues that like economic markets, the marketplace of ideas suffers a
bias in favor of the wealthy who have greater access than the poor or
disenfranchised. Id. at 6. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market").
19 SMOLLA, supra note 16, at 9.
20 It is a right defiantly, robustly, and irreverently to speak one's mind,
just because it's one 's mind." Id.
12
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government for redress of grievances, as originally
developed in Medieval England.
A. The Right of Free Expression: Ancient
Roots
The right of free expression as a means toward
effecting change in governmental policy predates the
founding of the United States. Although the Magna Carta
contains no language directly protecting free speech, some
authors suggest that it contains the seeds that later
flourished into support for free-speech rights.21  These
seeds take the form of the right to petition the governing
authority for redress, which finds some reference in the
22 23Magna Carta but more direct support in later texts. Yet,
21 The most salient feature in its seeds-of-free-expression context is that
the Magna Carta enunciates a limit on the power of the Crown.
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1. "However unarticulated, there is in the
Charter the principle that we today would call the 'rule of law."' A.E.
DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 23 (Univ. of
Va. Press 1964). According to Howard:
The very fact that the King was forced to agree to this
declaration of rights and liberties set an example that could
never be erased. In a later century when Stuart kings, to cloak
their tyranny, invoked the doctrine of 'Divine Right,' men
could look back to Magna Carta as a reminder that free men
are not obliged to allow themselves to be ground into the dust.
Id.
22 According to one author, who cites an unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, the right to petition predates even the Magna Carta. While
the King regularly provided redress, he only provided redress when
beneficial to himself and only under a very limited set of
circumstances-namely in private disputes between property owners.
Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigal Constitution: The History and
Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2153, 2163
n.26 (1998). Thus, this early petition for redress was not a means to
bolster political rights or affect policy. Id. at 2163-64. On the other
hand, the Magna Carta does provide, in Chapter 61, a means of
petitioning by which barons could seek that the King abide by the
Charter. See id. at 2164 n.29. The King and his counselors had
discretion over how to treat petitions, but even those rejected or not
13
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around the time of the Magna Carta, the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances became a formal
mechanism by which the disenfranchised could participate
with the enfranchised in English political life.24 Not
surprisingly, the right to petition began early in North
America when it was codified in the Body of Liberties
adopted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641.25
acted on had to be read. Id. at 2168. The Magna Carta provides:
[I]f We, Our Justiciary, bailiffs, or any of Our ministers offend
in any respect against any man, or shall transgress any of these
articles of peace or security, and the offense be brought before
four of the said twenty-five barons, those four barons shall
come before Us, or Our Chief Justiciary if We are out of the
kingdom, declaring the offense, and shall demand speedy
amends for the same.
HOWARD, supra note 21, at 50 (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 61).
23 E.g., The Bill of Rights of 1689, quoted in Michael J. Wishnie,
Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 667, 685).
This bill gave subjects the right to petition the King, and declared that
"all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." Id.
at 685 n.92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 Mark, supra note 22, at 2169. Mark observes:
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for example, an
extremely wide band of English society participated in politics
by petitioning for redress of grievances, without question a
wider spectrum of society than that with the franchise.... A
petition from a group of prisoners, for example, suggests a
participatory consciousness that extended well beyond even
that which underlies some quite modem concepts of
enfranchisement.
Id. at 2169-70.
25 See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 688. The Body of Liberties provides:
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free
shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councell, or
Towne meeting, and either by speech or writing to move any
lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information,
whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance, so it [can] be
done in convenient time, due order, and respective manner.
14
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Not unlike today's demonstrators who take to the
streets to protest war, economic injustice, or environmental
degradation, those who petitioned the govermnent in
Colonial America were among the disenfranchised.26 Also,
like street marching today, petitioning in colonial times
made it possible for even the disenfranchised to participate
in political life.27  Furthermore, like some street
demonstrations carried out by the disenfranchised and their
sympathizers in the 1960s, as well as more recently,
28
petitioning during colonial times successfully effected
changes in governmental policy. 29  The Declaration of
Independence also refers to unsuccessful petitions for
redress from the King of England made "in the most
humble terms," but which "have been answered only by
repeated injury.' 30 Finally, the First Amendment itself
provides for petitioning. 3 1  Although originally seen as
central to the relationship between government and the
governed, the courts and academics historically have paid
A Coppie of the Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New
England (December 1641), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS ON
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION
122, 124 (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., ed., 1963). See also Mark, supra note
22, at 2177.
26 Wishnie, supra note 23, at 686-87. "Disenfranchised white males,
such as prisoners and those without property, as well as women, free
blacks, Native Americans and even slaves, exercised their right to
petition for redress of grievances." Id. at 688-89 (citations omitted).
Id. at 687.
28 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The First Annual Peter Cicchino Awards for
Outstanding Advocacy in the Public Interest Pannel Discussion: A
Defender of Humanity: In Honor of Peter Cicchino, 9 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 45, 47 (2001) (rallying against global
economic inequality allows participants to feel a connection with "the
subordinated and disenfranchised whose humanity is routinely
denied").
29 For example, more than half the statutes enacted in eighteenth-
century Virginia began as petitions. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 687.30 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
31 "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I (emphasis added).
15
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this aspect scant attention. 32  For practical purposes, the
First Amendment's protection of petitioning has been
subsumed into its defense of speech and the press.
33
"[W]here once political speech had petitioning at its very
core, and what we understand as speech and press stood at
the periphery, now the core and periphery are reversed.",
34
Giving historic context to and underlining the
importance of free speech in America, colonists in the early
1720s, writing under the pseudonym "Cato," explained:
Freedom of Speech is the great Bulwark of
Liberty; they prosper and die together. And
it is the Terror of Traytors and Oppressors,
32 Mark, supra note 22, at 2155.
" Id. at 2154-56. A narrow exception to this trend arose during the
1960s with the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, named
for two Supreme Court cases, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Gary Minda, Interest
Groups, Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905, 908-10, 913
(1990). Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court, citing the right to
petition as "an essential component of our representative government"
under the First Amendment, immunized from antitrust attack
petitioning (i.e., lobbying) by business special-interest groups, even
where the purpose of such petitioning was to restrain trade and even if
the restraint caused an antitrust injury. Id. at 909-10, 913. Professor
Minda questions the validity of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
however, when he states:
The true threat to the values of free expression and
representative government lies not with antitrust regulation of
petitioning, but rather with antitrust immunity, which has
allowed the political process to be overwhelmed by the
excessive influence of corporate greed and private access.
By immunizing government-petitioning cases under the
Noerr-Pennington antitrust doctrine, the courts have allowed
business interests to use political expression as a predatory
strategy for capturing the benefits of regulation, thus
threatening the political legitimacy of government.
Id. at 1028.
34 Mark, supra note 22, at 2154.
16
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and a Barrier against them. . . .But when
[free speech] was enslaved... [t]yranny had
usurped the Place of Equality, which is the
Soul of Liberty, and destroyed publick
Courage. The Minds of Men, terrified by
unjust Power, degenerated into all the
Vileness and Methods of Servitude: Abject
Sycophancy and blind Submission grew the
only means of Preferment, and indeed of
Safety; Men durst not open their Mouths,
but to flatter. 
35
Yet, intellectuals of the time frequently followed the
teaching of eighteenth century English commentator,
Blackstone, whose conception of free expression consisted
of barring government from prior restraint of speech while
allowing subsequent punishment. 36 Arguably, this type of
thinking underlies the passage of the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, 37 which punished, inter alia, criticism of the
government. 38  These Acts, passed amid a looming
35 Letter from Cato number 15, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same
Is Inseparable from Publick Liberty, in KENNEDY, supra note 14, at 15.
36 See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW:
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 182-
83 (Rowman & Littlefield rev. ed. 1994).
The liberty of press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints on
publications, and not in freedom for criminal matter when
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to
destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the
consequences of his own temerity.
Id. at 182 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1866)).
37 Law of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570; Law of July 14, 1798, ch.
74, 1 Stat. 596 [hereinafter Law of July 14, 1798].
38 The Sedition Act punished any act wherein a person should "write,
print, utter or publish.., any false, scandalous or malicious writing or
17
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prospect of war against France, provoked immediate public
furor. 39 Thomas Jefferson assailed the constitutionality of
the Acts-rightfully so according to author Chafee-so
much so that when he became the nation's third President
in 1801, he pardoned all prisoners arrested under these
Acts. 40  Popular indignation with prosecutions under the
Acts destroyed the Federalist Party, and Congress repaid all
of the imposed fines.
41
Despite this history, the United States Supreme
Court has never passed on the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts, 42 and for nearly the first century and a
half of its existence, the Court expended little effort on
examining or upholding free speech or free press rights.43
One reason the Court rarely reached First Amendment
writings against the government . . .with intent to defame ... or to
excite against them. . . the hatred of the good people . . . or to stir up
sedition" with up to two years in prison and a $2,000 fine. Law of July
14, 1798, §2. Truth was a defense. Id. at §3.
39 WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183. The passage of the Acts represented
the one instance from the founding of the nation until 1917 in which the
government attempted to apply the doctrine of bad tendency, which
punishes speech that tends to favor an enemy at war by creating
disaffection in the country and discouraging men from enlisting in the
armed forces. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 25-28.
40 CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 27-28.
41 Id. at 27. See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
42 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. "Although the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in
the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Act
of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional." Id. (citations
omitted).
43 E.g., WOLFE, supra note 36, at 183 ("The period between 1800 and
1919 was generally dormant for free-speech cases on the federal court
level."). However, it is not as though the Supreme Court never referred
to free-expression rights in the 19th century. See, e.g., United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876) ("The right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers
or the duties of the national government, is an attribute of national
citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by,
the United States."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80 (1873)
("The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
... are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.").
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questions during the nineteenth century is that the prospect
of mob violence or economic punishment discouraged
parties from asserting their rights to free speech in any
court. Thus, few cases or controversies regarding speech
made their way to the Supreme Court. an
Indeed, it was not until well into the twentieth
century that Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States,45 presaged the Court's modem
tendency to give teeth to First Amendment protection of
expression. Justice Holmes wrote, "I think that we should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe."46  This dissent
appeared in one case among a series in which both agitators
against the World War I draft and Socialists, who
advocated the violent overthrow of the government, were
hauled into court for violating the Espionage Act of 191747
and a similar state statute. Once there, their convictions
48were upheld. Even in the 1925 case of Gitlow v. NewYork, 49 which serves as a free-speech milestone by holding
44See generally Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom
of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 268-70
(1986) (noting that economic and social pressures kept plaintiffs from
taking free speech cases to court in the 19th century). For example, in
1869 the New York Times sent riflemen and machine guns to protect the
Herald Tribune from a mob, and employers purportedly threatened to
eliminate employees' jobs if William Jennings Bryan was elected
president in 1896. Id. at 268 n.21, 269 n.22. Nevertheless, evidence
exists that newspapers did not exactly feel "shackled" by the Supreme
Court's nineteenth century free speech jurisprudence. Id. at 270-71.
Moreover, nineteenth century procedural and substantive rules
prevented many cases from reaching the Supreme Court, and the Court
did not "incorporate" the First Amendment into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment until 1925. Id. at 267-68.
45 250 U.S. 616.46 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, amended by the
Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75 § 1, 40 Stat. 553.
48 See, e.g., Abrams, 250 U.S. 616; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
49 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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for the first time that the First Amendment was
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause 50 and was therefore applicable to the states,
the majority held that legislatures could prohibit classes of
speech that they consider to be dangerous. 5' Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dissented, pointing out that "[e]very
idea is an incitement." 52 This paved the way for the latter's
seminal concurrence in Whitney v. California.53  There,
Justice Brandeis enunciated the clear and present danger
50 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press-which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.
Id. While debating the Bill of Rights, the House of Representatives
approved a provision stating that "[n]o State shall violate the equal
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in
criminal cases." Gibson, supra note 44, at 268 n.18 (quoting 1 ANNALS
OF CONGRESS 755 (J. Gales ed. 1834)). However, the Senate rejected
the provision. Id. (citing 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1146 (McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing
1971)).
51 According to the Court:
[W]hen the legislative body has determined generally, in the
constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a
certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they
may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance
coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to
bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration.
It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that
the use of the language comes within its prohibition.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670.
52 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Every idea is an incitement. It
offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other
belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its
birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an
incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the
result.").
13 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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test as a limit on government prosecution of speech, such
that "[o]nly an emergency can justify repression."
54
Justice Brandeis further emphasized that those who
won the nation's independence believed that "without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine. 55 This call
to limit government sanction of speech would not really
strengthen until the 1960s. 56  During the Great War Era,
Learned Hand, sitting as a district court judge, most
eloquently defended the right of free speech in an
Espionage Act case in which he issued an injunction
requiring the postmaster to distribute a magazine
containing anti-war poetry, cartoons, and other writings.
57
54 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
" Id. at 375.
56 See, e.g., Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (overturning
Ohio law punishing advocacy of violence as a means to achieve
industrial or political reform); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276 (enunciating
the actual malice standard in defamation of public figures); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (reiterating that the teaching of the
moral propriety or necessity for a resort to force are not sufficient for
conviction). In Brandenberg, Justice Douglas criticized the courts for
too readily punishing advocacy by characterizing it as a threat.
Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 454-55 (Douglas, J., concurring). According
to Justice Douglas,
When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how
the 'clear and present danger' test has been applied, great
misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but
always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to
the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous.
Second, the test was so twisted and perverted in [Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)] as to make the trial of
those teachers of Marxism an all-out political trial which was
part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial
parts of the First Amendment.
Id. at 454.
57 Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F.
24 (2d. Cir. 1917). Chafee considers that during the World War I era,
there was "no finer judicial statement" advocating the right of free
speech than this from Judge Hand. CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 46.
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Judge Hand wrote:
Political agitation, by the passions it arouses
or the convictions it engenders, may in fact
stimulate men to the violation of law.
Detestation of existing policies is easily
transformed into forcible resistance of the
authority which puts them in execution, and
it would be folly to disregard the causal
relation between the two. Yet to assimilate
agitation, legitimate as such, with direct
incitement to violent resistance, is to
disregard the tolerance of all methods of
political agitation which in normal times is a
safeguard of free government. The
distinction is not a scholastic subterfuge, but
a hard-bought acquisition in the fight for
freedom.58
B. The Need for Free Expression: The Lack
of Alternatives
Certainly such an eloquent defense of free speech
during wartime applies with no less force today,
particularly where the current administration portends a
permanent war against terrorism. Engaging in political
speech in the streets is worthy of the most heightened
58 Masses Pub. Co., 244 F. at 540. Judge Hand further argues:
If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their duty or
their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should not be
held to have attempted to cause its violation. If that be not the
test, I can see no escape from the conclusion that under this
section every political agitation which can be shown to be apt
to create a seditious temper is illegal. I am confident that by
such language Congress had no such revolutionary purpose in
view [when it passed the Espionage Act].
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protection, especially because the mass media may not
accurately reflect the voices of the public, and because
much of the public lacks access to the media.5 9 Indeed, for
much of the twentieth century, the main avenues of
protest-such as leafleting, picketing, rallying on public
property, and engaging in door-to-door advocacy-were
geared toward low-cost message-making. Courts' First
Amendment rulings sought to protect such methods
60
because the rich enjoyed a built-in advantage of media
access in getting their message across to a broad audience,
and potentially were able to exclude those without such
means from public debate. 6 1 Underscoring the importance
59 "[F]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one."
Seth F. Kreimer, Social Movements and Law Reform: Technologies of
Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in the
Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 121-22 (2001) (quoting
A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed. 1975)). While media
consolidation has put the lack of access in sharp focus, see supra note
4, it can hardly be said that this concern is new. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in a 1966 trespass case, stated:
The right to petition for the redress of grievances has an
ancient history and is not limited to writing a letter or sending
a telegram to a congressman; it is not confined to appearing
before the local city council, or writing letters to the President
or Governor or Mayor. . . . Conventional methods of
petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off to large
groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal
complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic
maze; courts may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966) (citations omitted). In
Adderley, Florida students were convicted of "trespass with a malicious
and mischievous intent" for demonstrating against racism and other
0ovemrnmental policies on the grounds of a local jail. Id. at 40.
E.g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (protecting
familiar methods is "essential to the poorly financed causes of little
V Ieople").
Kreimer, supra note 59, at 122. One book reviewer refers to "a
world bought and paid for by big business, which, not coincidentally,
can count on the corporate media to push anti-people agendas."
Marlene Webber, Kicking Against Them, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 13,
2002, at D14 (book review). A letter writer contends that members of
the public will take to the streets when they are "deliberately bypassed
23
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of low-cost street protesting, Supreme Court Justice
Douglas noted:
Those who do not control television and
radio, those who cannot afford to advertise
in newspapers or circulate elaborate
pamphlets may have only a more limited
type of access to public officials. Their
methods should not be condemned as tactics
of obstruction and harassment as long as the
assembly and petition are peaceable.
62
While it is true that the Internet has the potential to
provide a low-cost medium for those with dissenting
political messages to reach a broad audience, it serves more
as a highly efficient organizational, research, and
interpersonal communication tool than a replacement for
the town square.63 Still, the Internet enables both large and
small groups, which represent the entire political spectrum,
to make their views available to readers all over the
64world. And thus far, they have been able to elude
governmental and media censorship in doing so. 6' For
by those in power." Postbag, Don't be a Stooge of Globalization,
BANGKOK POST, Oct. 3, 2000 (letter to the editor).62 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 50-51.
63 See generally Kreimer, supra note 59, at 142-43 (arguing that the
existence of more than five billion websites creates a "digital attention
deficient" as Internet users only have so many hours in a given day to
view websites and a group's message may get lost in the clamor). See
also Frederick W. Mayer, Labor, Environment and the State of U.S.
Trade Politics, 6 NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 335, 339 (2000)
(explaining that the Internet merely allows groups to promote leaders'
efforts, solicit support, provide information to members, distribute key
documents, or serve as an informational clearinghouse, rather than
engage in the debate characteristic of visible public protests).
64 Kreimer, supra note 59, at 125. A good example of such a website
may be found at http://www.indymedia.org.
65 "Not only does the Internet allow insurgents to bypass the 'soft'
censorship of the mainstream media, but it allows evasion of the more
direct efforts at suppression of information by local, state, or national
authorities." Kreimer, supra note 59, at 127. Professor Kreimer cites
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protest groups, maintaining a website means giving readers
a view of marches and police reactions that the broadcast
media may ignore. 66  Moreover, the use of Internet chat
rooms, e-mail, and websites enables dissident groups to
provide volumes of information including, for example,
complaints and court decisions that would have been
inconceivable without the computer-based medium.
Moreover, groups employ online resources to facilitate
recruitment and mobilization. 
67
Professor Seth Kreimer, however, contends that for
all its ability to move information and reach globally, the
Internet has not developed into a cyber-town square.68
Primary among the reasons for this lack of development
include what he calls the "digital attention deficit";
dissident group websites, no matter how comprehensive,
exist in a worldwide cacophony of websites, each trying to
compete for readers who only have twenty-four hours a
day.69  Moreover, protest site publishers may be able to
post links on portals that attract heavy traffic or host more
easily found "sucks" sites.7 ° But these may not offer the
impact of ground protests at prominent venues, such as the
National Mall in Washington, which by their nature capture
the Mexican Zapatista rebels' ability to convey their accounts to the
world, Vietnamese dissenters' efforts to post banned novels, and
Serbian radio stations' web-based broadcasts to bypass airwave
jamming by the government. Id. at 127-28. Similarly, Matt Drudge's
efforts arguably dragged the mainstream media into full-scale coverage
of the Monica Lewinsky sex scandal during the Clinton era, while "the
seamy quality of the Starr Report became impossible to disguise when
the text of the report became available online." Id. at 130.
66Id. at 125-26.
67/d. at 131-37.
68 Id. at 140.
69 Id. at 142-43.
70 Kreimer, supra note 59, at 152-53. See, e.g.,
http://homedepotsucks.com (criticizing Home Depot for trying "to
stifle [sic] freedom of speech, [and] attempting to steal this domain");
http://paypalsucks.com (critiquing the service used to pay for product
purchased on the eBay auction website). Note that businesses, aware of
the effects of "sucks" websites, have tried to thwart them through legal
means.
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the public's attention. 71 "On the Internet, there are neither
malls nor sidewalks.,
72
While the argument is strong that the Internet has
yet to serve as a substitute for the town square, it is also
unlikely that the Internet would replicate the emotive
impact of street protest. Although his expertise lay in
copyright, Professor Melville Nimmer wrote an appellate
brief on and advocated at oral argument the value of
emotive speech in an important First Amendment case,
Cohen v. California.73 In Cohen, Justice Harlan adopted
Nimmer's own phrasing 74 when he wrote:
[W]ords are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution,
while solicitous of the cognitive content of
individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important
element of the overall message sought to be
communicated. Indeed, as Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has said, "one of the
prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measures-
and that means not only informed and
responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation.,
75
71 Kreimer, supra note 59, at 147-48.
72 Id. at 148.
7' 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning defendant's conviction for
disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket with the slogan "Fuck the
Draft"); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1635,
1649, 1655-57 (1996).
74 Van Alstyne, supra note 73, at 1656-57.
75 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322
U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944)).
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Because the Internet does not duplicate a true public
meeting place and the majority of the citizenry lacks
meaningful access to shape the content of the mass media,
most political dissenters still lack viable alternatives to a
public forum in which to voice their opinions.
C. The Public Forum and its Traditional
Limits
Whether bypassed by those in power, lacking
alternate vehicles for message-making, or simply outraged
at ill-conceived government policy, citizens who take to the
streets and other public spaces utilize a forum traditionally
dedicated to political expression. Though frequently
recited in First Amendment literature, the words of Justice
Roberts, in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,76 are worth repeating here. In that opinion,he wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may
rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens. 7
While this proclamation of privilege should resonate like a
favorite tune to the ear of any street demonstrator, one
should note that Justice Roberts also stressed that "the
privilege of a citizen . . . to use the streets and parks for
76 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
77 Id. at 515.
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[free expression] may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative."
78
Yet, while recognizing a governmental prerogative
to regulate in the interest of peace and order, Justice
Roberts nonetheless admonished that government must not
use "the guise of regulation" to abridge or deny free
speech.79  After deciding Committee for Industrial
Organization, the Court developed a regulation scheme that
categorizes the use of public spaces for political expression
based on their relative availability to the public. Thus, the
Court referred to what is now known as the traditional
public forum-the streets, sidewalks, and parks found to be
"natural and proper" places for political expression. 80
These are places that "by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." 8' The
Court also has defined limited or designated public fora and
nonpublic fora, 82 but the focus of this article rests on
political expression in the traditional public forum,
78 Id. at 515-16. The privilege "must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order." Id.
79 
Id. at 516.
80 In such places, "expressive activity will rarely be incompatible with
the intended use of the property, as is evident from the facts that they
are 'natural and proper places for dissemination of information and
opinion."' Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 817 (1985) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163t1939)).
1 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
t1983).
2 Limited or designated public fora include university meeting
facilities and municipal theaters, places that the government has
deliberately opened to expressive activity for limited time periods, for a
limited class of speakers (e.g., student groups), or for a limited range of
topics (e.g., school board business). The nonpublic forum category
refers to government property not traditionally used or deliberately
designated for speech activity. For example, courts have found post
office sidewalks, airports, state fairgrounds, jails, military bases, and a
municipally-owned pier to be nonpublic fora. For a thorough treatment
of the public forum doctrine, including abundant case citations, see
Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45
Loy. L. REv. 411, 418-62 (1999).
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especially to elucidate how recent government actions have
sharply limited its availability.
The extent to which the government is permitted to
regulate speech in a public forum depends on whether or
not the content is a motivation for the constraint. Content-
based restrictions in public fora are sharply circumscribed
and strictly examined. 83  "It is axiomatic that the
government may not regulate speech based on its
substantive content or the message it conveys. ' ' 84 To be
valid, a content-based regulation "must be shown to protect
some vital state interest, or to prevent some clearly
identifiable harm. ' 85 An egregious form of content-related
regulation is that based on viewpoint. 86  "When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views
taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant."
87
83 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995) (citing Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45) (holding that a state
may regulate expressive content "only if such a restriction is necessary,
and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest").
84 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
828 (1995). Moreover, "[d]iscrimination against speech because of its
message is presumed to be unconstitutional." Id. at 828. Professor
O'Neill lists five categories in which courts have found impermissible
governmental acts that restrict speech based on content: (1)
categorically suppressing or favoring a particular message; (2) blocking
access to a forum because of a speaker's intended message; (3)
charging higher fees for certain speakers to use a forum because the
speech is likely to generate controversy and require more police
protection; (4) withholding a subsidy to which a speaker, but for her
message, would be entitled; and (5) altering a speaker's message as the
price of access to the public forum, such as when private parade
organizers were required to include gay and lesbian participants who
would convey a message that the organizers cared not to communicate).
O'Neill, supra note 82, 429-433. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
828 (observing that the government offends the First Amendment when
it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of
their expression).
85 Mitchell, supra note 11, at * 15 (emphasis omitted).86 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
87 Id. "The government must abstain from regulating speech when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker is the rationale for the restriction." Id. (citing Perry Educ.
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In contrast, where a regulation is justified without
reference to the content of the expression, courts give
government entities some leeway to constrain speech by
imposing reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner. The government's purpose is the controlling
factor in determining such content neutrality. 89 When the
purpose served is unrelated to the content of the expression,
a restriction will be deemed content-neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages, but not
others.90 The content-neutral regulation must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest-in
this context, meaning that the restriction need not represent
the least-intrusive means, but only that the governmental
interest "would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation" 91 -and leave open ample alternate avenues
through which to convey the information. "An
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46).
88 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Boiled
down to its essence, the time, place, or manner doctrine permits
government to restrict speech to serve a substantial government
interest, but does not allow it to restrict more speech than necessary to
accomplish that end. Kelly Conlan, Note, The Orange Order Looks to
the First Amendment: Would it Protect Their Parades?, 17 J.L. & POL.
553, 565 (2001).
89 Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
90 Id. at 791. (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-
48 (1986)) (upholding zoning ordinance as content-neutral, even
though it affected adult theaters differently than others, because the
governmental purpose of its enactment was to quell undesirable
secondary effects attending adult theaters).
9' Id. at 797-99. "'The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations
does not turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests' or the degree to which those interests
should be promoted." Id. at 800 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675, 689 (1985)). Additionally, the validity of a regulation
"depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government
seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government's
interests in an individual case." Id. at 801.
92 Ward, 491 U.S. at 801. See also Bay Area Peace Navy v. United
States, 914 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990). "[A]n alternative mode of
communication may be constitutionally inadequate if the speaker's
ability to communicate effectively is threatened.... Restrictions have
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alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to
reach the 'intended audience. ' '93 The requirement that an
alternative be ample is important because the First
Amendment "protects the right of every citizen to reach the
minds of willing listeners, and to do so there must be
opportunity to win their attention."
94
III. Bullying with Billy Clubs: Government
Discourages Participation
Recently, governmental agencies across the nation
have undertaken extensive and expensive efforts that have
the ostensible purpose of enhancing public safety. In
reality, however, these efforts have had the effect of
curtailing the ability of political dissidents to win the
attention of their intended audience. Much like
government officials in the late eighteenth and early
twentieth centuries, who were facing war when they passed
laws clamping down on speech, 95 federal and local leaders
today refer to concerns about terrorism as reasons for
seeking constraints on free expression. In addition to oft-
times harsh treatment of street demonstrators, 96 the
been upheld, for example, when [the challenged ordinance] does not
affect any individual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to
distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on
public property is prohibited, and the [challenged rule] has not been
shown to deny access within the forum in question." Id. at 1229
(citations, emphases, internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in
original); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting ample alternatives ineffective where author of book criticizing
professional sports team owner prevented from reaching his audience
by ordinance barring him from selling the book within 1,000 feet of the
entrance to the sports venue during home games). "The alternatives
require Herculean efforts by Weinberg or his customers to complete the
sale." Id. at 1042.
93 Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229 (internal quotation marks
omitted).94 id.
95 See discussion of Alien and Sedition Acts and Espionage Act, supra
Part II.A.96 See infra Part III.B.
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government has, under the auspices of the war on terror,
sought topermanently gag certain entities subject to FBI
searches.97 A New York district court judge recently found
the law prohibiting disclosure in such cases facially
unconstitutional, noting that "as our sunshine laws and
judicial doctrine attest, democracy abhors undue secrecy, in
recognition that public knowledge secures freedom."
98
Beyond the federal government's current obsession
with secrecy is its concentrated and multi-faceted assault on
protesters and their use of public spaces to engage in
political speech. Government agencies at the federal and
local level intimidate protesters from participating,
unjustifiably denounce them as violent, impede their entry
or exit from demonstrations, assault them with chemical
agents such as pepper spray, shoot them with so-called
"less-than-lethal" projectiles (ignoring manufacturers'
suggested limitations on their use), round them up in mass
arrests, seek exaggerated charges, and abuse them while
they are in custody.
99
A. Denouncing the Participants
Before demonstrators even show up for their rally,
authorities frequently have already begun to denigrate or
intimidate them.' 00 This denunciation often takes the form
9' See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2000 & Supp. 2003); Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at
479-80, 483-84. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) prohibits Internet
service providers from disclosing "to any person that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to information or
records under this section." 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c).
98 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
99 See infra Sections III. A & III. B.
100 For example, prior to the Republican National Convention in 2004,
New York City officials demonized and criminalized those who
planned to engage in political protest and portrayed them "in the most
negative light." Class Action Complaint, MacNamara v. New York
(S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), para. 62 [hereinafter "MacNamara Complaint"]
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://nlgnyc.org/pdf/mcclassactioncomplaint.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2005). New York Police Commissioner Kelly made public statements
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of taunts, thinly veiled threats, or apocalyptic predictions of
demonstrator-derived violence. Sometimes officials seem
to base these predictions on little more than isolated
incidences of vandalism or infrequent cases of violence that
marked previous marches in other cities.
1. Protesters' Propensity for Violence
Exaggerated
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
"painted a dire picture" of civil disobedience and mass
protests prior to the Democratic National Convention in
August 2000,101 based on disruptions caused by dressed-in-
black anarchists, who constituted a small percentage of the
tens of thousands of marchers protesting globalization at
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in
December 1999.102 During a presentation to the Los
about the threats "hard-core" and "dangerous" protesters posed to New
York City. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101 Jeffrey L. Rabin & Tina Daunt, LAPD Seeks Reversal of Protest Site
Designation, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at B 1.
102 The Washington Post described the scene in Seattle as follows:
Delegates who stepped out of their hotels Tuesday morning,
the first day of the [WTO] conference, with freshly issued ID
badges around their necks [exited their hotels to find that]
throngs of chanting demonstrators had taken control of the
streets of downtown Seattle. With arms linked, they formed
tight human chains to block all entrances to the convention
center where the meeting would take place.
Downtown's usual din of traffic was banished, replaced by the
beating of protesters' drums and a lone trombone's wail, by
chants and '60s rock tunes at peak volumes. Riot police
marched in tight phalanxes, slapping their nightsticks against
the sides of their boots. The sound was like massed jackboots
on pavement.
Robert G. Kaiser & John Burgess, A Seattle Primer: How Not to Hold
WTO Talks, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1999, at 40. Most protesters
left property alone, but a small group of youths dressed in black, whose
faces were covered with ski masks or bandanas, committed acts of
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Angeles City Council in June 2000, the LAPD stirred fear
of pandemonium by showing a dramatic video of the
demonstrations in Seattle;' 0 3 the tenor of this video could
be compared to that of the famous 1936 anti-marijuana
propaganda film, "Reefer Madness."' 1 4 One police official
told the city council, "We fully expect to be fully involved
with mass arrests and civil disobedience ... on a level of
what we saw in Seattle if not more intense."
0 5
Poking fun at the City Council's concerns over
protesters, a newspaper columnist wrote that city leaders,
looking over their shoulders at Seattle, were "shaking with
fear" over the prospect of the public relations fiasco that
street-level political expression could bring. 10 6  "With
trembling hands, they're ripping up the Constitution and
throwing it to the winds, a craven sacrifice to the gods of
chaos."' 0 7
vandalism, breaking storefront windows of businesses such as
McDonalds and Starbucks and spray-painting slogans on buildings. Id.
"Though more than 20,000 union members marched peacefully in
Seattle that day, the world would see and remember the sporadic
violence and the clouds of tear gas." Id. The mayor of Seattle
responded to these impromptu protests (other, sanctioned events took
place at the same time in other parts of the city) by calling out the
National Guard, covering every street comer of downtown Seattle with
baton-wielding police officers "in head-to-toe black" who marched
shoulder-to-shoulder and shoved demonstrators out of a 25-block zone
of the city in which free speech effectively had been banned. Mitchell,
supra note 11, at *33, *35; Lynda Gorov, A Crackdown Calms Seattle
Action Taken to Prevent Confrontation, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1999,
at Al.103 id.
104 The author of this article, who was a newspaper reporter at the time,
attended the City Council meeting at which the LAPD showed its fear-
of-another-Seattle video, and saw the video. For further information on
Reefer Madness, see http://www.reefer-madness-movie.com (last
visited August 22, 2005).
105 Chris Ford, Police Outline Plan To Handle Protests, L.A. DAILY J.,
June 29, 2000, at 2.
106 Garry Abrams, Spines in Short Supply, Wimp City Faces Dreadful
Electoral Pestilence, L.A. DAILY J., July 11, 2000, at 1.
107 Id. The LAPD even went so far as to chop down trees for fear that
protesters might set them afire and to remove newspaper racks from
downtown Los Angeles in case they might be used as battering rams.
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2. Protesters Depicted as
"Terrorists"
Preparing to host the 2004 Republican National
Convention, New York City officials, no doubt still
haunted by images of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on their city, were concerned about a repeat during
the GOP political event. However, their concerns about
terrorist threats morphed into a practice of lumping
demonstrators and terrorists together. 108 The media gave a
voice to this effort. A top police official, for example, cited
"terrorist threats and the escalating plans of anarchist
groups to disrupt the city of New York" as cause for
concern.l°9 A civil rights attorney told Newsday, "The
context we're now operating here in New York City is that
protesters are terrorist threats, protesters are anarchists,
protesters are the enemy."110  Furthermore, New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg presumed demonstrators had
criminal motives by making statements to the press that
they "came here to get arrested." 11 Likewise, John Street,
Todd S. Purdum, The 2000 Campaign: The Scene; Police and
Protesters Ready; Politicians Hope for the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2000, at 22.
108 E.g., Bryan Virasami, GOP Convention Threats; Arrests led to
fingerprints; Top police official says terror fears convinced cops to
verify IDs of hundreds held that week, NEWSDAY, Oct. 27, 2004, at
A05.
109 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Newsday also reported that
police fingerprinted hundreds of protesters during the Republican
National Convention "due to looming threats by terrorist and anarchist
groups." Id.
o Id.
111 "The mayor... urged demonstrators not to fight their cases in court,
despite the fact that many say they haven't done anything wrong - and
out-of-towners who have pleaded guilty said they did so to avoid
returning to New York." Glenn Thrush, Convention Arrests; Mayor to
ex- detainees: Plead Guilty, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 2004, at A15. "The
mayor's comment reflects a disdain for the principle that people are
innocent until proven guilty." Id. (quoting Donna Lieberman,
Executive Director for the New York Civil Liberties Union). Mayor
Bloomberg further made public statements that those engaging in free
speech were "terrorists and guilty criminals." MacNamara Complaint
35
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 175
the mayor of Philadelphia anticipated the arrival of
demonstrators to the 2000 Republican National Convention
by belittling them, calling them "idiots."" 2 He then issued
a warning, stating "[s]ome will come here to disrupt, to
make a spectacle of what's going on. They are going to get
a very ugly response."'1 3  While mayors of Philadelphia
and New York made no effort to hide their hostility toward
free expression, recently a spokesman for the anti-terrorism
section of the California Department of Justice was even
more blatant, desigating anti-war protesting as a form of
terrorism outright.
Similarly, police training in preparation for anti-
globalization demonstrations that coincided with a 2003
Miami meeting of Western leaders attempting to create a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) emphasized
violent protests, yet gave little regard to protection of free
speech. 15  The media build-up of the Miami FTAA
protests emphasized the "anarchists, anarchists,
anarchists." 116 The emphasis on anarchists "contributed to
a police mindset to err, when in doubt, on the side of
fara. 62.
"[W]e have got some idiots coming here. Some will come and say
whatever obnoxious things they want to say and go home."
BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 21.
13
Id.
114 Mike van Winkle, the spokesman for the California Anti-Terrorism
Information Center told the Oakland Tribune, "You can make an easy
kind of a link that, if you have a protest group protesting a war where
the cause that's being fought against is international terrorism, you
might have terrorism at that protest. You can almost argue that a
protest against that is a terrorist act." James Bovard, Quarantining
Dissent: How the Secret Service protects Bush from free speech, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 4, 2003, at D1.
115 "[Miami-Dade Police Department] spent 40,000 'work hours'
preparing for this event, yet the training materials in the After-Action
Report document little pertaining to the protection of citizen rights of
free expression." Independent Review Panel of the Miami-Dade
Police Department, The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
Inquiry Report 5, Sept. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.miamidade.gov/irp/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
116Id. at 6.
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dramatic show of force." ' 1 7 Disconcertingly, this mindset
inhibited police from performing such basic tasks as
assisting members of the public." 8 In Seattle after the 1999
WTO Conference, the city council ultimately concluded
that the images of rampant violence and chaos, which the
media repetitiously broadcast to the world, amounted to an
inaccurate portrayal, "as peaceful political demonstrators
'were drowned out by press coverage of disturbances."'11 9
Politicians, police, and the media are not the only
ones who are quick to characterize citizens who go to
public places and engage in political speech as hoodlums
prone to violence. Sadly, this mindset crept into a federal
court considering a motion by protest groups to enjoin the
city of Boston, host of the 2004 Democratic National
Convention, from forcing demonstrators to protest in a
zone so harsh that the court said created the "overall
impression... of an internment camp."' 120 Despite finding
the protest zone to be "a grim, mean, and oppressive
place," the court justified the city of Boston's security
measures in light of the surmised potential for protesters to
engage police in "hand-to-hand combat."'
121
117 The idea was "to preempt violence rather than being subject to
criticism for avoidable injury and destruction based on a reserved
firesence of police force." Id.The report cites "failure by the police to respond appropriately to
civilian inquiries for directions, street closings, and other assistance."
Id. Suspicion of protesters is not new in Florida; St. Petersburg police
practices of photographing demonstrators and recording their license
plate numbers while they marched were criticized in 1988 for their
chilling effect on free speech and assembly. Such tactics are similar to
those the FBI allegedly used starting in 1981 in surveillance of groups
opposed to U.S. foreign policy in Central America. See Stephen Koff,
City Police Accused of Spying at Rallies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
14, 1988, at 1.
119 Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1160 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Paez, J., dissenting).
120 Coalition to Protest DNC v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74
(D. Mass. 2004).
121 Id. at 67, 75.
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B. Penalizing the Participants
The government further chills expression and limits
access to the public forum through intimidating and violent
treatment of protesters, denial of access to public spaces,
limiting ingress to and egress from marches, mass arrests
that sometimes include uninvolved bystanders, and abusive
treatment during detention. 122
1. Show of Force Intimidation
Police agencies prepare for demonstrations almost
as though they are headed to war with a violent enemy
rather than ensuring safety in a public forum for First
Amendment expression. 123  For example, Los Angeles
police projected their rough-and-ready image prior to the
2000 Democratic National Convention by staging a training
for television cameras to film a mock containment of
protesters. 124 Protest planners became so frustrated by pre-
convention harassment by police that they sued the city of
Los Angeles to get it to stop taking actions "aimed at
chilling [their] speech."' 125 The police officers questioned
the protestors about their identification, told them walking
the streets without identification was illegal, buzzed their
planning center with low-flying helicopters, and taunted
122 National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV-01-6877
FMV (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2003), available at http://www.nlg-
la.org/NLG v.-City.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2004).
123 Chris Ford, Commission Praises LAPD for Handling of Protest
Marches, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 23, 2000, at 1.
124 Nicholas Riccardi & Jeffrey L. Rabin, Protesters Say L.A. Will Be
Used as a Model of Injustice, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at B1.
125 D2K Convention Planning Coalition v. Parks, CV-00-08556 (C.D.
Cal., filed Aug. 8). See also Chris Ford, Lawyers Will Be Keeping a
Close Eye on the LAPD, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 11, 2000, at 1. ("The
complaint accuses the LAPD of carrying out an 'intense, well-
orchestrated campaign of intimidation and harassment' and seeks a
temporary injunction against the police actions.").
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them with threats of planning center raids.' 26 During the
convention, police, with their uniforms bristling with
pepper-spray canisters, tear-gas guns, and other weaponry,
menaced would-be protesters.127  The city sent
overwhelming numbers of heavily armed officers even to
small gatherings.1 28  One Los Angeles City Council
member noted, "There were demonstrations I was at where
there were more police than demonstrators." 1
29
Police frequently project a menacing presence at
demonstrations by showing up in heavy riot gear, which
critics deride as "Darth Vader" uniforms.1 3  After
examining how police handled the demonstrations during
the FTAA meeting, a Miami police review board conceded
that "[t]he overwhelming riot-clad police presence, when
there was no civil disturbance, chilled some citizen
participation in permitted and lawful demonstrations and
126 id.
127 Ford, supra note 123.
128id.
129 Chris Ford, Council Rails at Heavy DNC Police Presence, L.A.
DAILY J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another City Council member emphasized the heavy cost the city of
Los Angeles bore to police the convention, calling it a "fraud on the
taxpayers from the moment it started." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). City officials had estimated that the policing tab would be
$8.3 million, but it reached nearly $36 million, with almost $10 million
going just toward overtime pay for police officers. Id. The difference
between the estimated and ultimate policing cost was "more than [Los
Angeles] spends to fix sidewalks in the city, trim trees in the city and
clean up every neighborhood in the city." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The police presence during convention week was compared
to that of an occupying army and criticized as "staggering,
inappropriate and over the edge." 1d. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
130 "Having witnessed the ... outrageous overreaction to the minor
protests of the Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, I now know what it
feels like to live in a police state. The horde of officers in their Darth
Vader costumes dominated the streets, dwarfing and menacing the few
hundred peaceful protesters." John Schauer, Letter to the Editor,
Failure of Pot Initiatives a Victory Anarchy vs. Liberty Protesting
Overkill Silencing Free Speech Not-so-Sweet Deal Who's Typical?
Curing What Ails Docs Throw the Bums Out Tax the Aldermen, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at 34.
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events." 131 At one point, Miami police in riot gear blocked
access to a church service, even though there was no
demonstration at the time. 1
32
The intimidation of protesters is not always pressed
at the tip of a billy club. In 2002, the Justice Department
lifted FBI restrictions imposed in 1976 and began allowing
this federal agency to spy on Americans' everyday lives.
The FBI encouraged its agents to enhance "paranoia" by
increasing the number of interviews it conducted with anti-
war activists.1 34 The FBI claimed that doing so would "get
the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every
mailbox." 135
2. Use of Force Causes Injuries
While the so-called Miami Model came under some
criticism from the police review panel, the panel's report
does not tell the full story. According to those present,
Miami police employed extraction teams, described as
squads of plain-clothes officers in full body armor,
"wearing ski masks.., jumping out of vans and dragging
protesters off.' 136  Other snatch squads would drag
protesters behind three-row police lines, preventing legal
observers and medics from identifying the detainees and
gaining access to them. 137  Moreover, legal observers in
Miami obtained arrest reports listing "brutality, beatings
and such-tasers, wooden and rubber bullets, many cops
131 Id.
132/id.
133 Bovard, supra note 114.
134 Id. (quoting from an internal FBI newsletter) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 Christopher Getzan, Infamous 'Miami Model' of Protest
Clampdown, Coming to a Town Near You, THE NEW STANDARD, June
8, 2004, available at
http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action-show-item&itemid= 4 8 8
(last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 53.
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beating one person, concussion grenades, electrical shields,
etc."
13
In Los Angeles, the police department's policy-
making board questioned officers' use of "less-lethal"
weapons at a demonstration protesting police brutality in
October 2000.139 There, police shot demonstrators with
weapons designed, according to their manufacturer, for use
against "subjects heavily dressed and in a violent
mindset." 140 Among the weapons used that day was one
intended for use against armed or violent individuals,
which was described as "an excellent tool" for cell
extractions or cellblock-clearing operations in prisons. 141
Police in Portland, Oregon used not only less-than-
lethal weapons during a protest coinciding with a 2002
political fundraiser for President Bush but also used pepper
spray. 142  Police claimed that protesters were interfering
with the ability of attendees to reach the event site and
ordered the crowd to move back 120 feet. 143  After
demonstrators allegedly ignored the order, officers
assaulted the crowd with pepper spray and shot crowd
members with rubber bullets. 14 In the resulting civil rights
lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that officers sprayed peaceful
138 Id. at 54.
139 Chris Ford, Panel Checks 'Less-Lethal' Weapons, L.A. DAILY J.,
Dec. 20, 2000, at 1. (on file with author).
140 Id. at 9. (internal quotation marks omitted). It should be noted that
while the weapons are designed for use against "heavily dressed"
subjects, in October the sun in Los Angeles typically generates
summer-like temperatures. In fact, the average high temperature in Los
Angeles in October is 78 degrees and rarely is it necessary to be heavily
dressed. See National Weather Service, Downtown Los Angeles
Climate Page, 1921-2004 Data, Observed and Average
Monthly/Annual, Max Temp,
http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/lox/climate/cvc.php (last visited Feb. 13,
2005).
141 Ford, supra note 139, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142 Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV-02-1448-HA, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25685 at *2 (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 2003).
14 Id. at *2-*3.
144id.
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protesters in the face with pepper spray and other chemical
agents. 145 Police forcefully blocked the exit of one family
with small children, including an 11-month-old who had
been pepper sprayed, even though they were screaming in
pain and seeking medical attention.1 46 Police sprayed the
parents and their three children without warning.
145 Second Amended Complaint, Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV-
02-1448-HA, at paras. 5.6, 5.8-5.11 (D. Ore. Sept. 8, 2003).
146 Id. In one incident, officers, without audible warning, "doused and
soaked" protesters with pepper spray, aiming the weapons directly into
the faces of the protesters, and caused one protestor to sustain extreme
pain and chemical burns. Id. paras. 4.5-4.6. In another incident, the
family with children ages 6, 3, and 11 months, who were concerned
that they had been surrounded by officers as the demonstration wound
down, sought to exit the protest area but were twice denied by police.
Id. paras. 6.4-6.6. Later, an officer "took aim" at the mother and
sprayed chemical agents into her face, also hitting her 11-month-old
child. Id. para. 6.8. The father was sprayed in the eyes, so both parents
were debilitated and kneeling or prone on the ground in pain. Id. paras.
6.7, 6.9. Meanwhile, their three children were crying in pain and fear
and left "unattended by their parents for a period due to the effects of
the chemical agents and their parents' incapacitation from the chemical
agents." Id. para. 6.9. The complaint further alleges that the Portland
police officers' assault on the demonstrators violated the First
Amendment because "[t]he mass spraying of chemical agents caused a
large number of peaceful protesters to leave the area and abandon their
lawful free speech and assembly activities." Id. at para. 5.11.
147 Ryan Frank, et al., Cleanup, Questions Begin, THE OREGONIAN,
Aug. 23, 2002, at A01. "There was no warning, no ultimatum,
nothing," the father told a newspaper reporter as he tried to comfort his
wailing 11-month-old son, whose eyes were red and swollen. "They
picked the guy with three kids to spray first." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In a more recent and similar episode in Pittsburgh,
police used Tasers, pepper spray, batons, and dogs against people
demonstrating in front of a military recruitment station. Pittsburg
Organizing Group, Press Release, Save Our Civil Liberties, Pittsburgh
Police Attack Non-Violent Protestors With Tasers, Pepper Spray and
K-9 Units, available at
http:///www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/2005/08/1180.shtml (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006). Two of the demonstrators required
hospitalization. Id. One of those hospitalized was a grandmother who
was bitten from behind by a police dog, arrested, and kept in an
unventilated police van in the hot sun for 45 minutes. The other person
hospitalized was a young woman who police officers pepper sprayed
directly in the face and then "Taser[ed] her mercilessly as she lay on
the street screaming." Id. Police also pepper-sprayed a four-year-old
girl and toppled a man with multiple sclerosis in his motorized
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3. Checkpoints and Denial of Access
to Public Fora
During some events which drew strong opposition
from protesters, police erected barriers or thwarted public
passage to spaces that clearly are public fora. For example,
armed officers staffed checkpoints outside the FTAA
meeting site in Miami, and several streets were off limits to
anyone without meeting credentials. 148  One reporter
observed, "Security fences cut up downtown like a jigsaw
puzzle, with numerous checkpoints.'
149
Police in Los Angeles during the 2000 Democratic
National Convention protests, as well as at another
demonstration later that year, used a slightly different
tactic, blocking ingress to and egress from ongoing
demonstrations in public places. 150 A district court found
credible evidence that Los Angeles police "prevented
people from joining [a] demonstration, standing on the
sidewalk, or leaving the march for any reason, including to
use the restroom or disperse [sic] leaflets."151 The court
found that those actions permitted a reasonable inference
that police unconstitutionally chilled the demonstrators'
wheelchair. Id.
148 BOGHOSIAN, supra note 1, at 44.
149 Id. (quoting John Pacenti, Miami Trade Summit Security Hailed,
Reviled, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 22, 2003, at Al).
150 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV (order granting in part
and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment). New
York police also have limited ingress to and egress from ongoing
demonstrations. See Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *14-*15 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
151 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV, at 10 (granting in part
and denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment).
Plaintiffs, a coalition of protest groups and a human rights bar
association, alleged that along with blocking ingress to and egress from
demonstrations in August and October 2000, police improperly
terminated legal political protests "without cause," used excessive force
against those engaged in free expression, and drowned out participants'
speech by flying helicopters at low altitudes "without a legitimate law
enforcement justification to do so." Id. at 5.
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First Amendment right to free expression.' 
52
4. Mass Arrests, Exaggerated
Charges
During events that attract large numbers of
protesters, police have engaged in mass arrests or round-
ups and file exaggerated charges--or even charges for
crimes that do not exist-against those arrested. For
example, during the 2004 Republican National Convention,
New York police arrested more than 1,800, suddenly
sweeping protesters, legal observers, members of the
media, and even bystanders from the street in orange plastic
nets. 153
152 Id. at 9. A New York court related the account of a family whose
participation at a 2003 anti-war demonstration was effectively
thwarted, and thus their expression chilled, by the New York City
police department's use of barricades and protest pens. Trapped blocks
from the event, the family decided to go home because the mother did
not believe that "there was going to be any way ever of getting
anywhere close to the demonstration." Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13350, at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 Dan Janison, et al., There was order, but at what price?, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 4, 2004, at A04; Diane Cardwell, Lawyers' Group Sues City Over
Arrests of Protestors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3. See also
MacNamara Complaint, paras. 87A., 87B (noting police used "orange
nets[] to arrest groups of people lawfully standing on sidewalks in
Times Square, including legal observers and members of the media").
Id. paras. 87B (stating police used the orange nets to round up and
arrest "individuals who were either participating in, observing, or were
merely in the vicinity of a march which began in Union Square"). Id.
paras. 87D, 142 (pointing out that one march had not even proceeded a
full block when police officers surrounded more than 200 people, used
the orange nets, and arrested them all, even though they had remained
on the sidewalk without blocking it and had complied with police
instructions). Id. para. 161 (explaining that a group was assembling for
a permitted march when a police officer screamed and officers rounded
up the participants with plastic orange netting and handcuffed them).
Id. para. 185 (noting that officers surrounded a group of demonstrators
after an officer shouted, "Arrest them all!" The group included
protesters "as well as non-protesting bystanders") (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also First Amended Complaint Schiller v. New
York, No. 04 Civ. 07922, para. 24 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mc-lawsuit-schiller.pdf ("At Convention-related
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In addition, while posting smaller numbers of
arrestees, during the 2000 Democratic National
Convention, the Los Angeles police carried out mass
arrests, forcing detainees to wait hours to be processed,
strip searching some of the detainees, and filing charges
that either were thrown out for lack of probable cause or
were based on nonexistent law.154  An attorney
representing a group of animal rights activists, who were
arrested en masse during the Los Angeles Convention,
characterized the round-up as "an unlawful effort to
suppress expressions of dissent.'' 155 The forty-two animal
rights activists were arrested after they marched into a
demonstrations there were nearly 1,800 arrests, many of them mass
arrests of people lawfully on public sidewalks or streets, with law-
abiding demonstrators and innocent bystanders alike being swept up.").
Another New York case arising from the 2004 Republican National
Convention contains this account of a violent mass arrest:
[A] group of demonstrators carrying signs and playing drums
and other instruments left its gathering place at the southem
end of Union Square Park and proceeded north on Union
Square East. They were followed by curious observers. After
the police prevented the demonstrators and observers from
proceeding north on Union Square East, the group moved east
on 16th Street. Using mesh nets and large numbers of officers,
the police then sealed off both ends of the block . . . and
refused to allow anyone inside to leave. Many of those trapped
between the police lines had been walking lawfully on the
sidewalk, and some had not even been following the
demonstrators but were simply caught in the crowd when the
police sealed the entire block. Without giving any opportunity
for people to disperse, the police began systematically
arresting people on the block, throwing some people to the
ground.
First Amended Complaint, Dinler v. New York, No. 04 Civ. 07921
para. 3 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/rnc_lawsuitdinler.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
154 See infra notes 155-61, 165-70 and accompanying text.
155 "It's very obvious what was going on here," the attorney added.
"They arrested these kids on Tuesday [the second of the four days the
convention lasted] and they planned to hold them until Friday after the
convention." David Houston, Animal Rights Activists Plan to Sue City,
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 22, 2000, at 2.
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commercial area of downtown Los Angeles and
approached a jewelry store they mistook for a furrier while
chanting that it is harmful to wear animal fur. 156 The store
owner became frantic and closed the metal security grate,
prompting some to kick or bang on the grate. 157  Police
rounded up these protesters, sixteen of whom were
juveniles, forced them against a wall with their hands up,
forced them to sit in the hot sun and in a police bus for
hours, and charged them with conspiracy to commit
vandalism. 158 A judge threw out the charges for all but two
of the protestors for lack of probable cause. 159 In another
incident shortly before the beginning of the 2000 DNC
Convention, Los Angeles police arrested two young women
who had been participating in the protest planning,
handcuffed them, interrogated them, and threw them into
holding cells. 160 Their alleged crime: jaywalking.
16 1
While police lacked probable cause to arrest the
animal rights demonstrators, they charged a group of
156 Ted Rohrlich & Henry Weinstein, Convention-Related Arrests
Cause Little Stir in Legal System, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2000, at A22.
157 Id. Anne La Jeunesse, DNC Anti-Fur Activist Pleads No Contest,
L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 16, 2000, at 2.
158 Houston, supra note 155; Anne La Jeunesse, Observers See Protest
Photos Taken by Police, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 11 (stating
that an ACLU attorney pointed out that police arrested legal observers
and journalists along with the protesters, contending that the police
were engaged in "a pattern to try to eliminate observers of their...
misconduct"); Susan McRae, Volunteer Cameraman Sees the Rougher
Side, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 1. A student filming the animal
rights protest and subsequent arrest was clubbed by a police officer in
full riot gear and not informed of the charges against him. Id. at 11;
Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra note 156.
159 Anne La Jeunesse, Court Drops Charges in Ant-Fur Protest Case,
L.A. DAILY J., Sept. 26, 2000, at 2. Two others, who allegedly kicked
the store-front grate, were charged with felony vandalism, and one of
these later pleaded guilty to the charge. Id.
160 Ford, supra note 123.
161 Id. An ACLU lawyer commented, "Obviously, it's unheard of for
somebody to be hauled off to [the police station] and handcuffed... for
jaywalking. This sort of repression of people for their political views is
to be expected in a police state, but it has no place in a democratic
country." Ford, supra note 125, at 1.
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bicyclists with reckless driving, a violation that does not
apply to bike riders under California law. 162 Advocating
the increased use of bicycles instead of cars, seventy one
bicyclists were riding through downtown Los Angeles as
part of a sanctioned demonstration, when they suddenly
were swarmed by motorcycle officers, who shouted, "Put
your bikes down!"' 163  The bicyclists were subjected to
mass arrest; 164 yet unsurprisingly, all charges were later
dropped. 165  Additionally, bicyclists in a similar event in
New York in 2004 endured the same treatment.' 
66
5. Abuses in Detention
The twenty three women among the bicyclists in
Los Angeles were strip-searched twice-once after a judge
had already ordered their release.' 67 Los Angeles County
162 Flynn McRoberts, Dear Mother Tribune, Send Bail Money, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 17, 2000, at 17. Realizing that police had wrongly charged
the bicyclists, the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office revised the
charges to misdemeanor obstructing a public way and two traffic
infractions. Id.
163 id.
164 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). McRoberts, a Chicago
Tribune reporter who bicycled with the group known as Critical Mass
to report on the event, further described the process: "With their hands
on their holstered batons, officers in riot gear told us to get 'up against
the fence!'" Id. Most officers acted professionally, but they "cuffed us
behind our backs with hard plastic 'flex cuffs' and kept us at the fence
under [an] overpass for an hour or so," and made the group wait in a
bus for another hour. Id. "Out of the blue, they cornered the riders and
ordered them off their bikes.... There was no warning, no message to
disperse. It was very scary. I mean, we just went on a bike ride. How
did we end up in jail?" Sue Fox, $2.75 Million Proposed for Cyclists
Arrested in Protest, L.A. TIMES, March 25, 2003, at BI (internal
luotation marks omitted).
Fox, supra note 164, at B 1.
166 During the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York,
once-cooperative police officers turned on participants in the bicycling
event. Police "used orange nets to trap and arrest scores of people
participating in [the] bicycle event that [police] had allowed to take
place for nearly one and one-half hours before the mass arrests were
made without warning." MacNamara Complaint, para. 87A.
167 Fox, supra note 164. Also, after the judge ordered their release, the
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sheriff's deputies walked the women, many in biking shorts
and tank tops, past holding cells filled with jeering male
prisoners. 16  They were taken to a chilly cinder-block
hallway and ordered to face the wall and undress,
whereupon "belligerent uniformed officers" conducted
visual body cavity searches of the women.'69 Los Angeles-
area taxpayers shelled out $3.625 million to settle lawsuits
that arose from this treatment. 170 In 2003, FTAA protesters
were also strip-searched.17 1 They accused Miami jailers of
violating their Fourth Amendment rights by requiring them
to undergo strip and visual body cavity searches without
reasonable suspicion that such searches would disclose
contraband or weapons.172
Aside from strip searches, denial of access to
medicine and phone calls,173 and being held beyond their
release date, members of the public who have participated
in political speech have experienced other abuses in
detention. They have been denied access to restroom
facilities and forced to endure lengthy detention in cold,
women participants were denied telephone calls and access to
medication. Id. Even the judge himself could not resist over-restricting
protesters by requiring as a condition of their bail that they refrain from
riding bicycles, prompting criticism from a criminal lawyer. Rohrlich
& Weinstein, supra note 156. "Ordering someone not to ride a bicycle
has nothing to do with guaranteeing the person will appear in court,"
the lawyer said. Id. The lawyer further questioned the constitutionality
of the judge's order that a bicycle messenger not ride his bike, because
he is being deprived of his livelihood. Id.
168 Rohrlich & Weinstein, supra note 156.
169 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Elizabeth Fernandez, Strip-
search claims spur immediate outcry; Women's lawsuits inspire calls
for reform, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2003, at A13.
170 The women received $70,000 apiece and the men $5,000 each in the
$2.75 million settlement with Los Angeles County. Fernandez, supra
note 169, at A13; Fox, supra note 161, at Bl. In addition, the City of
Los Angeles paid $875,000 to settle a lawsuit from the same group of
bicyclists based on lack of probable cause for their arrest. Council OKs
Settlement Over Convention Protest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B3.
171 Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516-CIV, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19552, *4-*6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2004).
172 id.
173 E.g., MacNamara Complaint.
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toxin-suffused quarters. 174 Protesters and others who were
corralled in orange nets and arrested in New York during
the 2004 Republican National Convention were hauled to
Pier 57, a filthy bus storage and repair facility, where they
allegedly were exposed to a variety of toxic and
carcinogenic chemicals and substances for up to 50
hours. 175 Environmental inspections of this facility in 2001
and early 2004 revealed a lack of fire protection systems,
asbestos particles, and "floors covered with black oily
soot." 176
The New York arrestees, furthermore, were caged
in chain-link fence enclosures topped with razor wire that
did not have enough benches for sitting or sleeping,
requiring detainees to rest on the grime- and chemical-
covered floor, which caused skin rashes and blisters.
177
The facilities not only lacked adequate restroom facilities,
but also lacked toilet paper and a place to wash up.'
78
During the arrest process, demonstrators and bystanders
were handcuffed for hours, causing pain, numbness, and
swelling, as well as denied access to restroom facilities and
medical attention. 179  Some plaintiffs contended that the
174 See supra, Part III.B.4.; Gorov, supra note 102 (Seattle police
arrested hundreds, holding them "face-down on the wet streets, their
hands bound with plastic handcuffs"). All arrestees were fingerprinted,
even if accused of only "minor offenses for which fingerprinting is
unnecessary." Id. at para 64.
175 MacNamara Complaint, paras. 66, 78, 90, 95, 110, 126, 176, 193.
'
76 Id. at para. 67.
177 Moreover, although detainees were dressed for hot summer weather,
the facilities were kept cold with fans blowing at top speed, and they
were not given blankets or other means to keep warm. Id. at paras. 67,
77, 78, 93.
1 78 Id. at para. 93.
179 Id. at paras. 92, 93 (plaintiff complained of handcuff tightness, but
officer said nothing could be done; she suffered three weeks of
numbness, pain and swelling of her left hand); Id. at paras. 95, 96, 97,
98 (plaintiff a Ph.D. and vice-president at J.P. Morgan, was arrested
while merely walking home from a bookstore and despite lack of
probable cause for her arrest; officer told her, "Sorry but you were at
the wrong place at the wrong time"; she suffered extreme pain in her
shoulder and swelling in her hand due to the handcuffing); MacNamara
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City of New York deliberately and needlessly detained
protesters and others for lengthy periods even when they
could have processed them more quickly using existing
booking facilities around the city. 1
80
IV. Intent to Silence Implied: How Governmental
Actions Chill Free Expression
The plaintiffs further asserted that the mass round-
ups, arrests allegedly without probable cause, and
unnecessarily long detentions in cruel and inhumane
conditions were intended "to punish and retaliate against
individuals who were engaging in political protest."
' '8
Consequently, the city deterred the expression of core
political speech. 
182
It is true that city officials at least need to be
prepared to maintain order in case crowds-or even a small
Complaint paras. 102, 107-08, 112-14, 118-19, 123-24, 133-34, 137-
38, 143-44, 146, 151-52, 173-74, 177-78, 182, 186, 191, 195 (noting
that extremely tight handcuffing for many hours caused plaintiffs
extreme pain, discomfort, and numbness); Cardwell, supra note 152, at
B3. ("marchers suddenly swept into orange nets, languishing on buses
in tight handcuffs without medical attention, and one woman, panicked,
in convulsions after being corralled into a mass arrest as she walked to
work"). See also First Amended Complaint, Dinler v. New York, No.
04 Civ. 07921, para. 3 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mcjlawsuit-dinler.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006);
First Amended Complaint, Schiller v. NewYork, No. 04 Civ 07922,
para. 24 (S.D.N.Y. filed 2004), available at
http://nyclu.org/pdfs/mcjlawsuit-schiller.pdf (last visited Jan. 30,
2006).
180 Some of the plaintiffs further pointed out that in 1982 the city
processed 1,600 demonstrators and usually released them the same day,
often within several hours. MacNamara Complaint, at paras. 63, 65.
Protesters argued that the city held arrestees too long to avoid
embarrassing city leaders during the convention. Sabrina Tavemise,
City to Pay $150 a Person in G.O.P. Arrest Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 2005, at B3. The city settled one dispute over arrest and
detainment methods for $231,200, and the city's comptroller office
stated that 570 notices of claim totaling $859 million had been filed.
Id.
181 Id. at para 61.
182 id.
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percentage of a crowd-should decide to abandon the
peaceful methods that most tend to follow. The vast
majority of protesters at the Seattle WTO demonstration in
1999 were peaceful, but a small contingent appeared
willing to engage in property destruction. 183 In New York
in 2004, city leaders were attempting to ensure that the
streets remained safe for city residents and visiting
politicians alike, a concern overlain by the specter of a
reprisal of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the
city. 184 But while a government justifiably concerns itself
with public safety, it may not limit speech based on mere
conjecture that vandalism (which courts, elected officials
and the media frequently characterize as "violence") or
disruption might occur. 185  It follows that "First
Amendment jurisprudence teaches that banning speech is
an unacceptable means of planning for potential
misconduct."' 86 Moreover, "[t]he courts have held that the
183 Kaiser & Burgess, supra note 102.
184 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
185 According to the Ninth Circuit,
Although the government legitimately asserts that it need not
show an actual terrorist attack or serious accident to meet its
burden, it is not free to foreclose expressive activity in public
areas on mere speculation about danger. Otherwise, the
government's restriction of first amendment expression in
public areas would become essentially unreviewable.
Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1228 (citations and internal
%uotation marks omitted).
6 Serv. Employee Int'l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d
966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d. 1363,
1373 (9th Cir. 1997)).
The law is clear that First Amendment activity may not be
banned simply because prior similar activity led to or involved
instances of violence. There are sound reasons for this rule.
Demonstrations can be expected when the government acts in
highly controversial ways, or other events occur that excite or
arouse the passions of the citizenry. The more controversial
the occurrence, the more likely people are to demonstrate.
Some of these demonstrations may become violent. The
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proper response to potential and actual violence is for the
government to ensure an adequate police presence and to
arrest those who actually engage in such conduct, rather
than to suppress legitimate First Amendment conduct as a
prophylactic measure."
'1 87
Therefore, the aggressive tactics undertaken by
police, as well as governmental acts blocking access to the
public forum, arguably violate this principle, because they
curtail free expression based on the possibility that mischief
may erupt rather than based on actual wrongdoing by those
engaged in political speech. Furthermore, the
government's ignoble and rough treatment of dissidents
violates the First Amendment by discouraging
participation.
A. "Ordinary Firmness" Standard
To successfully allege a First Amendment violation
under such circumstances, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's actions deterred or chilled the plaintiff's speech
and that the deterrence was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant's conduct. 188 While this statement
"might be read to suggest that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed [the
court] requires only a demonstration that defendants
intended to interfere with [plaintiffs'] First Amendment
rights."' 189  A court, thus, will examine "whether an
courts have held that the proper response to potential and
actual violence is for the government to ensure an adequate
police presence and to arrest those who actually engage in
such conduct, rather than to suppress legitimate First
Amendment conduct as a prophylactic measure.
Collins, 110 F.3d at 1372 (citations omitted).
187 Collins, 110 F.3d at 1372.
188 Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d
1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).
189 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court looks to intent
"[b]ecause it would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability
52
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 192
official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary
firmness from future First Amendment activities."'
' 90
The intent component of this principle was at issue
in Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino
County. 191 There, a bomb went off under the car of an
environmental activist while she was driving it, severely
injuring her. 192 Police and FBI agents ascribed
responsibility for the explosion to the activist, then her
passenger and released incriminating information about
them that later proved to be false; charges against the
activists were never filed. 193 The activist and her passenger
sued, alleging inter alia that the police and FBI agents
conspired to falsely accuse them in connection with the
bombing, chilling their First Amendment activities. 194 The
court found intent on the part of the police and FBI because
their actions included describing the environmental
activists as "members of a violent terrorist group,"'
195
for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually
determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity." Id.
190 Id. (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir.
1996), vacated on other grounds, 523 U.S. 1273 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord, Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252 (5th
Cir. 2002). It is settled law among federal appellate courts that
to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against an
ordinary citizen, [plaintiffs] must show that (1) they were
engaged in constitutionally protected activity, (2) the
defendants' actions caused them to suffer an injury that would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage
in that activity, and (3) the defendants' adverse actions were
substantially motivated against the plaintiffs' exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct.
Id. at 258.
'9' 192 F.3d 1283.
192 Id. at 1287.
193 Id. at 1287-88.
194/d. at 1288.
'9' Id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note how law
enforcement officials characterize the activists' group Earth First!, an
avid environmental group known for acts of vandalism and civil
disobedience, as a "violent terrorist" organization. Id.
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spreading misinformation, evincing a desire to cast their
group in a negative light, and thus harming its activities. 96
B. Applicability in Protester Cases
Following Mendocino Environmental Center, a
federal court in Oregon concluded that a high school
football coach's abuses toward a student whose parents had
complained of earlier mistreatment would lead ordinary
people in the parents' position to refrain from further
condemnation of the coach's practices to protect their son
from further harm. 197 Denying the football coach's motion
to dismiss, the court found that the coach had engaged in
"verbal tirades and emotionally abusive conduct" toward
the plaintiffs' son and other players during a summer
training camp. 198 After the plaintiffs complained, the coach
turned the student's teammates against him, encouraged
other parents to verbally attack the plaintiffs, and called the
student into an equipment room, locked the door, and
verbally abused the boy. 199
Many of the cases applying the "ordinary firmness"
standard involve retaliation. However, this standard was
recently followed in a protester case as well. 200 A district
court in Los Angeles found that the LAPD's preventing
ingress to and egress from demonstrations during the 2000
Democratic National Convention, blocking protesters from
196 id.
197 Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130
(D. Ore. 2003).
198 Id. at 1123.
199 The coach turned the teammates against the plaintiffs' son by falsely
telling them that his parents had accused him of racism. This is
significant because the plaintiffs' son was one of five African-
American players on a team of 120 students. Team members
threatened the plaintiffs' son with physical harm, chastised and isolated
him, and the coached harassed him during school hours in front of his
friends. Id. at 1124.
200 E.g., Crawford-El, 93 F.3d 813. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192
F.3d at 1300 (collecting decisions).
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using sidewalks, and using low-flying helicopters that
interfered with speakers' ability to communicate "permits a
reasonable inference that [the LAPD's] acts would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from participating in future
First Amendment activities.
'" 20 1
If government intent to chill speech can be found
when law enforcement officials call environmental activists
"terrorists" and otherwise spread misinformation about
their group, 20 2 it is equally likely that the intent to chill
could be found when mayors and police officials liken
protesters to terrorists and say that they take to the streets to
get arrested.20 3 If a person of ordinary firmness would be
chilled from engaging in free speech because a coach is
harassing her son, 204 then a partygoer would be deterred
from protected expression because he was arrested after
saying "I can't believe what is happening" while police
were breaking up a party. 20 5 If a mayor's campaign against
topless bars and their owners, silences the expression of a
policeman's paramour, 206  then surely assaulting
201 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, No. CV-01-6877 FMV (granting in part and
denying in part defendants' motion for summary judgment).
202 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1287-88.
203 See supra Part III.A.
204 Cain, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
205 Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
206 Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74 (2d. Cir. 1998). To be accurate,
the court here did not find a First Amendment violation, in part because
the plaintiff's 89-page complaint was "an omnium gatherum,
obsessively repetitious, overwrought in tone, and organized like a front
hall closet." Id. at 82. But the court affirmed in part the lower court's
judgment denying the public official defendants' motion to dismiss on
grounds of qualified immunity, giving the plaintiff another chance to
replead "in a way that would organize the issues." Id. In another case
decided on the same doctrine, neighbors opposed to a Berkeley,
California, multi-family housing proposal expressed their concerns
publicly that the project would house substance-abusing or mentally
disabled persons. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
The neighbors wrote the Berkeley City Council, spoke out at public
meetings, and published a newsletter critical of the project, prompting
an eight-month investigation by local officials of the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who believed that the
neighbors had violated the Fair Housing Act by distributing
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demonstrators with pepper spray, shooting them with
rubber bullets, rounding them up in plastic orange nets, and
detaining them in substandard conditions would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from returning to the streets to
engage in protected expression. 20 7  As previously
mentioned, a court found it plausible that some LAPD
actions did just that during the 2000 Democratic National
Convention. 2 8 Therefore, even taking into account the
need to maintain street order and security, the vast array of
recent government actions taken against protesters, as
described in Part III, supra, so chill expression that they
readily could be found to deter a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in future protected speech. Thus,
these actions arguably violate the First Amendment.
V. Fencing the Public Forum: Protest Pens,
Viewpoint Exclusion, Privatization
Harsh street tactics are not the only governmental
acts that have taken a toll on First Amendment expression.
The government has further muted voices of dissent in
"discriminatory" newsletters and flyers. Id. at 1220, 1221 (internal
quotation marks omitted). During the investigation, HUD officials
interrogated the neighbors
under threat of subpoena about their views and public
statements regarding the challenged project; directed them to
produce an array of documents and information, including all
involved parties' names, addresses, and telephone numbers
and all correspondence or other documents relating to their
efforts in opposition to the project; informed them and a major
metropolitan newspaper that they had violated the Fair
Housing Act; and advised them to accept a "conciliation
proposal" that required them to cease all litigation and the
distribution of "discriminatory" newsletters and flyers.
Id. at 1220. The court concluded that the HUD's actions "would have
chilled or silenced" a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
future activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1229.
207 See supra Part Il.B.
208 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
56
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 196
public places by eliminating key portions of the public
forum, relegating dissenters to portions of the public forum
that are less visible to the targets of their speech than
portions accorded supporters of the government's policies
or non-allied members of the public, and yanking the forum
for expression out from under the public's feet through
privatization.
A. Protest Pens: The Ghettoization of
Demonstration
20 9
Protest pens, otherwise known as protest zones or
demonstration zones, essentially are a legacy of the WTO
protests in Seattle.21 °  Courts have split on the
constitutionality of their use. To the extent to which they
keep protesters at a distance from their intended audience
and hinder the protestors' ability to communicate their
message, they have been struck down. For example, in Bay
Area Peace Navy v. United States,2 1 1 a case that preceded
the WTO protests by nearly a decade, the plaintiffs, a group
of boaters, displayed their disagreement with U.S. military
policy by displaying signs, having children sing anti-war
songs, and conducting a theatrical production on their
vessels in front of a San Francisco pier from which high
government officials were watching a parade of Naval
ships. 212 The government claimed that a 75- to 100-yard
buffer around the pier imposed by the Coast Guard was
213needed to protect against terrorist acts. However, the
court found that the buffer zone was not narrowly tailored
because it "burden[ed] substantially more speech than
209 Mitchell, supra note 11 at *38.
210 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
211 914 F.2d 1224.
212 The demonstrators paraded in formation in pleasure craft ranging
from kayaks to 30-foot boats while the Naval display took place farther
out in the San Francisco Bay. Id. at 1225-26.
113 Id. at 1227.
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[was] necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests." 214 The court found the government's argument
unpersuasive because its references to terrorist or other
violent incidents were unrelated to events in the San
Francisco area (or even in the United States). It upheld a
lower court injunction limiting the buffer zone to no more
than 25 yards. 215  Some subsequent decisions have
followed this court's reasoning.
1. Protest Zones Found
Unconstitutional
Haunted by images of Seattle in 1999, Los Angeles
officials the following year developed a 185-acre security
zone around the venue for the Democratic National
Convention, relegating demonstrators to a protest pen 260
yards away. 216 In Service Employee International Union v.
City of Los Angeles, the court granted an injunction against
the security zone because its vastness did not render it
narrowly tailored enough to serve the government's
significant interest in delegate safety. The court also
reasoned that the distant protest pen did not provide an
217adequate alternate means of communication. According
to the court, "although it may be more convenient for
delegates to have exclusive access to the immediate area,
convenience can never predominate over the First
Amendment." 218  The court further noted that the time
restriction against speech would have been "absolute" had
the 185-acre security zone been built because it would have
214 Id. at 1227 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). The Peace Navy's
message could not effectively be conveyed at a distance of 75 yards
"because the audience on the pier could neither read the banners nor
hear the boatload of children singing." Id. at 1226.215 Id. at 1226, 1227-28, 1231.216 Service Employee Int'l Union, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968, 971.
217 I. at 971-72.
218 Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
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blocked expressive activities 24 hours a day.2 19
Acknowledging that the content neutrality of the security
area was not argued, the court nonetheless noted that it
"ha[d] its doubts regarding the zone's neutrality" because
free speech would have been permitted in the zone only to
those with access. 220  The court in Stauber v. City of New
221 222York 1 also shared this view.
The Stauber court agreed that the use of protest
pens is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's
interest in public order because it places an unreasonable
limit on the movement of demonstrators. 223 The New York
Police Department (NYPD) has created large pens using
interlocking metal barricades that run the length of the
219id.
220 Id. at 970 n. 1.
221 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350.
222 "Had the plaintiffs objected that particular police officers were
making decisions relating to the provision of access information or to
ingress and egress [to the protest pens used in a 2003 anti-war
demonstration in New York] for reasons relating to the content of the
demonstrator's speech, the objection would be appropriate. The
plaintiffs, however, have made no such objection." Id at *60.
Professor Mitchell expresses a similar view, offering the following
provocative queries:
If the streets 'from time immemorial' have been the place
where people debate and discuss, protest and rally, then how is
it that now it is only on some streets (or even some parts of the
streets) where this is possible, while on other streets - the
streets where the decisions are made that direct our lives - the
right to dissident speech is outlawed outright? Indeed, in the
end, isn't protest zoning really just a way of controlling the
content of debate without really acknowledging that that is
what is being done, by, for example, privileging the right of
WTO ministers to meet [in Seattle] and to speak over the right
of protest groups to contest that speech?
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
223 Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *80. Because the court
found that the city's restriction was not narrowly tailored, it declined to
reach whether the city provided adequate alternative means of
expression. Id.
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block and have an exit at one end.224 When a pen fills up
with protesters, the police physically close off the entrance
and require participants to enter a pen farther from the
center of the demonstration.225  As a result, protesters
cannot leave the pens, even to use the restroom or to get
food or water, without risking separation from those with
whom they attended; at times, police block access
altogether, driving people to give up and leave.226 Thus,
some groups have tried to keep their events small and omit
the use of a sound system to avoid NYPD involvement.
227
The Stauber court enjoined the NYPD's use of the pens
because the practice unreasonably restricted access to and
participation in protests.228
While the constitutionality of the use of protest pens
frequently turns, in significant part, on whether those
engaged in political speech are able to effectively reach
their audience, 229 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also considered the importance of the location of
speech as a component of its content in determining the
230constitutionality of time, place, and manner restrictions.
The court in Galvin ruled that the government's relegation
of a San Francisco prayer group that was protesting the
demolition of housing on federal land to a protest pen 150
to 175 yards away from the originally selected location was
not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest.
231
The court found that where location is "an essential part of
the message sought to be conveyed," a court must consider
224 Id. at *6, *25-*26. Protesters are expected to assemble in the pens,
which may hold about 4,000 people "shoulder-to-shoulder" per block.
Id. at *25.
225 Id. at *25-*27.
226 Furthermore, "once pens are full, people experience considerable
problems getting out of the pens." Id. at *26.
7 Id. at *28.
228 Id. at *95.
229 See infra Part V.B. 1.
230 Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 749-56 (9th Cir. 2004).
231 Id. at 743.
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the degree to which the regulation in question distorts the
message.232 The court concluded that "there [was] a strong
First Amendment interest in protecting the right of citizens
to gather in traditional public forum locations that [were]
critical to the content of their message, just as there [was] a
strong interest in protecting speakers seeking to reach a
particular audience."
233
232 Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that choice of communicative aspects, message,
and manner are best left to the individual. Id. at 750 (citing Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)) (presuming that
speakers, not the government, best know what they want to say and
how to say it). Unfortunately, a New York district court failed to
follow this policy, allowing the government to determine how a protest
was to be held, rather than allowing the planners to decide. United for
Peace & Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d. 19 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Specifically, the court upheld New York City's restriction of an
antiwar demonstration in a plaza rather than a march along city streets.
Id. at 20-21, 30-31. The plaintiffs argued that a march is a "time
honored tradition in New York City and perhaps the single most
important method of demonstrating large public support for a particular
cause." Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true that a
district court in New York, located in the Second Circuit, need not
follow the Ninth Circuit in which the Galvin case was decided.
However, the view expressed in Galvin that a court must consider the
extent to which a regulation distorts a group's message, where location
is an essential part of the message, is persuasive authority in a case with
facts such as those in United for Peace & Justice. The demonstrators
chose the street as a venue for their march, and they did so to
communicate that as many as 100,000 or more New Yorkers are so
opposed to the war in Iraq that they are willing to brave the frigid
February weather to communicate this sentiment. Id. at 20, 30. Under
the rule in Galvin, the government has no business taking that choice
away. Perhaps this New York court is too caught up in the fear of
terrorism that has pervaded government since the September 11, 2001
attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The court cited
"heightened security concerns due to September 11 th" as a reason for
upholding the city's prohibition on the antiwar march. Id. at 28-29.
Because they live at the site of the major portion of the September 11 th
attacks, it is understandable that some New Yorkers continue to live in
fear that their city may be targeted for another attack producing a mass
loss of life. However, that does not rightly provide an excuse for the
government to place excessive limits on core political expression, as
allowed by the court in United for Peace & Justice.
233 Id. at 752.
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2. Hollow Victory: Dissenters
Reduced to Negotiating for the
Public Forum
Both the Stauber and the Service Employees
International Union courts reached the correct result by
finding that the cities' practices unconstitutionally
restricted free expression. Professor Mitchell argues that
the latter case, which was decided in 2000 just months after
the WTO protests in Seattle, turned out to be a hollow
victory for free-speech advocates. 234  While the Los
Angeles protesters won the ability to demonstrate near the
targets of their speech, the case leaves future groups in the
position of having to negotiate with government officials
over which part of the public forum the government will
allow them to engage in protected speech.235
One protest group that sought to demonstrate on the
Great Lawn in New York's Central Park declined to
negotiate over geography. The court refused to grant an
injunction overturning the city's denial of a permit to use
the Great Lawn for a protest against the 2004 Republican
National Convention. 236 The court seemed almost huffy at
the groups' refusal to negotiate stating, "Simply because
234 Mitchell, supra note 11, at 37.
235 As a result of the case,
[A]dvocates of speech rights [are reduced] to arguing the fine
points of geography, pouring [sic] over maps to determine just
where protest may occur. Protesters are put entirely on the
defensive, always seeking to justify why their voices should
be heard and their actions seen, always having to make a claim
that it is not unreasonable to assert that protest should be
allowed in a place where those being protested against can
actually hear it, and always having to "bend" their tactics-
and their rights-to fit a legal regime that in every case sees
protest subordinate to "the general order" (which, of course,
really means the "established order").
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *37.236 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
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Plaintiffs feel that no other location in New York City is
worthy of their cause . . . does not make it So.,,237 In
another case, an organization of dissenters in Philadelphia
found themselves having to negotiate with police and
Secret Service agents for "the right to demonstrate on [a]
public sidewalk" across the street from a facility that the
President was expected to visit.238 And another group that
attempted to negotiate a protest route for the 2004
Democratic National Convention in Boston got stuck with a
deal so raw that the court itself wrote, "A written
description cannot begin to convey the ambience of the
[demonstration zone] a space redolent of the sensibility
conveyed in Piranesi's etchings published as Fanciful
Images of Prisons.,
2 39
3. Protest Zones Upheld
Perhaps the most significant protest zone case is
that in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld a 50-block "No Protest Zone" in Seattle during the
2401999 WTO meeting in a split decision. The court held
that the Local Proclamation of Civil Emergency Order No.
3, which imposed a limited curfew on downtown Seattle
streets, was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.
241
237 Id. at 271.
238 Amended Complaint, Acorn v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312,
para. 40 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2004), available at
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/acom-edpa-d 10.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Acorn Complaint].
239 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
240 Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1156. The term "No Protest Zone" was used
by city officials, police, and demonstrators to refer to the area in which
anti-WTO demonstrations expressions were banned, but the dissent in
Menotti noted that city officials changed its name to "restricted zone"
once "word came out" that "No Protest Zone" was an "inappropriate
term." Id. at 1158 n.1 (Paez, C.J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 1124-25, 1142-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon
determining that the "No Protest Zone" was a valid time, place, and
manner restriction, the court declined to consider whether banning
protest in downtown Seattle constituted a prior restraint.
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The majority in Menotti argued that demonstrators had
ample alternate means of communicating their message
both via the media, and because hotels where some WTO
delegates were staying were located outside the "No Protest
Zone." 242 But Judge Paez, writing in dissent, had the better
argument, calling Order No. 3 an "affront to First
Amendment protections. 243  Specifically, Judge Paez
found that Order No. 3 was not narrowly tailored to serve
the government's interest in security because the "No
Protest Zone" "purposely encompassed every place [where
protesters] could hope to communicate to delegates.",
244
Moreover, Judge Paez pointed out that the court had struck
down much smaller buffer zones in the past. 245 The dissent
also found that Order No. 3 did not leave open ample
alternate venues for speech, concluding that "an entire
medium of speech was foreclosed and the WTO protestors
were silenced and relegated to the sidelines. 246
Furthermore, the order was sufficiently vague as to allow
the official charged with enforcing the regulation unduly
broad discretion. 24 7 As to this latter point, the examples
242 Id. at 1139 n.49, 1142 n.54.
243 Id. at 1170. It appears that the majority in Menotti may have felt
either that the dissent was persuasive or was not so secure in its own
reasoning. The majority opinion is peppered with an unusual number
of lengthy footnotes disputing points made by the dissent.
244 Id. at 1168. Judge Paez points out that Order No. 3 lasted longer
than necessary, and that Mayor Schell signed the order in the early
morning hours of December 1, 1999, "long after both violence and
protest activity had subsided." Id. at 1168 n. 9.
45 Id. at 1168, 1168 n. 11 (citing Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at
1127 (75-yard buffer zone surrounding naval ships in a parade too
large, and 25-yard zone would suffice to serve security interests);
United States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
150- to 175-yard distance from entrance to visitor center); Kuba v. 1-A
Agric. Ass'n, 387 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir. 2004) (restricting protesters
to small locations more than 200 feet from venue entrance which was
not narrowly tailored)).246 Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1173.
247 Id. at 1174. Seattle's then-Police Chief Stamper admitted that Order
No. 3 was sufficiently vague that "it made it difficult from a working
cop's point of view to distinguish between who should and who should
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Judge Paez proffered in his dissent show that the police
used this discretion to practice de facto viewpoint
discrimination, keeping anyone who evinced any sort of
anti-WTO message out of the "No Protest Zone.",
248
Five years later, city leaders of Boston, with ghosts
of Seattle no doubt dancing in their heads, put forth a
cavalcade of restrictions that could serve as a checklist of
schemes designed to abridge free expression. First, the city
shut down a federal building adjacent to the convention
venue, as well as the subway, the principal railway station
serving routes to other parts of New England, the Charles
River, and even an Interstate highway for several hours
before and after the convention's daily activities.24 9 On the
not be left out." Id. at 1175.
248 See id. at 1162-67. The story of Martha Ehman is illustrative; she
was an attorney who worked within the "No Protest Zone." Dressed
causually, she was walking to work behind three people in business
suits who passed into the zone without incident. Id. at 1163. Officers
asked where she was going, then allowed her to pass when she told
them where she worked. Id. Once they noticed the words "No WTO"
written in masking tape on her backpack, officers required her to
remove the message or face arrest. Id. In another example, police
refused entry into the zone for a partner at a downtown law office while
he carryied an anti-WTO sign, even after he explained that he owned a
business within the zone; yet, after getting rid of the sign, he walked
through another checkpoint without incident. Id. A schoolteacher
carrying signs that read "Free Trade is Slave Trade" and "Global Cops
for Global Corps" was stopped even though she was outside the "No
Protest Zone." She was surrounded by four or five officers, who ripped
anti-WTO signs off her clothing and backpack, took the signs she was
carrying and broke them, then threatened her with arrest if she did not
"be quiet and leave." Id. at 1164-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ironically, the city could have used mobile police teams known as
"flying squads" whose duty was to identify and arrest vandals and
violent protesters while leaving the tens of thousands of non-violent
demonstrators to engage in free expression. Id. at 1172. Instead, these
squads were pulled off that duty and ordered to join fixed police lines
within an hour of arriving on the street. Id. "As a result, the relatively
small number of vandals could destroy property without threat of
arrest." Id. (quoting internal police report) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
249 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 65. Surely, if all public transportation
is shut down and auto traffic is compromised by actions as severe as
freeway closures, fewer individuals inclined to express dissenting
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few public streets surrounding the convention site that were
not cut off from public access, the city placed a severe limit
on the number of people allowed to demonstrate. 21 Only a
twenty-foot strip of a main street leading to the convention
site was made available to the public but was cut off from
delegates and officials by an eight-foot-high fence covered
with a material designed to prevent visibility, therefore
even those small demonstration groups located in streets
open to the public were not seen by their intended
audience, the delegates and officials on the other side.25'
If that was not enough to deter those intent on
expressing dissent, the worst horrors were reserved for
participants with the fortitude to enter the demonstration
zone. The zone "conveys the symbolic sense of a holding
pen where potentially dangerous persons are separated
from others. 252  It is "a place ... not just on the wrong
side of the tracks but literally under them."' 253 Its capacity
was a paltry 1,000 people. 254 The "roof' of the zone was,
at best, as high as an average adult and was supported by a
"forest of girders." 255  The tracks above were bedecked
with razor wire and patrolled by armed police and National
Guard officers. 256  The portion of the zone not located
under the tracks was covered overhead by mesh netting.
257
More significant than the demonstration zone's profoundly
views will be willing or even able to transport themselves to the
convention venue to protest.
250 "Anywhere in the soft zone, leafleting and small stationary
demonstrations of 20 persons or less may be conducted without a
permit. Demonstrations of between 21 and 50 people require a permit."
Id. Police would not let any more than 12,000 protestors in all of the
side streets combined. Id. at 66.
251 Id. at 65-66.
252 Id. at 74-75.
253 Id. at 74.
254 The city calculated that 4,000 protestors would fit, but under
questioning by the court, conceded that it "must limit the capacity ..
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oppressive nature, however, the remote chance the
delegates would see or hear demonstrators, because the
demonstration zone was set off by a double set of cement
barriers, each topped by eight-foot chain-link fences.
258
The outer fence was covered with mesh supposedly to
prevent liquids from being squirted into the protected area,
but which actually had the effect of impairing visibility,
and altogether preventing leafleting. 25 9 This last effect of
the city's multitude of restrictions, that no one was able to
pass leaflets to delegates and their guests, should fail
constitutional scrutiny because the "[f]reedom to distribute
information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive
it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that,
putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of
time and manner of distribution, it must be fully
preserved.,260  Banishing participants behind a double
fence that resembles a prison holding area goes well
beyond the reasonable police and health regulations
suggested by the Struthers court.
261
258 id.
259 According to the court,
Delegates and invited guests arriving or departing via buses on
the opposite or eastern bus row of the terminal will have
essentially no visibility from or to the [demonstration zone]
because of the distance and the mesh screen. By contrast,
those arriving or departing via buses in the western row may
be able to hear and, to some extent, see demonstrators in the
[demonstration zone], depending on precisely which bus they
take and whether they walk in relative proximity to the
[demonstration zone] fence. It will be, however, completely
impossible to pass a leaflet . . . to a delegate or other
[convention] guest, even one who wants to approach the edge
of the [demonstration zone] to receive the literature.
Id. at 68.
260 Struthers, 319 U.S. at 146-47.
261 See id. Struthers concerned an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
distribution of leaflets. If the state is constitutionally disallowed from
prohibiting distribution of circulars door-to-door, then arguably it
cannot, with constitutional blessing, completely prevent dissidents from
passing handbills to important government officials and their guests.
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Nonetheless, in Bl(a)ck Tea Society, the court
262upheld Boston's security scheme, even though it
admitted that it could not find that the restrictions on
prospective protesters were narrowly tailored.263  The
court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgement
that the Stauber court "considered detailed evidence"
before enjoining the use of protest pens in New York,264
and despite the design of the Boston demonstration zone
being labeled "an offense to the spirit of the First
Amendment" and "a brutish and potentially unsafe place
for citizens who wish to exercise their First Amendment
rights. 265 To justify its decision, the court cited a 1986
case upholding barricades to protect those exercising their
First Amendment rights "from those who would prevent its
exercise., 266  The court also based its decision on "past
experience at comparable events" such as the 2000
Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles.267 These
latter reasons do not provide strong support for issuing a
ruling that the court admits falls shy of constitutional
scrutiny, especially since newspaper accounts from Los
Id. at 149.
262 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d. at 77. A more recent case distinguished
Coalition, fnding that a regulation which kept demonstrators between
260 and 265 feet away from the targets of their speech was
unconstitutional. Kuba, 387 F.3d at 854, 863. The Kuba court found
that the government's interest in preventing traffic congestion and
ensuring public safety were significant, but "less weighty" than the
"substantial" interest found in the Bl(a)ck Tea Society case. Id. at 858
n.9 (citing Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.
2004)).
263 Coalition, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
2 Id. at 74.
265 Id. at 76.
266 Id. at 74 (quoting Oliveri v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 607 (2d Cir.
1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
267 Id. at 75. The court also based its decision on affidavits from law
enforcement personnel and information the United States government
gave the court regarding specific intelligence concerning security
threats kept under seal. Because the plaintiff was unable to confront
the information, the court did not rely on it in making its decision. Id.
at 75 n.2.
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Angeles in 2000 reveal that there were no major injuries
and minimal property damage during the Convention
protests.268
The First Circuit expressed its disagreement with
this viewpoint by upholding the Bl(a)ck Tea Society
decision, but the court should be criticized for doing so.
First, while it correctly characterized time, place, or manner
analysis as "intermediate scrutiny," 269 the court applied a
standard closer to a rational basis test. 27  Second, the
appellate panel raised the same concerns as the lower court
regarding harm done during past large gatherings such as
those in 2000 in Los Angeles, which amounted to little
more than injuries sustained by protesters and
journalists. 271 Yet, the court failed to list specific violent
incidents to justify its concerns. 272 Therefore, unlike the
268 The only injuries reported in Los Angeles were to demonstrators at
the hands of police. See, e.g., William Booth & Rene Sanchez, 2,000
Rally in Streets Against Sweatshops, THE WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2000,
at A25 ("Dozens of protesters ... have been struck by rubber bullets
that police have fired into crowds twice this week."); Paul Pringle,
Week of Demonstrations Closes with Minor Injuries, 190 Arrests, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2000, at A23 ("Some demonstrators
threw rocks and bottles at the police. Officers dispersed the crowd with
batons, pepper spray and rubber bullets, injuring numerous protesters
and journalists."). See also Jim Newton, Police, Critics Clash Over
Use of Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2000, at Al ("no serious injuries, a
smattering of property damage"); V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J.
Schodolski, Immigrants, The Rights of Workers Top Final Rally, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2000, at 15 (indicating no reports of serious injury).269 Bl(a)ck Tea Society, 378 F.3d at 12.
270 Id. at 13 ("We turn next to the City's goal, mindful that the
government's judgment as to the best means for achieving its legitimate
objectives deserves considerable respect.").
271 See supra note 268.
272 See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc'y, 378 F.3d at 14. According to the court,
While a government agency charged with public safety
responsibilities ought not turn a blind eye to past experience, it
likewise ought not impose harsh burdens on the basis of
isolated past events. And in striking this balance, trial courts
should remember that heavier burdens on speech must, in
general, be justified by more cogent evidentiary predicates.
On this hastily assembled record, the quantum of "threat"
69
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 209
decisions in Stauber and Service Employees International
Union,273 the First Circuit found that Boston's security
measures, "though extreme," were narrowly tailored and
left open viable alternative means of communication.
274
This conclusion is open to question.
275
B. Viewpoint Discrimination in "Pro-Con"
Cases
Besides employing the constitutionally dubious
tactic of corralling protesters into fenced-off cordons
evidence was sufficient to allow the trier to weigh it in the
balance.
Id. The court continued:
The City claims that the risk of harm was substantial. It
designed the elaborate security measures here at issue in light
of recent past experience with large demonstrations, including
those at the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los
Angeles. The double ranks of fencing were meant to deter
attempts to break through the fence; the liquid dispersal mesh
was intended to protect the delegates from being sprayed with
liquids; and the overhead netting was added to prevent
demonstrators from hurling projectiles. Conduct of this type
admittedly has occurred at a number of recent protests.
Id. at 13. Note that there was no report of attempts to break through the
security fence in Los Angeles in 2000. On the other hand, the author of
this article, then a reporter covering the demonstrations at the 2000
convention, interviewed one man who had been shot six times with
plastic bullets for attempting to climb the fence to post a sign. The
bullets caused quarter-sized welts on his shirtless torso.
273 See supra Part V.A. 1.
274 Bl(a)ck Tea Soc 'y, 378 F.3d at 14.
275 The alternate means of communication mentioned by the court are
dubious. Principally, the court said the delegates could get the
dissidents' message through the television, radio, the press, the Internet,
and other outlets. Id. But for reasons discussed in Part II.B., supra,
these methods do not constitute a viable alternative for citizens of
modest means and are no substitute for street advocacy. Professor
Mitchell concludes, "[N]o matter what the courts say and no matter
how carefully police and the courts together draw the lines of protest,
creating a geography of rights . . . can be frankly oppressive."
Mitchell, supra note 11, at *42.
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sanitaires,276 the government has also engaged in obvious
viewpoint discrimination 277 by creating special protest pens
into which dissidents are shunted. The special protest pens
are distant and often hidden from the protesters' target of
speech, while demonstrators who favor government policy
are allowed within view of elected officials. A variant
from this "pro-con" approach would be to simply banish all
demonstrators of whatever stripe from the public official's
view and allow only those who do not express an opinion
to be located closer to the official.278 While this trend has
accelerated where opponents of President George W.
Bush's policies have attempted to make their views known
to the President, the practice is rooted in the early years of
the Clinton administration.
In Johnson v. Bax,279 a critic of Clinton stood at a
New York street comer near where the President was
speaking, bearing a sign that read "Mr. Clinton: STOP
276 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
277 Justice Kennedy reminds us that viewpoint discrimination is "an
egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
829. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) ("The principle that has emerged from our
cases 'is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others."') (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
278 This happened, for example, in Seattle following the 1999 WTO
protests that were marred by a small minority's vandalism spree. See
supra note 102. Seattle's mayor called in the National Guard to clear
the streets, declared a state of emergency, and closed public spaces in a
25-block area of the city to all including those who objected to WTO
globalization policies except residents, owners and employees of
businesses, emergency personnel, and, more interestingly from a
viewpoint-discrimination standpoint, WTO delegates (presumably
advocates of WTO policies) and shoppers (presumably voicing no
opinion regarding WTO policies). Mitchell, supra note 11, at *33-*34.
Thus, the mayor's street-closure order amounted to a pro-con scheme
whereby pro-WTO delegates and those with no opinion were allowed
in the very public places from which V/TO opponents were excluded.
279 No. 93 Civ. 3530, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8850, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 25, 1996) (granting an order for a preliminary injunction).
71
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 211
CAMPAIGNING AND LEAD! '280  Police told the critic
he had to go to a designated protest zone. When he
resisted, the police took away his sign, thereby committing
a "clear violation" of his free-speech rights. 28 The critic
made another sign, returned to the street comer, was again
told to leave and refused, and was subsequently arrested.282
Police set up "pro" and "anti" demonstration areas, with
which the court had no quarrel, but because police, rather
than the demonstrators themselves, were the ones directing
demonstrators into the pens based on the content of their
speech, the court found the practice impermissible.283
The Bax court noted that while "spectators" who
cheered in support were allowed to stand across the street
from the President, dissenters were kept at least 75 yards
284away at all times. This practice, the court indicated,
appeared to be an unconstitutional discrimination, but the
court was not prepared to rule on this issue.285 While the
police in Bax kept dissidents 75 yards from President
Clinton, which would appear to be unconstitutional under
Bay Area Peace Navy, 286  the George W. Bush
Administration has required dissenters to be as far as one
half mile away from where the President is speaking, while
allowing supporters and those expressing no opinion to
remain closer.2 87  Faithful to Orwellian tradition, these
280 d. at *2.
281 Id. at *1-2. "The fact that the destruction of Mr. Johnson's sign
was a violation of his First Amendment rights has not been disputed
and the fact that the police officers knowingly violated his right is
evidenced by the professed inability of any of the officers to remember
who took the sign." Id. at *3-*4.
282 The court also found the arrest a "clear violation" of the plaintiff's
First Amendment rights. Police claimed they arrested him for blocking
the sidewalk, but the court found that the record "clearly refutes" the
claim, in part because one of the officers gave testimony that "is not
true." Id. at *3, *4-*6.
283 Id. at *8.
2 4 Id. at *9-* 10 (granting an order for a preliminary injunction).
285 Id. at *10.
286 See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
287 "These zones routinely succeed in keeping protesters out of
72
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 212
remote protest pens have been dubbed "designated free
speech" or "First Amendment" zones.
288
1. Dissenters Hidden from
Presidential Motorcade
In 2002, for example, police cleared the motorcade
path of all protest signs when President Bush went to
Pittsburgh. While the police allowed supporters to line the
route, they required dissidents to move to a distant baseball
field designated especially for them. 289 Furthermore,
police confiscated the sign of one participant, who was
arrested for disorderly conduct and detained until the
President had left town. 290 A court threw out the disorderly
conduct charge. 291 During a hearing, the arresting officer
admitted that he had been instructed by the Secret Service
to direct some protesters, but not others, into the fenced-in
zone. 292  Regarding the zone, the arrestee later told a
reporter for Salon, "I could see these people behind the
fence, with their faces up against it, and their hands on the
wire.... It looked more like a concentration camp than a
free speech area to me, so I said, 'I'm not going in there. I
thought the whole country was a free speech area.",,
293
The Pittsburgh case is not an isolated incident. One
presidential sight and outside the view of the media covering the
event." Bovard, supra note 114.
288 Id.; Complaint, Elend v. Sun Dome Inc., No. 8:03-CV-1657-T-
23TGW, para. 14 (M.D. Fla. 2005), available at
http://www.voiceoffreedom.com/archives/protestzonefinalcomplaint/fn
lprotestzone.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
289 Bovard, supra note 114.
290 Id.; Transcript of Proceeding, Commonwealth v. Neel, (Oct. 31,
2002) available at http://homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/neel-




293 David Lindoff, Keeping Dissent Invisible,
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2003/ 10/16/secretservice/index
_np.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
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protest group provided a court with fifteen examples from
all over the country. 2 94 For example, two grandmothers
were arrested for displaying handwritten signs critical of
President Bush after declining to go to a designated zone
hundreds of yards from the entrance to the venue the
president visited.295 In South Carolina, police arrested a
man on "trespassing" charges for holding a "No War For
Oil" sign among hundreds of Bush supporters. 296 He had
refused to remove himself to the designated zone a half
mile from where President Bush was to speak. 297 Although
the state dropped the trespassing charges because they did
not apply to public property, the federal government
remained undaunted and charged the defendant with
entering a restricted area around the President of the United
States, a rarely-enforced law carrying a penalty of six
months incarceration or a $5000 fine. 298 There could not
be a clearer case of content discrimination, considering a
police officer told the defendant, "[I]t's the content of your
sign that's the problem."
299
In addition, an Indiana man who stood near the
entrance to a venue at which Vice President Dick Cheney
was to speak displayed a sign that read "Cheney, 19th
Century Energy Man." He was arrested on disorderly
conduct charges after refusing to move to a protest zone
500 feet from the entrance. 30 0 In this case, the court found
that the protest zone was not narrowly tailored to serve the
government's interest in safety at the event. 30 1 Moreover,
the court concluded that the protest zone did not constitute
an adequate alternate channel of communication because its
294 Acorn v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-4312, 2004 U.S. District
LEXIS 8446, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2004).




299 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
300 Blair v. City of Evansville, 361 F. Supp. 2d 846 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
31Id. at 859.
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500-foot distance from the venue's parking facilities and
entrance "significantly curtailed" the plaintiffs ability to
convey his message to event patrons, a key component of
his intended audience. 30 2 The government has engaged in
blatant viewpoint discrimination, as the foregoing examples
illustrate, by relegating dissenters to distant designated
zones while allowing supporters and others to be within
view of the President. Furthermore, in at least one
instance, police even forbade the media from entering a
protest area to speak to dissidents and banned protestors
from exiting the zone to express themselves to the
media. 303
2. Court Declines to Enjoin Practices
In Philadelphia, a dissident organization sought to
enjoin the government from keeping its members further
away from the President than where supporters were
allowed.30 4 In one instance, a police line forced dissenting
protesters to stay a third of a block from where a
presidential motorcade was to pass, but allowed supporters
to stand closer. 30 5 In another, police parked several large
vans directly in front of dissenting protesters, ensuring that
the President was unlikely to see them. 306 Government
officials in Philadelphia were subject to a consent decree,
issued in 1988, permanently enjoining them from barring
leafleting and sign-carrying based on the messages
communicated.30 7  The plaintiffs in Acorn sought
declaratory, as well as injunctive relief and an order
requiring government officials to comply with the 1988
302id.
303 Bovard, supra note 114.
304 Acorn, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8446, at *2-*3.
305 Acorn Complaint at paras. 25, 34, 35, 37, 44-46.
306 d.307 Acorn, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *I -'*2.
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consent decree. 30 8 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
based on a lack of standing, 30 9 despite conceding that the
government "may indeed have violated" the protesters'
rights. 310  The plaintiffs were unable to show a concrete
likelihood that the government would violate their
constitutional rights, or to specify future dates and times of
official events at which violations were likely to occur. 311
While the Acorn court denied a dissident group
standing for purposes of an injunction, the court in Stauber
v. City of New York 3 12 found that the New York Civil
Liberties Union (NYCLU) had standing because it
sponsored protest events in the past and planned to do so in
the future. 3 13  The Stauber court further found that the
plaintiffs in that case sufficiently alleged impairment for
the purposes of standing by demonstrating that the
challenged government practices "may prevent the NYCLU
from expressing its message as forcefully as it would in the
absence of the practices." 314 Clearly, the standard followed
in Stauber requiring that plaintiffs show they are in the
business of sponsoring political-speech events and that the
government may impair their expressions, is less stringent
than the specification of future events by time and date
required in Acorn. Thus, Stauber enunciated the more
correct and just standard. The Acorn court effectively
conceded that its standard is unlikely to be met when it
noted that plaintiffs "usually cannot learn of the scheduling
of such events in sufficient time to enable them to obtain
judicial relief.
315
Moreover, the Acorn court appears to improperly
308 Id. at *3-*4
309 Id. at *7.
310 Id. at *7.
311 Id. at *6-*7. "In my view, plaintiffs' claims are too amorphous to
be justiciable at this point in time." Id. at *7.
312 See Stauber, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350.
313 Id. at *40.
314 id.
315 Acorn, 2004 U.S. District LEXIS 8446, at *5.
76
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 216
rely on the fact that Secret Service regulations forbid its
agents from regulating speech based on viewpoint.
316
Essentially, the court instructs the plaintiffs to sue
individual Secret Service agents over First Amendment
violations, finding that "no useful purpose would be
served" by entering a declaratory judgment to the effect
that the Secret Service must not engage in viewpoint
discrimination 317 This finding is questionable, as "the
internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not
mandated by statute or the constitution, do not confer
substantive rights on any party." 318 Because the internal
regulations of the Secret Service were unlikely to confer
rights on the plaintiffs, the declaratory judgment that the
Acorn plaintiffs sought would have served a useful
purpose.
Courts in the future should not follow Acorn, but
should look to Stauber for guidance. If courts follow
Acorn, most protest groups will be unable to specify a
future likelihood of viewpoint discrimination required by
that court, despite ample evidence that the Secret Service is
engaging in a practice of banishing dissenters to remote
fields or pens while allowing supporters to congregate
much closer to the President. Furthermore, this issue
should be heard by the Supreme Court; otherwise, the
President could elude dissenters by avoiding or rarely
visiting those jurisdictions which, through their equitable
powers, might forbid the Secret Service from violating the
Constitution. Better yet, Congress could accomplish the
goal of requiring equal treatment of all who engage in
political speech by passing a statute that punishes
government officials who discriminate by viewpoint with
316 Id. at *6. "[T]he Secret Service has elaborate written guidelines
which specifically provide for non-discrimination on the basis of the
views sought to be expressed by the protesters." Id.
317 Id. at *6. Agents who violate Secret Service policy cannot
successfully assert a qualified-immunity defense. Id.
318 See, e.g., United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir.
1990).
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sanctions like incarceration or stiff fines.
C. Privatization: Theft of the Public Forum
While determining whether an outdoor space is a
street, sidewalk, or park, and thus a traditional public
forum, should not raise many questions, the advent of
public-private partnerships as a substitute for public
investment has begun to blur the line between public and
private spaces. While the Supreme Court is not likely to
countenance an outright ban on expression in traditionally
public places, it has allowed speech restrictions on private
property, even if heavily trafficked by the public. For
example, after Congress stripped certain free-speech
activities from the Supreme Court building and grounds,
the Court responded by declaring the law unconstitutional
when applied to the sidewalks surrounding the building.
319
The Court pointed out that there was no fence or other form
of delineation that marked the sidewalks surrounding the
Court's grounds as "some special type of enclave."
320
Congress "may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the 'public
forum' status of streets and parks which have historically
been public forums."
321
319 "The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court
grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such
for First Amendment purposes." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
180 (1983). The statute at issue provided, "It shall be unlawful to
parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme
Court Building or grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or
device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party,
organization, or movement." Id. at 173 (quoting 63 Stat. 617 § 6)
codified at 40 U.S.C. § 13k).
2°Id. at 180.
321 Id. (quoting United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic
Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
According to the court,
The inclusion of the public sidewalks within the scope of
[section] 13k's prohibition, however, results in the destruction
of public forum status that is at least presumptively
78
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court treats private
spaces differently. For example, despite the increased
function of shopping malls during the late 20th century as a
central gathering place for Americans, the Court has ruled
that these private properties lie outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,322 the
Court reversed an Oregon district court's injunction
prohibiting a shopping mall owner from interfering with
peaceful, noncommercial handbilling by draft and anti-war
demonstrators. The Court held that private property, such
as a mall, does not "lose its private character merely
because the public is generally invited to use it for
designated purposes. ' 323  In doing so, it distinguishedMarsh v. Alabama.324  Writing in 1972 for the four
impermissible. Traditional public forum property occupies a
special position in terms of First Amendment protection and
will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason
that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a
use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the
government transform the character of the property by the
expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what
might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel ofproperty.
Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, in dissent Justice Stevens
counseled judicial restraint, contending that the Court should not have
ruled on section 13k's constitutionality, because the statute did not
reach the activities in which either defendant allegedly engaged. Id. at
188-89 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One of
the defendants was threatened with arrest for distributing leaflets and
handbills, which has nothing to do with the display of "any flag, banner
or other device" proscribed in the statute, because "only after the
material left [defendant's] possession would his message have become
intelligible." Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). The other defendant did
display a device, Justice Stevens reasoned, but because her sign merely
recited verbatim the text of the First Amendment, it could not be said to
have been "designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party,
organization, or movement." Id.
322 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
323 Id. at 569. The Court reasoned, "The essentially private character of
a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by
virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modem
shopping center." Id.
324 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (upholding the right to distribute
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dissenting votes in Lloyd, Justice Marshall sounded a
prophetic note when he concluded:
It would not be surprising in the future to
see cities rely more and more on private
businesses to perform functions once
performed by governmental agencies. The
advantage of reduced expenses and an
increased tax base cannot be overstated. As
governments rely on private enterprise,
public property decreases in favor of
privately owned property. It becomes
harder and harder for citizens to find means
to communicate with other citizens.
When there are no effective means of
communication, free speech is a mere
shibboleth. I believe that the First
325Amendment requires it to be a reality.
Four years later, the Court extended Lloyd and held
that strikers were not allowed into a shopping mall to picket
their employer, a shoe retailer. 326 Nonetheless, some jurists
have urged that because shopping malls do function as
public gathering places, mall owners have a reduced
expectation of privacy and therefore must allow political
expression. 327 Answering the Supreme Court's invitation
leaflets in company-owned towns).
325 Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 586 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall further advocated that the court continue to follow Marsh and
hold that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property
for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." Id. (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506) (internal quotation marks
omitted).326 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
327 E.g., Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N. E. 2d. 59, 62 (Ohio 1994)
(Wright, J., dissenting) (advocating the application of a time, place, or
manner analysis to achieve an appropriate balance between the mall
owner's property rights and the public's free-speech rights). Justice
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to employ alternate analyses or read their own constitutions
more broadly than the Supreme Court interprets the federal
Constitution, 328 a few states, namely California, Colorado,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Washington, have recognized a limited right to free
expression at privately owned shopping malls.32 9 The
California Supreme Court held that that state's Constitution
"protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised" in
privately owned shopping centers. 330  Professor O'Neill
predicted that because the First Amendment does not reach
private spaces, the battle over the contours of speech-
related access to the increasingly privatized public space
will be fought on a state-by-state basis.
331
1. Hoarding Horton Plaza
One such battle over privatized public space took
place over Horton Plaza Park in San Diego, California.332
Wright noted:
When one thinks about how a shopping mall actually
functions, the enclosed common areas within the mall are
comparable to the town square of yesteryear surrounded by
downtown stores.... [C]itizens, because of the public nature
of a mall, have a heightened expectation that they are
permitted to engage in some forms of speech activities.
Id. at 67.
328 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982).
329 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 455. See also Horton Plaza Assoc. v.
Playing for Real Theatre, 228 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (Cal. App. 1986)
(collecting decisions). Ten other states have not recognized this limited
right. O'Neill, supra note 82, at 455-56.33°Robbins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
This is based on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (granting every person the
right to "freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right") and CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 3(a) (granting right to "petition government for redress
of grievances"). See also id. at 345-46.
331 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 456.
332 Horton Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. 817. See also Mitchell, supra
note 11, at *17-*26 (reviewing Horton Plaza).
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In an attempt to revitalize commercial activity in the
downtown area, San Diego leaders permitted the
development of a shopping mall adjacent to Horton Plaza
Park, designed to serve as the mall's pedestrian entrance.
333
To increase the odds of the mall's financial success, the
city altered the park's landscaping and furniture by
removing benches and replacing lawn areas with prickly
plants, attempting to make the park a less inviting place to
gather, thereby encouraging people to pass through Horton
Plaza Park and into the eponymous shopping mall.334
Thus, the effect of the mall's opening in 1985, as well as
the owner's goal in opening it, "was to move public life
inside, to capture it really, for its own commercial
interests."
335
In a nod to Pruneyard, the shopping mall owners set
up highly restrictive permit limitations to govern political
expression.336 The Playing for Real Theatre applied for a
333 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *22.
334 The redesign "simply made it impossible to hang out in the park."
Id.
311 Id. at *21-*22, *26.
336 Horton Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21. Restrictions recited
by the court include:
(1) Only one permit to any one person or group or
organization will be issued per day. (2) A permit shall allow
the holder to use only the portion of center property expressly
designated and specified in the permit. (3) The office of the
Center manager shall have the power to deny a request for a
permit if the manager in good faith believes the proposed
Political Expression to be profane, indecent, disturbing,
offensive, in poor taste, or otherwise not conducive to the
controlled business environment of the shopping center. (4)
The number of persons who may engage in Political
Expression in the Center at the same time shall be determined
by the owner. Such number shall be determined with reference
to the space provided in the designated area and the number of
separate groups engaged in such activity at the same time. In
no event shall more than two persons from any one group
occupy space in the designated area at the same time. (5) No
permits will be issued between Thanksgiving and December
31st of any calendar year.
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permit to perform a ten-minute skit in the mall re-enacting
the U.S. bombings of El Salvador. The skit involved eight
actors and included leafleting as part of the skit. 337 The
mall manager denied the request for the play, but approved
the leafleting. 338  The theater group neither dispersed
handbills nor put on the play, yet based on a tip from an
unnamed police informant that the group planned to create
a disturbance and engage in violence in the shopping mall,
its owner sued the group. The mall owner won a
preliminary injunction against any dramatic performances
by the group and required 72 hours advance notice for any
leafleting. In Horton Plaza, the court distinguished
Pruneyard and similar cases, limiting their holdings to
protect only leafleting and signature-gathering, and not
"expressive conduct" such as putting on plays. 340  The
dissent in Horton Plaza chided the majority for upholding a
prior restraint of political speech and for buying the story,
"based on double and triple hearsay statements," that the
theater group planned to create a disturbance. 34' Therefore,
Horton Plaza serves as a warning that creeping
privatization of public spaces heralds a concomitant muting
Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 828 (Butler, J., dissenting).
338 id.
339 Id. at 820-22, 828.
340 Id. at 824.
34 1 Horton Plaza Assoc., 228 Cal. Rptr. at 828 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Justice Butler added, "Chicken Little and Henny Penny are alive and
well." Id. Justice Butler further noted:
Finally, this case comes to us in a plain wrapper. The content
is sterile. [Defendant] Phipps and his Theatre cohorts did not
protest the denial of the permit to put on the play and they did
not leaflet as allowed by issuance of the second permit.
Hearing bumps in the night, Horton Plaza seeks to exorcise
phantoms of its imagination. Our review should await an
actual controversy.
Id. at 832-833 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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of dissenting voices.
342
2. New York: The Great Grass
Debate
As the twentieth century progressed, courts came to
the conclusion that property rights, though vital, were not
as important as personal rights when considering whether
to rule in equity. Relatively early in the century, a Texas
court announced that "personal rights of citizens are
infinitely more sacred and by every test are of more value
than things that are measured by dollars and cents."
343
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, the California
Supreme Court commented that treating property rights
more favorably than personal rights bespeaks a doctrine
"wholly at odds with the fundamental principles of
democracy," 344  especially in cases involving First
Amendment rights. 345  This doctrinal development
342 See Mitchell, supra note 11, at *26.
343 Hawkes v. Yancey, 265 S.W. 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See
also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The powers
of the courts to strike down an offending law is no less when the
interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental personal
rights of free speech and assembly.").
3 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 180 P.2d 321, 325 (1947).
Whether to grant equitable relief "should not in logic or justice turn
upon the sole proposition that a personal rather than a property right is
involved. . . . These concepts of the sanctity of personal rights are
specifically protected by the Constitutions, both state and federal, and
the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity, and worthy
of especial protection." Id.
345 In one of those cases, the Supreme Court observed:
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press
and religion ... we remain mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position. As we have stated before, the
right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First
Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free
men."
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted). See also Robbins, 592 P.2d
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represented a move away from the common law
requirement that a plaintiff assert a Property interest before
a court would grant an injunction. Yet, in this nascent
century, especially where the rights of dissidents are
concerned, what is old apparently is new again.
For example, in National Council of Arab
Americans v. City of New York, the court denied protest
groups the use of the Great Lawn in New York's Central
Park, made extensive reference to the threat posed by a
mass rally on the Great Lawn, and appeared far more
concerned about the condition of the grass than about the
groups' free-speech rights. 347 The court expressly pointed
out that the Great Lawn was restored in 1997 at a cost of
more than $18 million.348 Whether the city got its money's
worth is questionable because it was only after the
restoration that the city imposed restrictions on the size of
crowds allowed in the park and required that events be
canceled if they take place during or shortly following
rainy weather. 349 What the court did not mention was that
at 347 ("the public interest in peaceful speech outweighs the desire of
?roperty owners for control over their property").46 See Hawkes, 265 S.W. at 237. Here, the court noted:
The rule that equity will not afford relief by injunction except
where property rights are involved is known chiefly by its
breach rather than by its observance; in fact, it may be
regarded as a fiction, because courts with greatest uniformity
have based their jurisdiction to protect purely personal rights
nominally on an alleged property right, when, in fact, no
property rights were invaded. This is, in our opinion, as it
should be ....
Id.
347 Nat'l Council ofArab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 261-64, 270.
348 Id. at 263.
141 Id. at 261, 263-64. The court, shown "dramatic photographs" by
city officials of a pre-restoration Great Lawn in a beleaguered state,
appeared concerned that the park not return to those "dust bowl" days.
Id. at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, other park
areas such as East Meadow offer all-weather capability. Id. at 262.
The cancellation requirement in rainy weather for events scheduled on
the Great Lawn is especially puzzling given that Central Park
85
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 225
some of the $18 million needed to complete the restoration
came largely from private corporate donors, who were
allowed to use the Great Lawn for their large events, unless
the grass was wet. 350 In communicating with the plaintiffs,
the city emphasized that underlying its use-restriction plan
was the idea that "restoration accomplished through
significant public and private investment can be
preserved.135  Thus, while National Council of Arab
Americans is a decision ostensibly based on a time, place,
or manner analysis under which the court found the city's
restriction reasonable, the subtext of the decision appears to
be that where private donors help or principally fund an
improvement to a public park, private functions will
receive precedence over free-speech activities. 352  Most
experiences frequent wet weather, averaging approximately an inch of
rain a week during summer months. See National Weather Service,
Normals and Extremes, Central Park, New York, 1869 to present,
available at
http://www.erh.noaa.gov/okx/climate/records/nycnormals.htm.
350 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 263; Complaint,
Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 6602,
paras. 8, 16, 47, 59, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at
http://www.arab-american.net/pdffiles/First AmendedComplaint.pdf
(last visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter "Nat'l Council of Arab Ams.
Complaint"].
351 Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. Complaint, at para. 51 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
312 City officials contended that the predicted 250,000 rally participants
that the plaintiffs sought to permit would "decimate" the Great Lawn
and require a lengthy closure. Nat'l Council of Arab Ams., 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 264. On the other hand, the city boasted in a press release,
cited in the opinion, that the restored lawn "consist[ed] of
approximately twelve acres of 'hearty' Kentucky blue grass," soil
engineered to resist compaction, and more than four linear miles of
subsurface drainage infrastructure. Id. at 263. The plaintiffs
challenged the propriety of the apparent partial privatization of Central
Park:
Although the corporate donors may feel a sense of private
ownership over the Park and do not want to be 'paying' to
host a demonstration that may strongly advocate against their
perceived interests the [Central Park Conservatory] may not
act to deny protest permits on the Great Lawn in order to
protect its relationships with such donors. The Park remains a
86
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disconcerting, however, is that the court seemed to bolster
its decision not to grant an injunction by noting that if the
city permitted protestors to use the Great Lawn, dissedent
groups might encourage more people to attend their
event. 353 This approach appears to be little more than a
pretext to quell dissent. After all, a primary function of a
public forum such as Central Park is to accommodate
political expression, and the city's decision to close the
park to expressive activity, in part, because opening the
park might encourage more expression, offends the very
interest in free speech that a public forum is supposed to
accommodate.
3. Leaving Las Vegas to the
Privateers
Much like New York City did in obtaining private
money to refurbish the Great Lawn, Las Vegas, attempting
to reverse the declining economic fortunes of its "frumpy"
and dated downtown, redeveloped the area using a private-
public financing scheme. 354  The result was a five-block
pedestrian zone closed to traffic, dubbed the "Fremont
public forum for all and is not privatized or subject to the
discriminatory urges of [the conservatory's] corporate
sponsors.
Nat'l Council of Arab Ams. Complaint, at para. 59.
353 The court quoted the following statement that plaintiffs made at trial
in their opinion:
If this Court was to rule that the Great Lawn is not off limits
for political legal mass assembly protest, there would be a
surge of excitement and enthusiasm, and we don't know what
the palpable impact of that would be . . . a lot of people who
might not at this moment think about coming to Central Park a
week before would find a way to get there.
Nat'7 Council of Arab Ams., 331 F. Supp. 2d at 272.
354 ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1077 (2004).
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Street Experience." Wishing to minimize interference with
commercial activity such as shopping in the new pedestrian
zone, however, the city outlawed various free-speech
activities, including leafleting, solicitation, and setting up a
table in a public space to distribute literature or collect
signatures (a practice called "tabling").355 After police
dispersed a small rally called to protest the restrictions, the
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada sued.356
The district court that declared a pedestrian mall is a
nonpublic forum, upheld the solicitation, and tabled the
bans while denying summary judgment to the city on the
leafleting prohibition. The court reasoned that the
leafleting prohibition probably violated the First
Amendment even under the more relaxed standard of
scrutiny for nonpublic fora. 357 The lower court determined
that the pedestrian mall was a nonpublic forum because:
(1) the city had created it for the purpose of stimulating
economic growth and "not for the purpose of promoting
expression"; (2) the $70 million spent on the
redevelopment project represented a "great expense"; and
(3) the textured pavement and overhead canopy
distinguished the redeveloped area from surrounding streets
and sidewalks. 
358
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
this reasoning, holding that the Fremont Street Experience
was a public forum as were other commercialized
pedestrian malls, such as the Venice Beach Boardwalk and
Olivera Street in Los Angeles, and Fisherman's Wharf and
Union Square in San Francisco. 35 9 Although United States
appellate courts apply "a jumble of overlapping factors"
when determining public forum status, they typically
355 Id. at 1095, 1096.
356 id.
35 7 Id. at 1096.
358/d.
359 In such determinations, courts consider historical use. Id. at 1103-
04, 1106.
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consider compatibility of the uses of the forum with
expressive activity.360  Public thoroughfares, such as the
Fremont Street pedestrian mall in Las Vegas, are
361"inherently compatible" with free speech. Courts also
seek to protect the reasonable expectation that speech will
be protected where a location in question is
indistinguishable from other public fora.362 Even the use of
distinctive pavement and landscaping is not sufficient to
change the character of a public forum. 363 The appellate
court concluded, "The Fremont Street Experience is still a
street."
364
Perhaps more noteworthy than the court's holding
was that it echoed the concern voiced thirty-one years
earlier by Justice Marshall, which states that as cities are
drawn unresistingly down the path of financing public
projects with private funds, citizens may encounter greater
difficulty in effectively communicating their views.
36 5
"Although governmental attempts to control speech are far
from novel, they have new potency in light of societal
360 Id. at 1099-1100.
361 Id. at 1101.
362 "The recognition that certain government-owned property is a public
forum provides open notice to citizens that their freedoms may be
exercised there without fear of a censorial government, adding tangible
reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people." Id. at 1100
(quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
363 Id. at 1102.
364 Id. at 1103. This reasoning echos that of an earlier U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case, in which the city of Los Angeles
sought to limit a man's leafleting in El Pueblo de Los Angeles State
Historic Park, which encompasses Olivera Street, a tourist-oriented
commercial area. Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 572-
74 (9th Cir. 1993). The city argued that Olivera Street "is a distinctive
section of the park, with a unique historic and cultural atmosphere
which is designed to foster commercial exchange." Id. at 576. The
court found this argument "unconvincing," noting that the Olivera
Street area "is still part of the park and it is indistinguishable from other
sections of the park in terms of visitors' expectations of its public
forum status." Id.
365 See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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changes and trends toward privatization."
3 66
Unfortunately, this new potency has had a negative impact
on the ability of dissidents to express themselves, as seen
with respect to the Great Lawn in New York367 and the
Horton Plaza in San Diego. 
368
D. Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel: Viewpoint
Discrimination Meets Privatization
While the Supreme Court in United States v. Grace
cut governmental attempts to destroy the public forum
status of places traditionally used as public fora, more
recent attempts by private actors, typically political
campaigns, to temporarily privatize a traditional public
forum by obtaining a permit to use a park for an event have
drawn mixed judicial responses. 369 During such events, the
campaign committee typically treats the park as private
property and excludes dissidents or limits admittance to the
venue to those who do not support the campaign's
opponent. 37  Two cases, both arising from a Republican
campaign rally using the public commons in an Ohio town,
demonstrate the split in authority concerning these
viewpoint discrimination-meets-privatization schemes.
In Schwitzgebel v. City of Strongsville,371 the
campaign committee for then-President George H. W. Bush
obtained a permit to use a park for a campaign rally and
restrict entrance to those holding tickets to the event. A
police officer and a Secret Service agent guarded each
entrance to the fenced-off park, requiring entrants to set
aside any signs whether favorable or unfavorable to the
366 ACLUofNev., 333 F.3d at 1097.
367 See supra Part V.C.2.
368 See supra Part V.C.1.
369 See generally O'Neill, supra note 82, at 459-62.
370 Id. at 459.
371 898 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
372 Tickets generally were made available to whomever wanted them.
Id. at 1211-12.
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campaign.373 The plaintiffs entered with concealed signs
criticizing Bush's AIDS policy. When they displayed the
signs, a brouhaha ensued, resulting in their ejection from
the park and arrest on various misdemeanor charges.
374
The Schwitzgebel court found that, despite the issuance of
the permit, the park was a traditional public forum and the
government could not convert it into something less
protective of free speech.375 The court noted:
In essence, public fora serve as bulwarks
protecting the right of all persons, especially
those who have no access to any other
outlet, to speak their minds freely. Courts
must not allow the government to overcome
the bastions protecting such an important
right through so simple an exercise as the
granting of a permit.376
The court found that when a permitted event, the
admittance to which is restricted to ticket-holders, is held at
a public park, the park retains its public forum status.
Nonetheless, the court upheld the exclusion of the plaintiffs
from the event by applying what Professor O'Neill
characterizes as a "tortured time, place, and manner
analysis." 377 Following Saunders v. United States, 378 the
Schwitzgebel court found a significant government interest
in preventing, by use of the permitting scheme, an
individual from physically intruding on and interfering with
another's event to inject his or her own beliefs. 379 Through
171 Id. at 1212. The campaign provided its own signs for participants to
use during the rally.
374 The charges were later dropped. Id. at 1212-13.
375 Id. at 1216.
376 i.
377 O'Neill, supra note 82, at 461 n.262.
378 518 F. Supp. 728, 729-30 (D.D.C. 1981), affd without op., 679 F.2d
262 (D.C. Cir. 1982).379 Schwitzgebel, 898 F. Supp. at 1218.
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its ruling, the court also sought to avoid "cacophony" by
barring opponents from holding events in the public fora.
380
The court's reasoning, however, flies in the face of the
Supreme Court's recognition of the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' 381 and that
free debate may carry with it "verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance." 382  Thus, the Schwitzgebel
court's justification for using a permit system to stifle
dissent lacks validity. Essentially, the government is using
a privatization scheme to do an end-run around the First
Amendment's ban on viewpoint discrimination 383 by
handing a traditional public forum to a private entity that
discriminates. Courts should not countenance this practice.
If the Schwitzgebel court came to an improper result
even while reaching the proper finding that permitting the
use of a park does not strip the park of public forum status,
then the court in Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville384 failed
even to reach an appropriate finding. In Sistrunk, a high
school student was required to surrender her button
showing support for Bill Clinton before entering a Bush
0 Id. at 1219. In deciding that the permitting scheme was a valid time,
place, or manner restriction on the plaintiffs, the court found content-
neutrality because the issuance of the permit was not based on content
of the speech involved in the event; once issued, the permit could be
enforced "in a way that protects the expression of the permitted
message, even to the exclusion of some other message." Id. However,
the court here is allowing a governmental agency to issue a permit on a
content-neutral basis that gives an entity the ability to take over a
public forum and exclude speech on the basis of content in that public
forum. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (holding that a state may regulate
expressive content "only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest").
381 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
382 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25. Within established limits, the court
added that these effects are "in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony
is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength." Id. at 25.
383 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
4 99 F.3d 194 (6th Cir. 1996).
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rally. The court, analogizing the case with Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,385 found that
the Bush campaign had a right to exclude the student's
button because allowing her to wear it would
unconstitutionally deprive the campaign of autonomy over
its message. 386 In Hurley, the Supreme Court enunciated
the principle underlying the Sistrunk court's decision when
it ruled that Massachusetts could not require Boston war
veteran parade organizers to include a gay-rights group that
would have imparted a message in discord with what the
organizers sought to communicate. 387 The Sistrunk court
likened the plaintiff in that case to the gay-rights group and
the campaign to the veterans, reasoning that compelling the
Bush campaign to allow the plaintiff to attend its rally
wearing a Clinton button would be analogous to requiring
the veterans group to permit gay-rights activists to march in
the Boston parade. The court stated this would be the same
because "participating in the rally as a member of the
audience is more akin to marching in the parade itself as
one of the less visible marchers.
' 38 °
The Sistrunk dissent contended that this analysis
"turned the narrow holding of Hurley on its head. 389
According to the dissent, the Sistrunk plaintiff's attendance
at the rally was not akin to marching in the parade, but to
standing in the crowd lining the parade route; marching in
the parade, instead, is equivalent to standing at the podium
and speaking at the rally. 390  The dissent in Sistrunk
promotes the better view because an audience member at a
385 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
386 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199.
387 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559, 574.
388 Sistrunk, 99 F.3d at 199. The court further supported the
proposition that the campaign could exclude dissenting voices from the
public forum that they occupied by finding that the campaign sought
attendees to "send the media a message" that Bush was going to win
the election. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
389 I. at 200 (Spiegel, J., dissenting).
39oId. at 201.
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rally wearing a campaign opponent's button or even
carrying a sign has no more effect on the message the
speaker at the podium conveys than a dissenter standing
along a parade route, who is part of the parade's
audience. 39  More significantly, the fundamental question
in Sistrunk was "how much control over a traditional public
forum may a municipality cede to a private group." 392 The
Strongsville, Ohio campaign rally cases, thus, present an
intriguing question of whether, in temporarily privatizing a
public forum by issuing a permit to a political speaker, a
governmental entity is able to turn the public forum into a
location allowing viewpoint discrimination. Considering
the extent to which courts protect free expression in the
public fora and the proposition that "the nature of certain
public forums cannot be altered, either by government fiat




392 Id. at 202. The record was not sufficient to determine this issue.
393Id. (quoting Bishop v. Reagan-Bush '84, No. 86-3287, 1987 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6669, at * 6 (6th Cir. May 22, 1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
394 To be fair, limiting speech-making in a public forum with the
purpose of facilitating simultaneous expression of views by groups
hostilely opposed to one another-as opposed to merely handing a
public forum to proponents of one point of view by the act of granting a
permit to use a park, as was the case in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel-
may be more readily justified. For example, in Grider v. Abramson,
994 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ky. 1998), Louisville, Kentucky authorities
used fencing and a buffer zone to separate simultaneous rallies by the
Ku Klux Klan and an opposing group in a downtown public park and
the adjacent courthouse steps. Id. at 841-43. The purpose was to
ensure that each group could express views "violently opposed" to the
other, within sight of the other, while reasonably secure that violence
would not break out. Id. at 843, 848. The plaintiffs challenged the
safety regime, in part, because it barred anyone besides scheduled
speakers from making a speech. Id. at 843. The court upheld this
provision, reasoning that the state should guarantee citizens "the right
to participate in events or demonstrations of their own choosing
without being subjected to interference by other citizens." Sanders v.
United States, 518 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.D.C. 1981). This limit on
speech-making is more justifiable than the limits upheld in Sistrunk and
Schwitzgebel because its purpose was to facilitate the simultaneous
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Fortunately, a more recent case, Parks v. City of
Columbus,395 rejected the denial of First Amendment
speech in a public forum that was temporarily privatized.
The court distinguished the facts in that case from those in
Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel because the event for which a
public forum was privatized did not convey any particular
message. 396 In Parks, the city issued a permit to the Arts
Council to close a city street to vehicular traffic for an arts
festival that was free and open to the public.3 97 As the
plaintiff walked on the city street during the arts festival
wearing a sign bearing a religious message and distributing
literature, a fully-uniformed off-duty police officer who
was hired to provide security told him that the event
sponsors "did not want him there" and threatened to arrest
the plaintiff if he did not leave. 398 The court found state
expression of deeply disparate views, the kind of "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open" debate that the First Amendment, at its core, protects.
See id. at 848 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270) (internal quotation
marks omitted). One court indicated that when a governmental entity
grants a private entity the use of a public forum, the private entity's
right to constrain speech and have such constraints enforced by the
governmental entity should be limited to situations where the restricted
speech is disruptive. Garthright v. City of Portland, 315 F. Supp. 2d
1099, 1105 (D. Or. 2004). This reflects reasonable thinking, so long as
it is applied to speech-making that actually disrupts. Merely wearing a
button or holding a sign while standing mute in a public forum that was
temporarily privatized (as was the case in Sistrunk and Schwitzgebel,
respectively) should not be considered disruptive under such a doctrine.
... 395 F.3d 643 (6th Cir. 2005).396 Id. at 651. The court concluded:
While it is unclear that the Arts Festival was actually
expressing a particular message, the City "submitted that the
collective message of the Greater Columbus Arts Council is to
bring visual and performing artists to the City to be enjoyed by
those who wish to go to the festival." This is not an
expressive message, but merely a purpose for the event. The
Arts Festival is an event that most likely has many artists who
are expressing various messages of their own.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
397 Id. at 645.
398 Id. at 646.
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action on the part of the city and concluded that "it [was]
difficult to conceive that Parks's removal was based on
something other than the content of his speech. 399
Because the restriction was content-based, the city had to
show that its action was "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and [was] narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.",40 0 The city failed to make such showing because it
had "not offered an interest, let alone a compelling one, to
explain why it prohibited Parks from exercising his First
Amendment rights in a traditional public forum."4 01
VI. Conclusion
In its frenzied rush to fortify its bellicose foreign
policy, the government in recent years has turned a cold
shoulder not only towards dissenters, but the teachings of
earlier generations of American jurists. Not all modem
thinkers are guilty of following this trend, however. As a
New York judge recently noted, "We have long since made
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens.,, 40 2 Even-and especially-in wartime, the search
for truth carried out through unbridled political expression
and robust debate is critical to the continued political
freedom of the nation. According to Justice Harlan:
The constitutional right of free expression is
powerful medicine in a society as diverse
'99 Id. at 654.
400 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
401 Parks, 395 F.3d at 654. "The City offered no explanation as to why
the sponsor wanted the [plaintiff] removed. There is no evidence that
the Arts Council had a blanket prohibition on the distribution of
literature or that others engaging in similar constitutionally protected
activity were removed from the permitted area." Id.
402 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 603 (2004) (citing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)).
96
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 236
and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity and in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests.
40 3
Concomitant with the right of free expression is the
right to gather in public places to give voice to political
views in order to convey them to authorities. 4°4 In modem
times, however, authorities demean public gathering for the
expression of political views because they assume that such
gatherings will take a violent form, thus presuming guilt
until innocence is proven. 40 5 Ironically, it can be argued
that the greater the constraints the government places on
dissidents through penning protesters, discriminating by
viewpoint, and privatizing away the public forum, the
greater the likelihood of civil disobedience to express views
the public otherwise would have voiced lawfully. 40 6 Yet,
along with the general perils inherent in civil disobedience
comes a newer, harsher threat of lengthy incarceration in
federal penitentiaries should the government choose to
employ section 802 of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Tools Required to Intercept and
403 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
404 "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right
on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
405 Mitchell, supra note 11, at *39.
406 Id. at *44 ("closing off of space to protest has made civil
disobedience all the more necessary").
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Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the "Patriot Act")
407
against demonstrators. This prospect is no flight of
fancy.
40 8
The government has already so compromised the
free use of the public forum that the only way to take it
back may be through widespread civil disobedience. But
because such a course would put many in danger, and
because, in a civilized democracy, the citizenry should not
have to resort to such extremes to engage in speech activity
the Constitution already protects, a better course would be
to rethink current policy toward those who use public
places to express their political views. Courts, no doubt,
have a significant role to play in this process and should
remain astute to governmental attempts to displace
dissidents by restricting access to the public forum.
Specifically, courts should be particularly wary of and
should treat with great suspicion schemes that: (1) corral or
pen protesters so they effectively are unable to get their
message across to the targets of their speech; (2)
discriminate according to viewpoint by banishing
opponents of government policies to distant or unseen
locations; and (3) propose to accomplish, through
privatization what the First Amendment otherwise would
not permit. By remaining vigilantly against such free
expression-compromising schemes, courts can hold the
other two branches of government to a constitutional
standard so that the people of this country may reclaim the
public forum.
407 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272.
408 Section 802 of the Patriot Act reaches those who violate a criminal
law in the commission of an act dangerous to human life the purpose of
which is to influence government policy through intimidation or
coercion. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 112-13
(Seven Stories Press 2002); Mitchell, supra note 11, at *44-*45.
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FEDERALISM GONE FAR ASTRAY FROM POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: THE ADMISSION OF
CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH BY STATE'S RULES-1990-2004
Dannye W. Holley
"Round up the Usual Suspects"
Claude Rains' Character in "Casablanca"
I. Introduction
This is a micro study of federalism in action. This
study identifies, ranks, and evaluates the current federal and
state rules regulating the same issue-whether to admit
prior convictions to impeach a witness and the appropriate
standards for doing so. Over the last several decades, there
has been an almost unanimous chorus of criticism
regarding the wholesale admission of convictions,
ostensibly only to impeach, especially when prosecutors are
authorized by an evidence rule to use convictions to
impeach the testimony of an accused in a criminal case.'
1 Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence
609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence,
48 DRAKE L. REv. 1 (1999) (observing that the two decades since the
enactment of the federal rule proved its standards too liberally admitted
convictions to impeach-especially the accused); Richard D. Friedman,
Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and
a Proposed Overhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1991) (proposing
the abolition of all character impeachment evidence, including the use
of prior convictions to impeach, against the accused); Carl McGowan,
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants By Prior Convictions, 1 LAW &
THE SOC. ORD. 1, 2 (1970) (noting that English jurist characterized the
American practice of admitting convictions to impeach when the
accused who took the stand, and who had not sought to employ
character evidence to bolster his own credibility, as a "barbarous
custom"). Later, McGowan also notes that both the 1942 Model Code
of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted the view
of the English Jurist, banning the use of convictions to impeach the
accused, unless he had sought to bolster his own credibility. Id. at 5.
Since 1970, however, the Uniform Rules version of 609 has been
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Despite this criticism, this study, and a companion study of
how state supreme courts interpret these rules, provide a
basis for concluding that this admission avenue persists and
results in the admission of, in all probability, thousands of
convictions against hundreds of witnesses in the United
States each year.2
Because this is a study of an important set of
evidence rules-rules which provide detailed practice
guidelines that form the basis for regulating the crucial trial
issue of admissibility-initially one might expect that the
substantively amended twice; once to conform to the 1974 version of
the federal rule to encourage uniformity in federal and state courts, and
again in 1999 on the policy premise that twenty-five years of
experience demonstrated that the federal rule too liberally admitted
convictions against the accused and more generally because of its
failure to define the concepts of "dishonesty" and "false statement.").
See also Gene R. Nicol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
391 (1980) (arguing that the risk of denying the right to a fair trial is
sufficiently great so as to violate the federal right to due process);
Abraham D. Ordover, Balancing the Presumption of Guilt and
Innocence, Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 140-
41 (proposing an amendment to the federal rules which would require
judges to evaluate whether the effect on the jury of admitting prior
crime evidence would be its use for an impermissible prejudicial
purpose). According to H. Richard Uviller,
Character-an available index of propensity to fabricate
testimony-is a complex and dangerous area of evidence law....
This confusion in the application of law may reflect the fact that
we simply do not understand the role of character in predisposing
a witness to perjury and cannot recognize the conduct that
implies propensity to render truthful or untruthful testimony.
Masking our fundamental ignorance, we promulgate a set of
rules-applicable virtually at judicial whim--that neither
provides jurors with useful facts nor guarantees to shield
defendants from prejudicial inference. Simply put, the credibility
factor may be a wild card that could seriously undermine our
claims of faith in the adversary adjudicative system of justice.
H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, And The Rule's of Evidence:
Seeing Through The Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993).
2 Dannye Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to
Impeach: State Supreme Court Interpretative Standards, 1990-2004
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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content of such rules would reflect jurisdiction-specific
concerns. This article examines if this expectation is
reality. The article then evaluates whether parochial
concerns justify this article's core finding that, at the end of
2004, there is more than one distinctive standard for every
two states regulating this very important issue. The first
purpose of this article is to report the results of the study of
the fifty states' rules and statutory standards regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach. This study evaluates
the current state standards using the federal rule and its
evolution as its focal point. The current federal rule is the
focal point for the identification and evaluation of the
standards in the states because, since its enactment in 1975,
most state rule makers have reviewed the federal rule and
the standards reflected during its evolution in considering
revision of their standard for admitting convictions to
impeach.3
Part I of this article discusses in detail the original
standards of the federal rule and tracks the evolution of that
rule during the first three decades of its existence.4 The
discussion includes the identification of the policy
decisions, and the lack thereof, reflected in the legislative
history leading to the enactment of the original 1975
federal rule, and the single subsequent substantive
amendment in 1990. This section also evaluates the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal rule.
5
Part II of this article tracks the evolution during the
same three decades of changes in state evidence law to
determine the degree to which state statutes or rules
emulated the federal rule, as well as the degree to which
state evidence codes mimicked the 1990 amendment to the
federal rule. 6 As a result of this evaluation, this article
organizes the fifty states' standards into three categories:
3 See infra notes 10-21, 24-26 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 32-163 and accompanying text.
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(1) those identical to the federal rule; (2) those more
restrictively admitting convictions to impeach; and (3)
those more liberally admitting convictions to impeach.7
The bedrock finding of this study is that currently states use
twenty-eight different rules or statutory standards to
regulate the admission of convictions to impeach, and that
in forty-one states these standards are different, sometimes
drastically different, than the federal rule.
8
The second purpose of this article, undertaken in the
third and final part, is to evaluate the merits of this large
array of rules regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. Achievement of this goal is premised first on the
acknowledgement that a bedrock virtue of federalism is-
except for those standards to which uniform adherence is
required by the national constitution, fifty-one legislatures
including the national Congress, or legislatively authorized
decision-makers-subject to each state's constitution to
resolve the same issue differently based on history, hunch,
policy, politics, or parochialism. This authority exists even
when, as is the case with regard to the issue of admitting
convictions to impeach, the federal standard was a known
and potentially unifying standard. In this final part, the
article evaluates whether it is "good federalism" when the
result of this freedom of choice is the existence of twenty-
eight different evidence standards with respect to the same
issue of admitting convictions to impeach a witness.
This final part of the article first identifies and
comments upon the most significant consequences of the
existence of so many standards and then focuses upon the
identification and evaluation of the plausible reasons for the
existence of so many state standards regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach. 9 Constitutional and
policy bases for evaluating the possible reasons for this
7 See infra notes 39-40, 41-125, 126-163 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 41-163 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 164-232 and accompanying text.
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diversity of standards are identified and evaluated. The
article concludes with a recommendation that most states,
as well as the federal government, should and must modify
their current standard regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach.
II. Federal Rule of Evidence 609: Enactment,
Official Commentary, and Evolution
When the federal rule regulating admission of
convictions to impeach was proposed, revised, and
finalized between 1969 and 1975, the national Congress
and most states permitted the use of prior convictions of
serious crimes, i.e., felonies, and misdemeanors involving
dishonesty or false statements to impeach any witness.'
0
By the time the federal rule was considered, the Advisory
Committee noted that a modification to this standard,
which required trial judges to balance exclusionary policies
versus the probative value of the specific "felony" to prove
a propensity to lie, had been adopted by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals and had received a great deal
of scholarly and judicial attention." During points in the
10 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. The advisory committee commentary noted that both the
Uniform Evidence and Model Evidence Rules only authorized the
admission of convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty or false
statement." The advisory committee acknowledged that the selection
of the standard expressed in the text was not the result of a policy
evaluation examining the merits of alternative standards, but rather a
decision to adopt current congressional policy as reflected in a District
of Columbia statute, in which Congress adopted this standard. For a
thorough review of the history of the enactment of the federal rule, see
Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 511-21 (1989).
11 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. In Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the
court held that trial judges should balance the probative value of the
conviction with regard to credibility against the unfair prejudice it
would cause. Id. at 769. The decision allocated the burden of
persuasion to the opponent of the conviction, most crucially the
accused, to prove that prejudice far outweighed probative value. Id.
The Luck court also identified guidelines that the trial judge should use
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enactment process, both houses of Congress adopted
standards that placed significantly greater restrictions on
the admission of convictions to impeach than even the
potential limits that would result from the balancing
standard of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
12
The initial House version of the rule banned use of
convictions to impeach any witness, except those for
crimes of dishonesty or false statements, and the original
Senate standard was almost as restrictive. 13  The Senate
amended its standard, however, reverting back to the liberal
majority admission standard of the times. The conference
committee ambiguously modified that standard, to require a
balancing evaluation when the conviction only qualified to
impeach because it was punishable by more than one year
in prison. 14  As the Advisory Committee recognized,
in conducting the balancing evaluation including the age of the
conviction, whether the conviction was relevant to prove dishonesty,
and whether it was for the same or similar crime as the crime for which
the accused is currently on trial. Id. The court also suggested that
when exclusionary concerns, such as similarity, were present the trial
judge should consider admitting only one conviction, or admitting such
a conviction only if it was strongly probative of dishonesty. Id. at 768,
n.8.
12 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's notes to 1974 enactment of
the federal rule. Additionally, the judge who wrote the Luck opinion
sharply criticized the advisory committee's 1970 proposed draft, which
authorized the admission of convictions for all felonies and all crimes
of dishonesty or false statement. McGowan, supra note 1, at 7-13.
While acknowledging that the broad balancing approach he asserted in
Luck may not be the best approach, Judge McGowan noted that the
advisory committee's approach on the merits was far worse because it
was a potential violation of the most fundamental evidence principal
that only relevant evidence should be admitted on an issue. Id.
13 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1974 enactment of
the federal rule. The Senate standard, if the accused was the witness,
was the same as the House standard, but it also authorized the
admission of other convictions against other witnesses. To qualify
against such witnesses, a felony conviction had to undergo a balancing
evaluation that evenly weighted and pitted against each other relevance
to prove a propensity to lie versus the unfair prejudice that would result
if the conviction was admitted.
14 Id. The conference committee adopted a balancing scale that gave
the same weight to the results of a probative value to prove a propensity
to lie evaluation, and to an unfair prejudice evaluation, expressly pitting
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however, implicit in this compromise is the unproven
assumption that all records of convictions for crimes
punishable by more than one year are relevant to prove a
propensity to lie.' 
5
As a result of this course of adoption, the federal
rule that became effective in 1975 was so ambiguous,
courts and commentators contended that it established
either two or three standards to regulate the admission of
convictions to impeach. 16
The two standards interpretation read the rule to
authorize the per se admission of evidence of a conviction
for any "crime" of "dishonesty" or "false statement" to
impeach a witness. These standards also excluded all other
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term less
than one year in prison. The rule as enacted failed to
specifically define the concepts "crime," "dishonesty," or
"false statement."' 17  The second standard under the two
them against each other, and also expressly stating that the balancing
evaluation applied to the impeachment of any witness. In a non-
sequential, subsequent paragraph, however, the advisory committee's
note asserted that the Conference Committee concluded that the
balancing protection was only warranted to protect the accused because
only then was it even arguable that unfair prejudice would be greater
than the loss of relevant evidence. The Conference Committee, without
evidence that it was conscious of this decision and without reference to
logic or empirical evidence to support its crucial assumption, decided
that every conviction for every crime punishable by more than one year
in jail was relevant to prove a propensity to lie. The Conference
Committee therefore concluded that the balancing evaluation need only
be undertaken when the witness was the accused or one of the
accused's witnesses. Inexplicably, however, the Conference
Committee failed to use the word "accused" in the final version of the
rule it adopted, and the word that the committee used, "defendant," was
also not defined in the rule.
15 See discussion infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
16 FED. R. EvID. 609(a) (1975).
17 Id. In December 2006, the federal rule will be substantively
amended. The amended rule will limit the evaluation of whether the
underlying crime involved "dishonesty" or "false statement" to an
analysis of the elements of the crime as charged and tried. FED. R.
EVID. 609 (2006). The proponent of the conviction to impeach must
prove that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or
admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. Id.
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standards interpretation of the federal rule as enacted
authorized the admission of a conviction for a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison against any
witness, but only if the "crime"-perhaps also considering
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
particular crime-made it relevant to prove a propensity to
lie, and then only if exclusionary concerns did not outweigh
its probative value. 1
8
The three standards interpretation of the federal rule
as enacted split this second standard. The first sub-standard
was that any conviction for a crime punishable by more
than one year in prison was per se admissible to impeach
any witness, except criminal and civil defendants, or
alternatively only the accused, criminal case defendant, and
perhaps defense witnesses in a criminal case. 19  As to
defendants, or perhaps just the accused, and arguably his
witnesses, such convictions were only admissible when the
crime-or perhaps circumstances surrounding the
commission of the specific crime-made it relevant to a
prove propensity to lie, and then only if exclusionary
concerns did not outweigh its probative value. These
differences in interpreting the enhanced federal rule were
caused by the fact that the standard concluded with a
specific reference to the "defendant"--a concept not
defined by the rule. Examined in context, the specific
reference to the defendant suggested only that category of
witnesses were protected by the sequential relevance and
exclusionary balancing evaluations.2'
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court resolved
the ambiguity in a five to three decision. The Court
18 Id. FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. The advisory committee noted that the rule adopted a functional
definition of serious crime based on congressional views of what was a
serious crime, rather than using the term "felony," which the committee
noted was defined differently in various states.
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adopted the most liberal admission of the three standards
view of the enacted federal rule's regulation of convictions
to impeach-limiting the balancing evaluation protection to
only the accused, and perhaps witnesses of the accused.22
In adopting the three standards interpretation, the Court
placed the most emphasis on its review and evaluation of
the five year legislative history of the rule. The Court
concluded that the majority standard in state and federal
practice prior to 1969 was even more liberal in admitting
convictions to impeach.23
Just one year later, however, Congress modified the
Court's interpretation of the rule.24 Although the Court's
interpretation was modified, the amended rule retained a
three standards approach. The amended rule kept what this
article has referred to as standard one, shared by both
interpretations of the enacted rule, which per se admitted
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement"
to impeach any witness. The amended rule also retained
the Court's second standard which provided more
protection to the accused and arguably his witnesses by
imposing the equally weighted balancing evaluation before
admitting convictions to impeach solely because the
underlying crime was punishable by more than a year in
prison. The amendment changed the third standard as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. The amendment
adopted a balancing evaluation tilted towards admission for
all other witnesses when the sole basis for offering the
conviction to impeach was the fact that the underlying
crime was punishable by more than a year in prison. 2 This
22 Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Id. at 530-35 (Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan J.J.,
dissenting).
21Id. at 511-24.
24 FED. R. EvID. 609 (1990).
25 Id. But see Uviller, supra note 1, at 817 (surveying federal trial
judges and concluding that the "apparent textual difference" with
regard to the specific balancing standard for the accused in Rule 609
and the Rule 403 balancing standard for all other witnesses does not
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revised third standard expressly incorporated by reference
the overall generic admissibility balancing standard of the
evidence rules, which requires a finding that the injury to
enumerated exclusionary policies, including unfair
prejudice, does not substantially outweigh the probative
value of the proffered evidence.
2V
Several perspectives should be identified
concerning the federal rule regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach, including its enactment history and
content before tracking the standards maintained, enacted,
and revised by the state legislatures and supreme courts
since 1975. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, as revised
in 1990, is still the current three standards scheme for
regulating the admission of convictions to impeach in
federal court. 
27
establish a meaningful difference in the evaluation of admissibility of a
P6rior conviction as proof of a propensity to lie as perceived or applied).
FED. R. EvID. 609. In the federal rules, and in many state evidence
rules, the generic policy-balancing rule is numbered 403. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 403.
27 But see discussion of the first substantive amendment of the
standards since 1990, effective December 2006, supra note 17. As
enacted and retained to date, the federal rule included four additional
subordinate admission guidelines that come into play once a conviction
first qualifies under one of the three basic admission standards. First,
the rule excludes otherwise qualified convictions when there is a form
of official recognition of rehabilitation provided the accused was not
subsequently convicted of a felony, or there was a form of official
recognition that in fact the accused was innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted. FED. R. EvID. 609(c). Second, the rule excludes
otherwise qualified convictions if they are in fact juvenile
adjudications, unless the constitution mandates their admission. FED.
R. EvID. 609(d). Third, the rule presumptively excludes otherwise
qualified convictions which were entered ten years prior to the current
trial if no jail time was imposed, or ten years after release if jail time
was imposed. The proponent can overcome this presumption only if he
gives notice and shows that, in the interest of justice, the probative
value of such an old conviction substantially outweighs its prejudice
based on specific facts and circumstances. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
Finally, the rule provides that the pendency of an appeal does not bar
the use of an otherwise qualified conviction, but the fact that the appeal
is pending is also admissible. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
The rule has never addressed two important related procedural
issues. First, it does not address the issue of whether the opponent of
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Second, the legislative history of the rule, at least by
implication, acknowledged that its significance depended
upon the liberality of the rule admitting convictions
substantively. 28
Third, inexplicably, with regard to the per se
admission standard, the federal rule drafters and reviewers
have never seen fit either to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement," as those two terms are used in Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, or to explain why they employed two terms
rather than employing a single concept. This omission has
endured despite the fact that the congressional Conference
Committee in finalizing the rule expressly stated a more
precise set of qualifying criteria when it identified, by
crime example and residuary language, an intent to limit
the admission of such a conviction, especially the accused, must testify
at trial to preserve his right to appeal a decision to admit a conviction to
impeach. A majority of states authorize the use of a motion in limine
or comparable pre-trial hearing procedure to test the admissibility of a
conviction to impeach prior to trial, in order to facilitate sound trial
strategic decisions including which key witnesses, especially the
accused, will testify at trial. In United States v. Luce, 469 U.S. 38
(1984), the Supreme Court placed the federal legal system in the
minority of state systems by holding that an accused could not appeal
the denial of a motion in limine which sought to exclude admission of a
prior conviction to impeach, unless the accused takes the stand and is
impeached with that conviction. This decision enhanced that the
likelihood the accused will choose not to testify. In 1999, however, the
federal rules of evidence were amended (specifically FED. R. EVID.
103) making it clear that the loser of a properly preserved pre-trial
evidentiary ruling need not revisit that issue during trial in order to
preserve the right to appeal the pre-trial ruling. The advisory
committee's note to the amendment, however, claimed that it was not
an attempt to codify or overrule Luce. Second, when a conviction is
admitted to impeach, the opponent is entitled in most jurisdictions to an
immediate limiting instruction-the jury must be told that the
conviction cannot be used to decide the merits of the case.
28 During its consideration of the rule in 1970, the Senate made specific
reference to the companion substantive rule (FED. R. EVID. 404) and the
possibility that a conviction could be admitted to convict in a criminal
case if it qualified under the exceptions to the nonnal substantive
exclusionary principle. The Senate also referred to the possibility of
admitting a conviction for specific impeachment purposes when a
witness "opened the door" by denying the existence of such a
conviction.
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per se admission to a narrow range of crimes whose
elements made the conduct-if not the record of
conviction-relevant to prove a propensity to lie.29  The
committee identified specific offenses satisfying the
definitions including: perjury, subordination of perjury,
false pretense, false statement, fraud, embezzlement, and
other crimes the commission of which per se involves
crimen falsi-the accused engaged in an untruth, a
falsehood, or deceit.
30
Fourth, and most importantly to this study of
federalism, the federal standard has been the only pervasive
benchmark referred to by state lawmakers in considering or
reconsidering the appropriate standard to adopt since
1975. 31 The next section of this article reports on what the
state rule makers have decided, bearing in mind, that each
state had the option of retaining their pre-1975 rule, or
adopting, modifying, or rejecting each of the three federal
rule standards for admitting convictions to impeach.
29 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1974 enactment of
the federal rule. But see discussion of the December 2006 amendment
of this standard supra note 17. This amendment is designed to finally
rovide textual recognition of the advisory committee's position.
Id.
31 Evidence authorities have asserted that as many as forty-three states
have modeled their evidence rules after the federal rules. Preface to
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (NUTSHELL)
(West 2003). Numerical evidence that the federal evidence rules, and
at least its numbering of the federal rule regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach, is illustrated by the fact that twenty-seven of
the thirty-one states with the same substantive standard, or with a more
restrictive standard, have numbered their rule regulating this issue with
an identical or a very similar number. See infra notes 39, 41.
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IlI. State Evidence Rules Regulating the
Admission of Convictions To Impeach-A
Conceptual Ranking of the Liberality of
Their Admission Standard(s) Organized in
Three Categories Based on Whether the
States' Standard(s) are Identical To, More
Restrictive, or More Liberal Than the
Standards of the Federal Rule
A. The Premises and the Bases for the
Premises for Ranking the State Rules
In this section the fifty states' standards are
organized into three categories: (1) those identical to the
federal rule; (2) those more restrictively admitting
convictions to impeach; and (3) those more liberally
admitting convictions to impeach. Within the latter two
categories-in order to accurately present the full
magnitude of the diversity of the states' rules regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach-the article groups
similar, more liberal, or more restrictive state rules and
discusses them sequentially beginning with the most liberal
and most restrictive state rules, and ending with the states
whose standards are only slightly more restrictive or more
liberal than the federal rule.
The primary premise for ranking rules on the
continuum from most restrictive to most liberal with regard
to admission of convictions to impeach is the quantity of
convictions they authorize for automatic admission. In
identifying the quantity of convictions, this article
recognizes that the rules most often make reference to
broad crime categories in authorizing automatic admission
of convictions to impeach, and that overall data is available
only to determine the quantity of convictions by relatively
broad crime categories rather than by individual crime.
What we do know, for example, is that several state rules
do automatically authorize admission to impeach with
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convictions for "felonies," a broad category of crimes most
frequently defined as those crimes punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year. We also know that
state courts collectively convict approximately one million
persons each year of such offenses. 2
Second, this article employs the following
assumption about one of the most frequent categories of
convictions-those involving crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement" for which many state rules authorize
automatic admission to impeach. Many of the state rules,
following the pattern in the federal rule described in Part I,
authorize such admission, without defining "dishonesty" or
"false statement." In ranking the state rules, it was
necessary to provide a definition for these concepts in order
to quantify the number of convictions which automatically
be admitted to impeach any witness. The most appropriate
definition is found in the official commentary and
32 In 2002, the most recent year for which national data is available,
state courts convicted about 1,051,000 adults of a felony. Although
each state's definition of the term felony varies, most states define it as
a crime punishable by a minimum term of more than one year in prison.
This is the same way that felony is defined in Federal Rules of
Evidence in determining what types of convictions can be used to
impeach a witness. In 2000, state courts convicted an estimated
924,700 adults of a felony. In 1998, state courts convicted an estimated
930,000 adults of a felony. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice
Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletins, Felony Sentences in
State Courts (2000, 2002, 2004). Every two years, the federal Bureau
of Justice Statistics conducts a survey of state "felony" convictions.
The survey also reports the number of felony convictions in the federal
system for that same year. In conducting the survey, however, the OJS
does not require or even suggest that the sampled state counties adhere
to a uniform definition of the word "felony" in reporting their data.
There is some variation on how that term is defined in the states. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text. At the end of 2004, there was
still no systematic collecting and reporting of the number of
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
of less than one year, although the National Center for State Courts has
begun a project to collect such data, which they hope to report
sometime in 2005. Based on data from individual states, the number of
convictions, if not the number of adults convicted for such offenses, is
at least two and one-half to three times as great as the number of
"felony" convictions.
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legislative history of the federal rule. 33  Based on this
definition, at most, ten percent of all convictions for crimes
punishable by any term of imprisonment are properly
characterized as involving "false statements" or
"dishonesty."
The third, and sequential, premise for ranking
states' rules on a continuum from most restrictive to most
liberal is the quantity of convictions they authorize for
possible discretionary admission, and the degree to which
the rule standards tilt the exercise of that discretion towards
admission. A state rule could employ one of three
progressively more restrictive balancing standards, pitting
exclusionary policies, especially unfair prejudice, against
the relevance of the conviction to prove a propensity to
lie. 34  Of course, convictions, which under a state's
standards do not qualify for either automatic or
discretionary admission are subject to per se exclusion, and
the evaluation scheme also must account for the percentage
of convictions in a given state that are in this third category.
The scheme must assign weight to the significance of the
automatic admission and exclusion categories as well as to
the three incremental discretionary admission standards.
The automatic categories were given more weight because
such rules eliminate the exercise of judicial discretion in
most states. Further support for this weighting decision
comes from the study of state supreme court cases for this
same fifteen year period.
The next major premise for ranking states' rules on
the continuum from most restrictive to most liberal is that
the standards for admitting convictions to impeach the
accused are as important as the standards regulating the
33 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
34 The federal rule employs both the discretionary standard tilted
towards admission and the neutral standard. See supra notes 20, 25-26
and accompanying text. For an analysis of state rules that employ the
discretionary standard tilted towards exclusion, see infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
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admission of convictions to impeach all other witnesses,
and therefore both categories of witnesses were given
independent and equal weight in determining the degree of
liberality of each state's rule. The basis of this premise is
that during the period of this study the substantial majority
of state supreme courts' decisions on this issue involved the
propriety of admitting convictions to impeach the
accused.35 In addition, empirical research findings include
those in which the verdicts of "jurors" and "juries" were
significantly influenced by the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused, as well as findings that the influence
on jurors was greater when convictions were admitted
against the accused as compared to other types of witnesses
including civil parties. 36 As already discussed, the federal
rule and a majority of state rules, reflect the rule makers'
decision to consider the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused separately from the standards for other
witnesses. 37
The final related, but less significant premise, is that
impeachment rules are specifically applicable only to the
parties to civil litigation, and are as important as those rules
that regulate the examination of non-party witnesses in civil
and criminal cases. Therefore, when a state rule has a
different standard for civil parties than for non-parties, the
two sets of rules are given equal weight in determining the
degree of liberality of each state's rule in admitting
convictions to impeach. The basis of this premise is
twofold. First, cases such as Green, demonstrate the grave
35 See Holley, supra note 2.
36 For a study usually referred to as the most comprehensive study of
the effect of the admission of convictions on actual juries, see HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, (Little Brown
1966) (reviewing study of the performance of actual juries and
concluding that the introduction of an accused's prior record for any
purpose increased the likelihood of conviction by 27%). For a
discussion of other studies reaching similar conclusions, see infra notes
209-18 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 20, 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 39, 44, 52,
59, 70, 102, 105-07, 161 and accompanying text.
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consequences that can result when convictions are admitted
to impeach the testimony of a party witness. Second,
empirical research reveals that when convictions are
admitted against civil parties, as compared to non-party
witnesses, there is a greater likelihood the outcome will be
influenced.38
38 See discussion of Green, supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
With regard to empirical evidence, see infra notes 209-18 and
accompanying text. Mississippi, infra note 123, is the only state which
in fact has a completely separate standard for civil parties, but
Louisiana, infra note 137, has a separate rule for all civil witnesses
including the parties, in comparison to the rule for all criminal
witnesses including the accused. In addition, Virginia, infra note 154,
has by court decision applied its criminal trial standard for admitting
convictions only to civil party witnesses. When these premises are
taken together they produce an evaluation scheme that could be
represented by the following "scale":
Conceptual Outline - Chart-Numerical Format
Justifying The Heirarchy and the Respective Rankings
MOST POINTS = MOST RESTRICTIVE
Cvs of crimes for which max penalty Cvs of crimes for which max penalty
is less than one ear is more than one year
Note: Assumption crimes of "Dishonesty or False Statement"
10% or less of all convictions in both of above categories
Auto Auto Auto Auto
Admit Exclude Admit Exclude
1 2 3 4 5 6
Balancing Balancing
abc abc
Point allocation for each of above 10 categories
0 168 10 16 1 0 168 10 16
FRE Score = 41.4
FRE Acc" 0(10%)
FRE AOW" 0(10%)
14.4 (90%) 0 (10%)
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The next subsection identifies the states whose
current rules mimic the federal rule. This subsection is
followed by the ranking of states which more restrictively
admit convictions to impeach than the federal rule, and a
subsection ranking the states which more liberally admit
convictions to impeach than the federal rule.
B. States with Rules That Employ the Same
Standard as the Federal Rule's Standard
for Admitting Convictions to Impeach
By 2004, nine of the fifty states by rule admitted
convictions to impeach using the same three standards as
the federal rule. 39 The rules in most of these states reflect
State Scores
Mont. = 64 W. Va. = 51.6 Ark., Del., Minn., Va. = 28
& Wash. = 43.2
Haw. 62 Vt. = 50.6 Miss. = 42.3 Or. = 27.2/28
Alaska = 60.8 Idaho = 48 I11. = 42 R.I. & Wis. = 24
Kan. = 60.8 Ariz., Me., Md., FRE = 41.4 La. = 14.6
S.D., & Tex = 46.2
Pa. = 57.6 Conn. = 46 N.H. = 36 N.J. = 12
Mich. = 56.65 Ga. = 44.8 Ca., Colo., Ky., N.C. = 9.6
& Nev. = 32
Ind. = 52.4 Tenn. = 44.2 Fla. & Neb. = Mass., Mo., &
28.8 N.Y. = 0
39 ALA. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (adopted effective January 1, 1996); IOWA
R. EvID. 609 (2004) (using the same definition of "felony" after
substantive amendments in 1996 aligned it with the definition used in
the post 1990 federal rule); N.M. R. EvID. 11-609 (2004) (emulating the
federal rule amendment pattern by revision in 1991 to reflect 1990
amendment of FED. R. EVID. 609(a)); N.D. R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(originally modeled after 1974 version of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, but with subsequent amendments this amendment
substantively tracks the 1990 amendment of federal rule); OHIO R.
EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in 1980, amended in 1991, the effect of
which was to make the state rule, for the first time, identical to the
federal rule); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2609 (2004) (original rule
effective in 1978, and amended effective 1991); S.C. R. EvID. 609
(2004) (enacted and effective in 1995); UTAH R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(enacted in 1980); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (requiring a 403
balancing evaluation for witnesses other than the accused with the
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an enactment process that closely compared the states'
rules to the federal rule, and were either enacted after 1991
or amended during the 1990s to track the amendment to the
federal rule following the Supreme Court's decision in
Green.40 Like the federal rule they mirror, these rules
originally failed to define and continue to fail to define
which crimes involve "dishonesty" and "false statement."
C. States With More Restrictive Rules
Regarding Admission of Convictions to
Impeach Than FED. R. EvID. 609
By 2004, twenty-four of the fifty states by rule,
statute, court decision, or a combination thereof placed
greater overall restrictions than the federal rule on the
admission of convictions to impeach. 41 The rules of these
substantive amendment effective in 1992).
40 ALA. R. EvID. 609 (2004); IOWA R. EvID. 609 (2004) (defining
"felony" in the same way as the federal rule); N.M. R. EVID. 11-609
(2004) (enacted in 1976, and emulating the FED. R. EvID. amendment
pattern by revision in 1991 to reflect the 1990 amendment of the
federal standard); N.D. R. EviD. 609 (2004); OHIO R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(enacted in 1980 and requiring even balancing of probative value for
lying against unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury if the witness is the accused in a criminal case. The original
1980 rule did not include a balancing reference because the Staff Notes
asserted that the federal rule at that time could be interpreted to require
policy evaluation for only the defendant in a criminal case. The intent
was to make the admission more restrictive by requiring a Rule 403
balancing analysis with regard to all witnesses.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
2609 (2004) (original rule effective in 1978. The 1991 amendment
aligned the Ohio rule with the 1990 change in the federal rule to require
balancing for all witnesses except the accused); UTAH R. EvID. 609
(2004) (amended in 1992 to tract the 1990 amendment to the federal
rule); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (employing identical language as the
federal rule, and a key substantive amendment with regard to requiring
a standard of balancing for witnesses in civil cases was added around
1992 which resulted in the Wyoming rule constituting the same
standard as the post-1990 federal rule).
41 ALASKA R. EVID. 609 (2004) (effective 1979, amended effective
1994); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (originally enacted in the mid-1970s);
ARK. R. EvID. 609 (2004); CONN. R. EvID. § 6-7 (2003) (enacted after
1995); DEL. CODE ANN., UNIFORM R. EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in
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twenty-four states employ seventeen distinct standards. In
the following discussion, similar, more restrictive state
rules will be grouped and discussed sequentially beginning
with the most restrictive rules, and proceeding to the states'
rules whose standards are only slightly more restrictive
than the federal rule.
States which by rule impose greater restrictions than
the federal rule on the admission of convictions to impeach
include Montana, which bans the use of convictions to
42impeach. This blanket prohibition of the use of
convictions to impeach was based on several policy
reasons. The most important of these reasons to the
drafters of the Montana rule was their evaluation that the
mere existence of a conviction has low probative value to
prove a propensity to lie, and in those instances where
conduct underlying the conviction is probative of lying,
1980); GA. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9-20, 24-9-84 (2004) (combining
substance of FED. R. EVID. 608 and 609); HAWAII R. EvID. 609 (2004)
(effective 1981); IDAHO R. EvID. 609 (2004) (rule adopted and became
effective in 1985 and the amended rule became effective in 1998); IND.
STAT. REv. R. 609(a) (2004) (enacted in 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN., §
60-421 (2004) (effective 1964); ME. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (amended
effective 1978, 1985, 1990, and 1992); MD. R. EvID. 5-609 (2004)
(adopted 1994) (overriding the conflicting statutory provision contained
in MD. CODE ANN. § 10-905); MICH. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in
1978, and amendments effective in 1980 and 1988); MINN. R. EVID.
609 (2004) (enacted between 1978 and 1980); MISS. R. EvID. 609
(2004) (as amended in 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-6, Rule 609
(2004) (originally effective in July 1, 1977, and then amended by
Supreme Court Order on June 7, 1990); PA. R. EvID. 609 (2004)
(effective 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12, Rule 609 (2004)
(effective date around 1980); TENN. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective
1990); TEX. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective 1998); VT. R. EVID. 609
(2004) (current restrictive substantive form of the rule, as discussed
infra notes 74-80, is the result of an amendment in 1989. The
amendment eliminated the historical standard of qualifying convictions
to impeach because they qualified as crimes of "moral turpitude.");
WASH. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (originally effective in 1979, and 1988
amendment requires a balancing evaluation for all witnesses, not just
the accused, in a criminal case); W. VA. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective
1985); People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. 1971).
42 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-6, Rule 609 (2004).
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another evidence rule allowed admission of such conduct.43
43 Mont. Code Ann. § 26-10-6, Rule 609 (2004) cmt. The Montana
Evidence Commission Comments following the rule stated:
This rule is unlike either the FED. R. EVID. 609 or Uniform Rules
of Evidence Rule 609 in that they both provide that evidence of
conviction of a crime is admissible for the purpose of attacking
credibility. However, both rules place substantial limitations
upon the admissibility of this type of evidence including: (a) the
discretion of the court; (b) a time limit; and (c) a pardon,
annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation making such evidence
inadmissible.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a), (b), (c); UNIFORM R. EvID. 609(a), (b), (c)
(1974). The latter subdivision also provides an "other equivalent
procedure" and makes conviction inadmissible; while Montana does
not have a certificate of rehabilitation, MONT. CONST. art. II § 28;
Section 95-2227(3), R.C.M. 1947 46-18-801. However, both provide
that when a person is no longer under state supervision, his full rights
of citizenship are restored. Adoption of this provision would mean that
only those persons serving a sentence in prison, serving a suspended
sentence, or on parole could be impeached by this method, which
would severely limit the usefulness of the rule.
The Commission rejected the rule allowing impeachment by
evidence of conviction of a crime, not only because of these
Constitutional and statutory provisions, but also, and most importantly
because of its low probative value in relation to credibility. The
advisory committee does not accept as valid the theory that a person's
willingness to break the law can automatically be translated into a
willingness to give false testimony. FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory
committee's note to 1969 Proposed Rule). The advisory committee
believed that being convicted of a certain crime is probative of a
person's credibility; however, the committee believed that the specific
act of misconduct underlying the person's conviction is relevant, not
whether his or her conduct has led to a conviction. Allowing the
admission of a conviction for impeachment purposes merely because it
is a convenient method of proving the act of misconduct is not
acceptable to the advisory committee, particularly in light of FED. R.
EVID. 608(b), which admits acts of misconduct if they relate to
credibility. Furthermore, the advisory committee felt that, in addition
to the reasons for rejecting the rule stated above, the present Montana
practice could lead to one of two undesirable results. First, the mere
fact that a witness can be asked whether he has been convicted of a
felony can, in many instances, cause severe embarrassment to the
witness. This is particularly uncalled for where the conviction has no
relation to credibility, such as manslaughter caused by an automobile
accident. This could cause many witnesses to decide not to testify at all
or, when the witness is a party, not to present or defend his side of the
case at all. The fact that the witness can explain his conviction can
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Hawaii has the second most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. The Hawaii rule
establishes two standards, one limits admission to only
convictions of crimes involving "dishonesty" for all
witnesses except the accused, and the other bans the use of
convictions to impeach the accused, unless she first offers
evidence to bolster her own credibility.44 "Dishonesty" is
not defined in the Hawaii Rule.45
This standard therefore protects all witnesses,
including the accused, to a much greater extent than the
federal rule. First, it removes the discretion afforded to
judges to balance the unfair prejudice against the probative
value of a conviction as proof of a propensity to lie based
solely on the hunch that a maximum punishment of over a
year for that offense per se means that such a conviction is
minimally relevant on this issue. In effect, Hawaii has
limited the admissibility of convictions to impeach by rule,
except for the accused, to only a portion of those
convictions that are automatically admitted against all
witnesses under the federal rule. The reasons for adopting
this significantly more restrictive approach include
references to state constitutional provisions and
simply add to the embarrassment and is not helpful. Second, when the
witness answers that he has been convicted of a crime, no further
inquiry is permitted. This can lead to confusion by jury members who
see no connection between the conviction of a crime and the case or to
undue prejudice, particularly when the witness is a defendant testifying
on his own behalf. Id.
44 HAWAHI R. EvID. 609 (2004).
45 HAWAII R. EVID. 609 cmt. (asserting that rule is meant to encompass
crimes involving false statement and giving "perjury" as a specific
example of such a crime). Like the federal rule, this is another instance
in which the drafters of the Hawaii rule would have done a better job if
they had either defined a crucial concept in the rule, here "dishonesty,"
in accord with their commentary, or eliminated the concept completely.
If the drafters eliminated the concept and simply inserted one concrete
qualifying crime in the rule or simply added the language "and other
crimes whose elements require proof of a false statement," the rule
would provide guidance to which crimes come within the scope of the
rule.
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interpretations thereof which have resulted in banning the
use of prior convictions to impeach the accused.46 Even
more significantly, one of the reasons given for the broader
exclusionary rule, which makes the rule even more
exclusionary than it appears on its face, is the policy
finding that the mandatory admission of any conviction is
wrong because it displaces, without adequate policy
justification, the pervasively applicable evidence policy
balancing rule-Federal Rule of Evidence 403-and its
state equivalents.47 The commentary explains that the rule
was drafted with the intent that when convictions for
crimes of "dishonesty" were offered to impeach witnesses
other than the accused, they should only be admitted if their
probative value as proof of a propensity to lie was not
substantially outweighed by exclusionary policy concerns,
including unfair prejudice.
48
Alaska has the third most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. This rule limits
admissibility to convictions of crimes which involve
"dishonesty" or "false statement" for all witnesses, but only
if the probative value of such convictions to prove a
propensity to lie outweighs the prejudicial effect. 49  The
Alaska rule is therefore, in contrast to the federal and most
state rules, a single standard rule. In contrast to the federal
rule, the Alaska rule eliminates the admission of
convictions based solely on the maximum sentence
proscribed for the underlying crime, as well as differential
treatment of the accused. Crimes of "dishonesty" and
"false statement" are not defined in the Alaska rule.
50
Kansas has the fourth most restrictive rule. This




49 ALASKA R. EVID. 609 (2004).
50 Id.
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"dishonesty" or "false statement" to impeach all witnesses
except the accused, but requires the automatic admission of
such convictions without consideration of prejudice and
other exclusionary policies. 5 1 The Kansas rule adopts a
two standards approach, eliminating the federal rule's
authorization of the potential admission of convictions to
impeach based solely on the fact that the maximum
sentence authorized for the underlying crime was for more
than one year. This rule mirrors the focus of the federal
rule's first standard of admission, but excludes the accused.
Overall, the Kansas rule is a hybrid of the Hawaii and
Alaska standards. It is less restrictive than the Alaska
standard because it does not require consideration of
exclusionary concerns before any crime deemed to be one
involving dishonesty or false statement can be admitted to
impeach a witness other than the accused. With regard to
the accused, this standard employs the same standard as
that of Hawaii-banning use of convictions to impeach
unless the accused first introduces evidence for the sole
purpose of bolstering his credibility.
52
The Kansas standard restricts the use of convictions
to impeach one class of witnesses-the accused-more
than the Alaska standard, but more liberally admits
convictions to impeach all other witnesses than the Alaska
standard. It is ranked fourth despite the fact it received the
same "score" as Alaska because, while protection of the
accused is co-equal with the need to protect the aggregate
of all other witnesses for the purposes of this article, the
Alaska standard is comparatively more protective of the
accused than the Kansas statute is of all other witnesses.
53
The Kansas rule also fails to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement."
51 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (2004).
52 id.
53 For a discussion of the basis for the co-equal "ranking" of the
accused with all other witnesses, see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania has the fifth most restrictive rule.
This rule limits admissibility for all witnesses to only those
convictions which are for crimes that involve "dishonesty"
and "false statement" and does not have an express
exception in the text of the rule for the accused. The
Pennsylvania standard is more restrictive than the federal
rule because it eliminates the admission of convictions to
impeach for all witnesses based solely on the maximum
length of potential punishment for the crime. However, the
rule is more liberal than some component of the preceeding
four state standards because it admits all convictions for
crimes of "dishonesty" and "false statement" against all
witnesses without a balancing evaluation.55 As such, the
Pennsylvania rule is like the Alaska rule because it adopts a
single standard of admissibility for all witnesses. In fact, it
is almost identical to that Alaska standard except it
eliminates the protection provided by the balancing of
exclusionary policy concerns against the probative value
for impeachment purposes of a conviction for a crime
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement." The
Pennsylvania rule also does not define which crimes
involve "dishonesty" and "false statement.'
56
Michigan has the sixth most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. This rule applies to all
witnesses, including the accused and is like the federal rule
because it authorizes the per se admission of convictions
for crimes which contain an element of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." The Michigan rule, however, is more
restrictive than the federal rule because it only authorizes
the admission of felony convictions, which have a theft
14 PA. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (making a cross-reference to a statute which
prohibited the use of otherwise qualified convictions to impeach the




56 The official commentary to the rule does not define these concepts.
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element for all witnesses other than the accused.57 With
regard to these theft felonies, a Michigan judge is only
authorized to admit such a crime to impeach if she finds
"significant" probative value on the issue of credibility, but
she does not then have to evaluate whether that probative
value outweighs unfair prejudice or other exclusionary
policies. 58 With regard to the accused, the Michigan rule
restricts the admission of felony theft convictions to
impeach to those that not only satisfy the "significant"
probative value to prove a propensity to lie requirement,
but also requires that once that level of probative value is
found by the trial judge, she must then determine that the
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect that will
result from its admission.59 Michigan is one of the few
states whose rule includes express guidelines for how to
evaluate "probative value" and "unfair prejudice.'
60
The Michigan rule, like the federal rule, adopts a
three standards basis for considering the admission of
convictions to impeach, but is more restrictive than the
federal rule with regard to the standards authorizing the
admission of convictions based in whole or in part on the
maximum punishment for the crime. Michigan is also the
first state in this discussion of progressively less restrictive
rules to potentially admit convictions to impeach against all
kinds of witnesses based on a particular crime (felony theft)
which is not within the rule's definition of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." Although the Michigan rule does not
define which crimes involve "dishonesty" or "false
57 MICH. R. EVID. 609 (2004).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 MICH. R. EvID. 609(b) ("The court shall consider only the age of the
conviction and the degree to which a conviction of the crime is
indicative of veracity. If a determination of prejudicial effect is
required, the court shall consider only the conviction's similarity to the
charged offense and the possible effects on the decisional process, if
admitting the evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify. The
court must articulate on the record, the analysis of each factor.")
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statement," by logical implication the rule takes the
position that theft, even felony theft crimes, do not qualify
as crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement."
61
Indiana has the seventh most restrictive rule. 62 Thi
rule authorizes the admission of evidence that any witness
including the accused was convicted of nine specified
serious crimes or attempts of those crimes, as well as all
crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." 63 For some
reason, probably historical, "perjury" is included among the
laundry list of specified offenses despite the fact that it is
obviously a crime of "false statement." 64  Significantly,
perjury is the only crime among those listed which by
element analysis satisfies even the minimum admission
standard of being logically relevant to prove of a propensity
65to lie. Moreover, the Indiana rule continues the almost
universal pattern of failing to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement."
66
The Indiana rule adopts a two standards approach in
contrast to the federal rule's three standards. The Indiana
and federal rules are identical for all witnesses with respect
to the standard for admitting convictions to impeach based
on crimes punishable by less than a year in jail, per se
excluding the vast majority of such convictions as
impeachment evidence. The Indiana rule, however, per se
excludes a much higher percentage of all convictions for
crimes punishable by more than a year in prison for all
61 Id. No mention is made of the definition of these concepts in the
official commentary to the rule.
62 IND. R. EvID. 609(a) (2004).
63 Id. The specific crimes identified in the rule are arson, burglary,
criminal confinement, kidnapping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, and
treason. Id. Including attempts of these crimes does not expand the
number of qualified crimes to possibly include misdemeanors because
the Indiana Penal Code provides that attempts are graded the same as
the completed crime; IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (2004).
64 Id. The Committee Commentary expressly asserted that the rule
reflected an express policy decision to preserve prior Indiana law.65 Id. See discussion infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
66 IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1.
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witnesses.67 This large percentage of per se exclusions for
most convictions of serious crimes more than offsets the
fact that the Indiana rule authorizes a higher percentage of
per se admissions of such crimes than the federal rule, but
only a relatively small percentage of convictions for the
nine crimes specifically identified in its rule. 68 Overall, the
Indiana rule admits convictions to impeach more liberally
than the Michigan rule because, while the two states have
the identical standard for all witnesses with regard to the
admission of convictions for crimes punishable by a year or
less in prison to impeach, Michigan per se excludes an even
higher percentage of convictions for crimes punishable by
more than a year in prison. 69
West Virginia has the eighth most restrictive rule
among these states. This rule is identical to the federal
standard with regard to the impeachment of all other
witnesses except the accused, but provides much greater
protection to the accused by restricting admission to
impeach the accused to only convictions for two crimes-
"perjury" and "false swearing.' 70  "Perjury" and "false
swearing" are specific crimes with specific definitions in
the West Virginia Penal Code.7' Under the West Virginia
67 Id. The Indiana Rule Advisory Committee commentary
accompanying the rule, expressly asserted that the rule reflected an
express policy decision to reject the approach taken in the federal rule.
IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 advisory committee cmt. Recent statistical
compilation of Indiana convictions, for example, provide conclusive
evidence that convictions for the nine identified -felonies in the Indiana
rule accounted for no more than fifteen percent of all felony
convictions in Indiana in 2003. Ind. Supreme Court, Div. of St. Ct.
Admin. Court Mgmt. and Statistics, 2003 Trial Court Disposition
Statistics,
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/courtmgmt/stats/2003.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2006).
68 See supra notes 17, 25 and accompanying text.
69 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
7 0 W. VA. EvID. 609.
71 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-5-1, 61-5-2. Perjury is graded as a felony-
punishable potentially by a maximum of more than one year in prison,
and false swearing is graded as a misdemeanor, punishable potentially
by a maximum of less than one year in prison.
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rule, a perjury or false swearing conviction is per se
admissible against the accused.72
The West Virginia rule, like the federal rule,
employs three standards to regulate the admission of
convictions to impeach. The two standards that mimic the
federal rule with regard to all other witnesses except the
accused more liberally admit convictions against such
witnesses than the rules of all the states ranked overall as
having a more restrictive standard. These two standards are
more liberal because they either more easily admit
convictions involving dishonesty or false statement against
such witnesses or more easily admit convictions based
solely on the fact that the maximum punishment for the
underlying crime exceeds one year. This rule also fails to
expressly define the crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
statement."
73
Vermont has the ninth most restrictive rule. This
rule applies to all witnesses, without an express exception
in the text of the rule for the accused. It authorizes the
admission of convictions to impeach when the crime has an
element of "untruthfulness" or "falsification," unless its
probative value to establish a propensity to lie is
substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect.
74
According to the Reporter's Notes to the 1989 amendment,
the rule committee substituted "untruthfulness" for
"dishonesty," and "falsification" for "false statements" to
embody an express policy decision. 75 The policy goal was
to avoid the possibility that the Vermont courts would
broadly interpret the terms "dishonesty" and "false
statements," especially the term "dishonesty" as courts in
other jurisdictions had done.76 The Reporter's Notes made
express reference to decisions from other jurisdictions
72 W. VA. EVID. 609.
73 id.
74 VT. R. EvID. 609.
75 id.
76 VT. R. EvID. 609 reporter's cmt.
128
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 268
which had held that "dishonest" crimes included such
offenses as burglary, drug offenses, shoplifting, larceny,
and other offenses which are inadmissible to impeach under
Vermont's amended concept of "untruthfulness.,
77
Although the text of the rule does not define
"untruthfulness" or "falsification," it does expressly limit
the determination of whether a crime is within either of
these concepts to an examination of the statutory elements
of the crime.78
The Vermont rule's second standard for admitting
convictions to impeach also applies to all witnesses, and
authorizes admission of Vermont felony convictions which
includes crimes punishable by more than two years of
imprisonment under Vermont law and crimes punishable
by more than one year in jail under the law of other
jurisdictions provided that the probative value to establish a
propensity to lie substantially outweighs its unfair
prejudicial effect.79  Collectively, the two Vermont
standards restrict the admission of convictions to impeach
the accused and all other witnesses more than the federal
rule both with regard to crimes punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year, as well as those punishable
by one year or less. The greatest difference in the
restriction on use of convictions to impeach is with regard
to other witnesses and the attempt to admit convictions
based on the fact that the underlying crime is punishable by
more than one year in prison. The federal rule's balancing
standard is tilted towards admission, while the Vermont
standard is tilted towards exclusion. On the other hand, the
Vermont rule is not as restrictive as the West Virginia rule,
because the difference in the latter's greater protection of
the accused exceeds the difference in the former's greater
protection of all other witnesses. Finally, the Vermont rule
77 id.
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is also potentially more restrictive than the federal rule and
most other state rules on its face because of its requirement
that the trial judge expressly state the factors used in
making the admissibility balancing evaluation. 80
Idaho has the tenth most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. This rule applies to all
witnesses, without an express exception in the text of the
rule for the accused, and authorizes the potential admission
of all "felonies." 81 The Idaho rule is the first rule in this
progression which only makes reference to the generic
concept of "felonies." Under the Idaho rule, however,
felony convictions are only admissible to impeach a
witness if the trial judge determines that the conviction is
relevant to prove a propensity to lie, and that when weighed
on an evenly balanced scale, the probative value is greater
than the prejudicial effect to the party offering the
witness.82 On the other hand, Idaho is one of the few states
whose rule does not independently authorize even the
potential admission of convictions for "misdemeanors"
crimes-punishable by a maximum prison term of one year
or less-that involve "dishonesty" or "false statements."
8 3
80 id.
81 IDAHO R. EVID. 609.
82 Id. (specifically requiring that the judge must establish that the fact
and the nature of the felony are relevant with regard to the issue of the
witnesses' credibility).
83 See supra notes 29-30, 32-33 for a discussion of the appropriate
definition of "dishonesty" and "false statement" as surrogates for
relevance to prove a propensity to lie, as well as the current available
data on the annual number of persons convicted of a felony-for the
most part, crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than one year. Unfortunately, while the National Center for State
Courts has begun a project to systematically collect data about the
number and types of annual convictions for misdemeanors in the states,
the first reporting date is not until the second half of 2005. Telephone
conversation with Matthew J. Durose, BJS Staff Statistician (Fall
2004). Mr. Durose is the co-author of all three of the reports on Felony
Convictions in State Courts, 1998, 2000, 2002, supra note 32. In the
few states which did report their total misdemeanor convictions, the
dimension of those convictions may be evidenced by the fact that in
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Idaho is the third state potentially admitting convictions to
impeach, which employs a single standard for making that
determination in contrast to the federal rule's three
standards. 
84
The Idaho standard, like the Vermont standard,
restricts the admission of convictions to impeach the
accused and all other witnesses more than the federal rule
both with regard to crimes punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year, as well as those punishable
by one year or less. The greatest difference between the
Idaho rule and the federal rule is in the degree of restriction
on the use of convictions to impeach with regard to other
witnesses and the attempt to admit convictions based on the
fact that the underlying crime is punishable by more than
one year in jail. The federal rule's balancing standard is
tilted towards admission, while the Idaho standard is an
evenly balanced scale evaluation, weighing probative value
to prove a propensity to lie against the likely unfair
prejudice that will result if the conviction is admitted.
The Idaho rule's classification as being more
restrictive than the federal rule must be qualified, however,
because it expressly authorizes the admission of both the
"fact" of and the "nature" of a felony conviction or both if
their relevance to prove a propensity to lie outweighs their
prejudicial effect. Although the rule does not define it,
the "nature" of the crime does expressly distinguish
between the "nature" of the crime and the "circumstances
of the conviction."
86
2002 alone there were more than 276,000 misdemeanor convictions in
the state of Florida. Fla. Trial Courts, Summary Reporting System,
2002 available at
http://www.flcourts.org/gen public/stratplan/tcpanda.shtml (last visited
May 24, 2006).84 Id. See discussion supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text.
85 IDAHO R. EVID. 609.
86 Id. If only the fact of the conviction is introduced to impeach a party,
the party can introduce the nature, but not the circumstances of that
conviction.
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On the other hand, the Idaho rule is not as
restrictive as the Vermont rule, because the latter's greater
protection of the accused and all other witnesses with
respect to the admission of convictions based upon fact that
the underlying crimes are punishable by more than one year
in prison, exceeds the former's slightly greater protection
of all witnesses with regard to the per se exclusion of
87
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less in jail.
Arizona, Maine, Maryland, South Dakota, and
Texas share the eleventh most restrictive rule among those
states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. These five states have
two standards rules, which admit convictions for crimes
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement" or those
relevant to a prove propensity to lie, as well as convictions
for crimes which are within a broad qualifying concept
against all witnesses. This includes the pervasive reference
to crimes punishable by more than one year in prison in
three state rules, and also to alternative references including
"infamous crimes" and crimes of "moral turpitude., 88 To
87 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
88 ARIZ. R. EVID. 609 (mimicking the language of the federal rule and
making no reference to "felony," instead identifying crimes whose
punishment provides for the possibility of imprisonment for more than
one year and any crime of dishonesty or false statement); ME. R. EVID.
609 (identifying crimes with punishments of one year or more and any
crime of dishonesty or false statement); MD. R. EvID. 5-609 (admitting
convictions for "infamous" crimes or other crimes relevant to
credibility). By using the generic reference to relevance, the Maryland
rule opens the door to the admission of a broader category of
misdemeanors than those within this article's relatively narrow
definition of crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." While
purporting to reflect some study of the federal rule, the rule, in fact,
was virtually identical to the prior Maryland rule. MD. R. EVID. 1-502
(1992). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12 (2004) (allowing the
admission of crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year
and crimes of dishonesty or false statement); TEX. R. EvID. 609
(felonies and moral turpitude misdemeanors potentially qualified as
admissible conviction). Like the Maryland rule, the Texas rule also
lends itself to possibly admitting a broader range of misdemeanor
convictions to impeach.
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be admitted, however, once a conviction of a crime deemed
to fall within one of these categories, it must then undergo a
similar balancing evaluation. A trial judge is required to
determine the probative value of the conviction as proof of
a propensity to lie, and then weigh it on an evenly balanced
scale against the prejudicial effect to any party opponent
except the prosecution in a criminal case. 89  Under the
federal rule, not even the accused that chooses to testify is
protected by this evenly weighted balancing evaluation
against the admission of the complete range of convictions
authorized to impeach. 90
On the other hand, the overall effect of the two
standards of these states is to more liberally admit
convictions to impeach than the proceeding ten standards,
because a broader range of convictions are qualified for
admission than in all of the proceeding states with respect
to the accused, all other witnesses, or both. The balancing
standard employed in these five states is also tilted more
towards admission than the Vermont rule, ranked ninth.
For example, "infamous crimes" and "moral turpitude" are
not defined by the rules employing these terms. The term
seems to be a vestige of these states' common law standard
for admitting convictions to impeach. 91 Like the federal
rule, and the rules in many of the states with even more
restrictive admission standards, crimes involving
89 ARIZ. R. EvID. 609 (mimicking the federal rule and making no
reference to "felony" instead identifying crimes whose punishment
provides for the possibility of imprisonment for more than one year,
and any crime of dishonesty or false statement); MD. R. EVID. 5-609
(allowing convictions for "infamous" crimes, and crimes of dishonesty
and false statement); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12 (2004)
(admitting evidence of convictions for crimes punishable by
imprisonment in excess of one year and crimes of dishonesty or false
statement); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (qualifying moral turpitude
misdemeanors as admissible convictions).
90 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
91 MD. R. EVID. 5-609 (admitting convictions for "infamous" crimes or
other crimes relevant to credibility); TEX. R. EvID. 609 (qualifying
"moral turpitude" misdemeanors as admissible convictions).
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"dishonesty" or "false statement" are specifically
mentioned in three of these rules, but these terms are not
defined.92 The commentary to the Arizona rule, however,
does provide a guideline stating that the determination of
whether a crime qualifies as a crime of dishonesty or false
statement should be made by reference only to the elements
of the crime.
93
Next, Connecticut has the twelfth most restrictive
rule. 94  The Connecticut rule mimics the standard that
evolved in its state supreme court, which identified three
policy factors to be used by trial judges in determining the
admissibility, against all witnesses, of the single category
of eligible convictions-those for which the underlying
crime was punishable by more than one year in prison.
95
The three policy factors identified in the rule are: (1) the
extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the significance of
the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) the
remoteness in time of the conviction. 96 The Connecticut
rule does not expressly direct the judge to balance these
three factors, nor specify the relative weight to be given
each factor. It also does not identify the balancing standard
trial judges should employ in determining the ultimate issue
of admissibility by using these three factors. Connecticut
does have a generic admissibility balancing rule, which, if
held applicable to this standard, would require admission,
unless concerns raised with regard to exclusionary policies
substantially outweigh the probative value of the crime
92 ARIz. R. EVID. 609; ME. R. EVID. 609; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-
12 (2004).
93 ARIz. R. EvID. 609 cmt.
94 CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7 (2004).
95 Id. Connecticut also has a statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-145
(2004), the text of which conflicts with the evidence rule, and more
permissively admits convictions to impeach than the federal rule. Prior
to the enactment of the evidence rule, however, the Connecticut
Supreme Court had placed the same limits on admissibility under the
terms of the statute that were enacted into the express language of the
evidence rule.
96 CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7 (2004).
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underlying the conviction to prove a propensity to lie.
9 7
The Connecticut standard's ambiguities make it
unclear if it is less restrictive than the federal rule with
respect to its authorization of the admission of convictions
to impeach when the underlying crime was punishable by
more than one year in prison. In giving consideration to
both the two-to-one ratio of exclusionary concerns to
admissibility concerns and to the possibility that the generic
balancing standard is employed, it is arguable that it more
liberally admits convictions for such crimes against the
accused than the federal rule, but more restrictively admits
such convictions against all other witnesses. It is clear,
however, that the Connecticut rule is significantly more
liberal in admitting convictions to impeach for this large
category of crimes than almost all of the state rules that are
more restrictive than the Connecticut rule. Connecticut is
the fourth state admitting convictions to impeach that
employs a single standard for making that determination in
contrast to the federal rule's three standards. Connecticut,
like Idaho, is only the second state whose rule does not
independently authorize even the potential admission of
convictions for misdemeanor crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." Therefore, the Connecticut rule is more
restrictive than the federal rule with regard to such crimes,
as well as a substantial majority of the states with more
restrictive rules. As explained in the earlier discussion of
the Idaho rule, its rank is attributable to the fact that there
are far more convictions for crimes punishable by more
than one year in prison, than for misdemeanors
appropriately characterized for impeachment purposes as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statements."
98
Georgia has the thirteenth most restrictive rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to
97 CONN. CODE EVID. § 4-3 (2004).
98 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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impeach more restrictively than the federal rule. 99 Georgia
has two statutes which the Georgia Supreme Court
historically interpreted to authorize the admission of any
conviction of a crime punishable by a maximum term of
more than one year in prison and all crimes of "moral
turpitude" to impeach any witness, except the accused. l00
The Georgia standards do not define "moral turpitude," a
common law concept, but the Georgia Supreme Court has
narrowly defined the term for this purpose.'01
Additionally, one of the statutes expressly bars
impeachment of the accused, unless that person first puts
his or her credibility at issue. 1
02
Overall, the impeachment standards of the Georgia
rule are more restrictive than the federal rule. The Georgia
standards include a blanket exclusionary policy with regard
to the accused that is much more restrictive than that of the
federal rule, which mandates the admission of convictions
for any crime characterized as involving "dishonesty" or
"false statement" to impeach the accused. It also authorizes
the admission of convictions for all crimes punishable by a
maximum of more than one year in prison against the
accused following a balancing evaluation. This difference
more than compensates for the fact that the Georgia
standards much more liberally admit convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum sentence of more than one year
in prison against all other witnesses than the federal rule,
and to a lesser extent more liberally admit convictions for
crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
one year or less against all other witnesses.' 
03
99 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-20, 24-9-84 (2004).
10o Id. (combining the substance of FED. R. EvID. 608 and FED. R. EVID.
609).
101 Hawes v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667 (Ga. 1996) (restricting
convictions for moral turpitude crimes for impeachment purposes to the
gravest offenses, including felonies, infamous crimes, and those that
are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind).
102 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20 (2004).
103 See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text. The federal rule
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On the other hand, the Georgia rule more liberally
admits convictions to impeach than the Connecticut
standard. Connecticut's exclusionary standards with regard
to all other witnesses are much stronger than Georgia's
standards for all types of convictions, particularly for
crimes punishable by more than one year in prison. It more
than compensates for the fact that the Georgia standards'
blanket exclusionary policy with regard to the accused is
more restrictive than Connecticut's, which employs the
same exclusionary standards with regard to the accused as
it does for all other witnesses.
Tennessee has the fourteenth most restrictive rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more restrictively. Tennessee employs the same
language to identify qualifying crimes as the federal rule,
and appears in its text to adopt a two, rather than a three,
standards approach. 104 Like the federal rule, one standard
focuses solely upon the accused as a witness, but unlike the
federal rule, provides for a single standard to determine
whether a conviction should be admitted, notwithstanding
whether it qualifies because the crime was punishable by
more than one year in prison or was properly characterized
as involving "dishonesty" or "false statement."' 5 The rule
requires that the trial judge undertake a balancing
evaluation, comparing the probative value of the conviction
for any qualifying crime as proof of a propensity to lie with
a likely unfair prejudice that notice of the conviction will
cause with regard to distorting the jury's resolution of the
substantive issues in the case. Only when the probative
value of the conviction outweighs the likelihood of unfair
does authorize the admission against all other witnesses of convictions
for another forty percent of all crimes, if the probative value of such a
conviction to prove a propensity to lie is not substantially outweighed
by exclusionary concerns, a balancing standard which is tilted toward
admission.
104 TENN. R. EvID. 609(a).
105 TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(3).
106 id-
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prejudice is the conviction admissible. 107 Hence, the
Tennessee rule regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused is clearly more restrictive than the
federal rule, which would automatically admit convictions
for crimes of dishonesty or false statement.
The Tennessee standard is also more restrictive than
the Pennsylvania and Michigan rules with regard to
convictions involving crimes of dishonesty and false
statement because those states' rules also authorize the per
se admission of such convictions against the accused.
10 8
The rules in these two states, however, disqualify all or
almost all convictions punishable by more than one year in
prison as an independent basis to impeach.'0 9  The
Tennessee rule continues the pattern begun by the federal
rule, which is followed by all the states rules evaluated so
far, of not defining the terms "dishonesty" or "false
statement" when those terms are used to identify those
convictions which qualify for admission to impeach.
On its face, the Tennessee rule provides less
protection to witnesses other than the accused than the
federal rule because it not only appears to authorize
automatic admission of convictions involving crimes of
dishonesty or false statement, but also any conviction
which potentially qualifies for admission based solely on
the fact it was punishable by more than a year in prison. 110
The Advisory Committee Comment, however, asserts that
the intent of the rule for such witnesses is to integrate the
rule within the core evidence admissibility rule, which is
pervasively applicable throughout these comprehensive
evidence codes, and which requires that admissibility of
107 id.
108 See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. The seventh most
restrictive overall ranked rule is more restrictive than the Tennessee
rule with regard to crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false statement"
because it eliminates these characterizations as a basis for an
independent admission to impeach.
109 See discussion supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text.
110 TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
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any item of evidence is conditioned upon its proponent
proving that its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by exclusionary policy concerns.111  The
Committee's comments do not suggest an exception to the
application of this balancing policy evaluation for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement, and this
interpretation of the Tennessee rule would make it more
restrictive than the federal rule with regard to witnesses,
other than the accused.' 1
2
Overall, the Tennessee rule is slightly more liberal
in admitting convictions to impeach than the Georgia
standard. Georgia's blanket exclusionary policy with
regard to the accused is much more restrictive than that of
the Tennessee exclusionary standards with regard to the
accused for all grades of crime, but especially those whose
admission is premised on a crime punishable by more than
one year in prison. The difference is slightly greater than
the difference between the more restrictive standards of
Tennessee with regard to all other witnesses when
compared to the standards of Georgia for such witnesses.
Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington
share the fifteenth most restrictive rule among those states
whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. 113 The rule these four
states share is slightly more restrictive than the federal rule
because it requires a balancing evaluation for all witnesses,
not just the accused, which equally weighs the probative
value of the convictions for crimes punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year as
proof of a propensity to lie, and the countervailing
prejudicial effect the admission of such a conviction will
cause to the parties or the witness. 1 4 Like the federal rule,
111 TENN. R. EVID. 609 advisory commission's cmt.
113 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MINN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R. EVID. 609.
114 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MINN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
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the rules of these states mandate admission of all
convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement" against any witness. 115 The rules in these four
states also fail to expressly define crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement. ' l  However, the commentary to the
Minnesota rule asserts that crimes of "dishonesty" are only
those crimes which involve untruthful conduct. "
7
The rule in these four states, as in nine of the
eighteen states which are ranked as more restrictive,
embodies a two standards approach to the evaluation of the
admissibility of convictions for the purpose of
impeachment."l 8 Overall, the standards embodied in the
Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington rules are
slightly more liberal in admitting convictions to impeach
than the Tennessee standard. The Tennessee standard for
all witnesses with regard to the potential admission of
convictions for crimes punishable by less than a year in
prison is slightly more restrictive because it requires some
form of a balancing evaluation, even for such offenses
properly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement," while the Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and
Washington standards mandate admission of the small
percentage of such offenses properly characterized as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement." With regard
to convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term of
more than one year in prison, these four states and
Tennessee employ the same even balancing standard for the
accused for all such offenses, except that these four states
mandate the admission of a small percentage of such
offenses characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
R. EVID. 609.
1"5 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MiNN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R. EvID. 609.
116 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MINN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R. EVID. 609.
1 17 MtNN. R. EVID. 609.
118 See supra notes 41, 50, 67, 88, and 103 and accompanying text.
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statement." For all other witnesses, however, the standards
of these four states are more restrictive because the
Tennessee standard adopts a balancing standard tilted
towards admission, while the Arkansas, Delaware,
Minnesota, and Washington standards employ the same
evenly balanced scale standard to such witnesses with the
exception that their rules mandate admission of the small
percentage of such offenses properly characterized as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement."
1 1 9
Finally, Mississippi has the sixteenth most
restrictive rule. 120 The Mississippi rule is identical to the
federal rule with regard to the impeachment of all non-
party witnesses and the accused, but provides greater
protection to civil plaintiffs and defendants when they
testify. This rule requires that the same beginning weight
be given to the probative value of convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than one year as proof of a propensity to lie, as to the
countervailing prejudicial effect that the admission of such
a conviction will cause to that testifying party.'1
2
Mississippi is the first state, among the twenty-four states
with more restrictive rules than the federal rule, to adopt a
four standards approach. 122 Although this rule also fails to
expressly define crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
statement," the official comments to this rule indicate that
the intent was to narrowly define these concepts. 1
23
Overall, the Mississippi rule is slightly more liberal
in authorizing the admission of convictions to impeach
than the standards shared in the rules of the four states-
'l9 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MiNN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R. EvID. 609.120 MISS. R. EvID. 609.
121 Id.
122 id.
123 Miss. R. EvID. 609 cmt ("dishonesty or false statement" means
crimes such as perjury or subordination of perjury, false statement,
fraud, forgery, embezzlement, false pretense, or other offense in the
nature of crimenfalsi).
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Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington-ranked
just above it as more restrictive. The sole difference is with
regard to non-party witnesses who have a conviction for a
crime punishable by more than one year in jail. The
Mississippi standard employs a balancing standard tilted
towards admission while the standard of the four states
employs an evenly weighted balancing evaluation. Illinois
has the seventeenth and therefore most liberal rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. Among these rules,
therefore, it is the state whose standards are closest to the
federal rule. This rule was adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 124 The court adopted what it characterized as the
proposed federal rule, which provides greater protection to
all witnesses than the enacted or current federal rule by
requiring a balancing evaluation, albeit one tilted towards
admission, for crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
statement."'1 25  The Illinois Supreme Court did not
generally define crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement" in its decisions. The rule provides for the same
standard for convictions to impeach for crimes potentially
punishable by a maximum of more than one year in prison
for all witnesses including the accused. Hence, Illinois is
the fifth state to adopt a one standard approach. The
Illinois standard provides greater protection to the accused
and all other witnesses with regard to the small percentage
of convictions for crimes appropriately characterized as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement." The Illinois
rule requires a balancing evaluation, while the federal rule
automatically admits such convictions. The Illinois
standard provides less protection than the federal rule to the
accused with regard to the admission of convictions to
impeach solely because they are punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year in prison. It requires a
124 People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. 1971).
125 id.
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balancing evaluation titled towards admission, rather than
the evenly weighted balancing evaluation required by the
federal rule. The rule employs the same standard as the
federal rule with regard to this category of convictions for
all other witnesses.
Overall, the Illinois rule is only slightly more liberal
than the Mississippi rule with regard to its standards on the
admission of convictions to impeach. The Mississippi rule
is more restrictive than the Illinois standard with regard to
the admission of convictions to impeach the accused and
civil party witnesses based upon the underlying crime
having a maximum term of imprisonment of more than a
year. While both require a balancing evaluation, the
Illinois rule is tilted towards admission. Because this
evaluation is premised on evidence that the admission of
convictions to impeach is more significant when the
admission is against party witnesses than other witnesses,
the Mississippi rule is a more restrictive rule. This
determination was made though the Mississippi standard is
more liberal than the Illinois standard with regard to
admitting convictions to impeach civil witnesses other than
party witnesses for such offenses, and all witnesses of
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum prison
term of one year or less.
D. States Whose Rules More Liberally
Admit Convictions to Impeach Than the
Federal Rule
Seventeen of fifty states, by rule or statute, more
liberally admit convictions to impeach than the federal
rule. 126  These seventeen states employ ten distinct
126 CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-
101 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-610 (2004) (The Florida Evidence
Code was enacted in 1976.); Ky. R. EVID. 609 (effective 1990,
amended in 1992); LA CODE EvID. ANN. arts. 609, 609.1 (2004)
(effective 1989, and amended 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
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standards which are overall more liberal in admitting
convictions to impeach than the federal rule. In the
following discussion, similar state rules will be grouped
and discussed sequentially, beginning with the most liberal
admission rules, and proceeding to the states' rules whose
standards are only slightly more liberal than the federal
rule.
Three states, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New
York, have rules which authorize the admission of any
criminal conviction to impeach. 127 This standard does not
appear among a series of evidence rules in two of these
states, but rather among the general statutes of these states
reflecting a long-standing state policy unaffected by the
enactment or evolution of the federal rule. 1
28
North Carolina has the second most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 129 The North Carolina rule employs a single standard
authorizing the impeachment of any witness with a
conviction of any crime punishable by confinement for
§ 21 (West 2004) (authorizing even the use of traffic offenses to
impeach); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
27-609 (LexisNexis 2004) (rule enacted in 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 50.095 (2004); N.H. R. EVID. 609 (LexisNexis 2004) (effective
1985); N.J. R. EVID. 609; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4513 (McKinney 2004) (first
enacted on or before 1920), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS § 60.40(1) (2004);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (2004) (enacted in 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40-355 (2004) (enacted in 1981) R.I. R. EVID. 609 (adopted in
1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-269 (2004) (containing rule for criminal
trials, while Payne v. Carroll, 461 S.E.2d 837 (Va. 1995), announced
the rule for civil trials); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004)
(Wisconsin Supreme Court enacted the rule in 1973 and it became
effective in 1974).
127 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (2004) (authorizing even the
use of traffic offenses to impeach.); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (2004);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. S 4513(2003), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS § 60.40(1)
(2004).
128 Massachusetts originally enacted its statute in 1836, and enacted its
last significant substantive amendment with regard to all crimes except
traffic offenses in 1950. Similarly, the current New York statutes
derived from statues antedating 1930.129 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 609 (2004).
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more than sixty days.'30 The official commentary to this
rule makes reference to its departure from the federal rule
and the historic North Carolina rule, which admitted any
conviction to impeach any witness.' 31 The current North
Carolina rule is much closer to its historical rule than the
federal rule. Most convictions are admitted against all
witnesses without evaluating if they are even relevant to
prove a propensity to lie, and therefore, trial judges are
never required to make the next sequential evaluation of
exclusionary concerns.
New Jersey has the third most liberal admission
rule. 132 The New Jersey rule employs a single standard
authorizing the admission of convictions for any crime to
impeach all witnesses. The rule gives the trial judge
generic discretion to exclude for other causes, and
identifies "remoteness" as the only specific exclusionary
cause. 133 The New Jersey rule does not expressly direct the
judge to balance "remoteness" or any other identified
exclusionary policy against the probative value of the
conviction to prove a propensity to lie, nor does it specify
the relative weight to be given identified factors, or the
balancing standard the trial judge should employ in
determining the ultimate issue of admissibility.
The New Jersey rule establishes a standard far more
liberal than the federal rule in admitting convictions to
impeach. The New Jersey rule authorizes the admission of
convictions for all crimes punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of one year or less against all witnesses,
including the accused, subject only to the possibility that a
judge might find that the conviction is too remote. The
federal rule, however, presumptively excludes the
130 Id. (referring to term "felony" without defining it, as well as to
certain categories of misdemeanors which encompass all of those
crimes punishable by more than sixty days confinement).
131 id.
132 N.J. R. EvID. 609 (enacted in 1993).
133 id.
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substantial majority of such convictions to impeach any
witness. 134  The New Jersey rule also authorizes the
admission of convictions for all crimes punishable by a
maximum of more than one year in prison against all
witnesses, including the accused, subject to the same
possibility of discretionary judicial balancing, while the
federal rule requires some level of balancing of an array of
identified exclusionary concerns against the probative value
of such a conviction to prove a propensity to lie. 1
35
Overall, the New Jersey standard is less liberal in
admitting convictions to impeach than that of North
Carolina. Unlike the North Carolina rule, the New Jersey
rule places some potential restraint on the admission of all
convictions to impeach, regardless of their proscribed
maximum term of imprisonment.
Louisiana has the fourth most liberal admission rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. 136 Louisiana
has two rules, one authorizing the admission of convictions
to impeach in civil cases, and the other authorizing the
admission of convictions to impeach in criminal cases.137
The civil rule has two standards authorizing the admission
of all convictions against all civil litigation witnesses for
crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than six
months, provided that their probative value outweighs the
unfair prejudice caused. The second rule appears to
mandate the admission of all convictions for crimes of
"dishonesty" and "false statement."' 138  Like the federal
rule, this rule-and the rules of almost all the states
employing these concepts-does not define "dishonesty" or
"false statement." 139 The criminal rule, in contrast to the
134 See supra text proceeding note 17.
35 See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
136 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609, 609.1 (2004).
137 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609, 609.1 (2004).
138 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609 (2004).
139 id.
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federal and most state rules, more liberally admits
convictions to impeach in criminal cases than in civil
cases-authorizing the admission of any conviction to
impeach any criminal witness including the accused. 1
40
Overall, the Louisiana standards are less liberal than
the New Jersey standard. The primary reason for the
ranking is that the Louisiana standard has a much more
exclusionary and potentially exclusionary standard with
regard to all civil witnesses. Louisiana, for example,
requires exclusion of most offenses punishable by a
maximum term of a year or less in prison against all civil
witnesses including party witnesses, while the uniform
New Jersey standard is fairly characterized as significantly
tilted towards the admission of convictions for such
offenses against such witnesses. In the evaluation protocol,
this difference more than compensates for the fact that the
Louisiana standards mandate the admission of convictions
for all offenses, regardless of their proscribed maximum
period of imprisonment, against all witnesses including the
accused at criminal trials, while the single standard New
Jersey rule is only significantly tilted towards admission of
all convictions at criminal trials.
Rhode Island and Wisconsin have the fifth most
liberal admission rules among those states whose rules
admit convictions to impeach more liberally than the
federal rule. 14 1 Both states have adopted the same one
standard rule which authorizes the possible admission of
any conviction to impeach any witness provided that the
trial judge, in the exercise of her discretion, finds that the
probative value of the conviction, as proof of a propensity
to lie, is not substantially outweighed by the unfair
prejudicial effect caused by its admission. 142 This standard
potentially authorizes the admission to impeach the accused
140 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. Ann. art. 609.1 (2004).
14' R.I. R. EVID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
142 R.I. R. EvID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
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and all other witnesses with a much greater percentage of
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less then
does the federal rule. It provides slightly less protection to
the accused and slightly more protection to all other
witnesses than the federal rule with regard to the admission
to impeach with convictions for crimes punishable by more
than one year in prison. 143 Rhode Island and Wisconsin
currently employ this considerably more liberal standard
because of an express policy choice-rejecting merely
mimicking the federal rule and opting instead to embody an
earlier federal approach as their standard. 144
Overall, the monolithic standard of Rhode Island
and Wisconsin is less liberal than that of Louisiana.
Primarily, the Louisiana criminal trial standard mandates
admission of conviction for all offenses against all
witnesses including the accused at criminal trials,
regardless of their proscribed maximum period of
imprisonment. Therefore, the Louisiana criminal trial
standard is significantly more liberal in criminal cases than
the rule of these two states. This difference is more than
enough to outstrip the fact that the uniform Rhode Island
and Wisconsin standard is tilted toward the admission of
convictions to impeach regardless of their proscribed
maximum period of imprisonment at civil, as well as
criminal trials. The uniform Rhode Island and Wisconsin
standard more liberally admits convictions at civil trials
than the Louisiana standard, which requires of a majority of
offenses punishable by a maximum term of a year or less in
prison exclusion from use as impeachment for any witness,
and an even balancing evaluation as the basis for admitting
convictions to impeach when the underlying crime was
14' R.I. R. EVID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
144Both the comment to the Rhode Island rule and the comment to the
Wisconsin rule demonstrate a careful evaluation of the federal rule and
proposed federal rule on the admission of convictions to impeach. The
Rhode Island Evidence Advisory Committee Notes compared and
contrasted each sub-section of its rule with the position taken on the
same issue under the federal rule.
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punishable by more than a year in prison.
Next, Oregon has the sixth most liberal admission
rule among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. 145 Oregon has
revised its rule several times in the past fifteen years, and
currently employs a two standards approach. The first
standard authorizes the admission of any conviction to
impeach any witness if the underlying crime is punishable
by a maximum term of more than one year in prison, and
the second standard authorizes the admission of a
conviction for a crime of "dishonesty" or "false statement"
no matter how it is graded for punishment purposes.
146
Additionally, the Oregon rule continues the almost
universal pattern of failing to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement." 
47
The Oregon rule more liberally admits convictions
than does the federal rule because its first standard admits
any conviction if the underlying crime is punishable by a
maximum term of more than one year in prison without
requiring an evaluation of the probative value of the
conviction to prove a propensity to lie against the
exclusionary concerns it implicates. Like the Louisiana
rule, the Oregon rule authorizes a broader admission than
the federal rule for criminal trials, but only against the
accused even if to a more limited degree. 148
The Oregon legislature has made a conscious
decision to pervert its convictions for purposes of the
145 OR. REv. STAT. § 40-355(1) (2004).
146 Id. The Oregon legislature, in combination with ballot initiatives,
has produced a rather frenetic rate of amending the state's rule;
amendments were enacted in 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2001. The
legislature amended the rule for a fifth time in 2003, a change which
became effective January 1, 2004. The effect of the 2004 amendments
was to add an additional misdemeanor assaultive type of crime to the
list of those which can be used for impeachment purposes. Now there
are twenty-two serious assaultive crimes that can be introduced into
evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness.
147 Id.
148 OR. REV. STAT. § 40-355(2) (2004).
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impeachment rule by adopting a policy that seeks to
enhance the likelihood that a person accused of a serious
assault crime, who testifies, can be convicted based on
propensity evidence, under the guise of authorizing the
impeachment with prior convictions for misdemeanor
assault against a family or household member. 149  The
Oregon rule seeks to achieve this goal by authorizing the
admission of prior assault convictions punishable by a
maximum period of imprisonment of less than one year in
prison, if committed by the accused against a family or
household member. 150  Overall, the Oregon rule less
liberally admits convictions to impeach than the prior five
standards because it is the first rule in the sequence of rules
categorized as more liberal than the federal rule, which
automatically excludes the substantial majority of all
convictions of crimes punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of one year or less.
Florida and Nebraska have the seventh most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 15 1 These states employ a two standards rule, which
authorizes the admission to impeach any witness of any
conviction for crimes potentially punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, and for any
conviction of a crime involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement." 152  These statutes also fail to define
"dishonesty" or "false statement."'
' 53
These states, like Oregon, more liberally admit
convictions than does the federal rule. They admit criminal
convictions solely because the maximum punishment
149 Id.
15 0 id.
151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-610 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-
609 (LexisNexis 2004).
152 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6 10 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-
609 (LexisNexis 2004).
153 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6 10 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-
609 (LexisNexis 2004).
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exceeds one year without weighing the probative value of
proving a propensity to lie against the exclusionary policies
violated if the conviction is admitted. The Oregon rule is
slightly more liberal because the Oregon legislature has
authorized a larger percentage of convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum of less than one year in jail to
impeach the accused.
Virginia has the eighth most liberal admission rule.
The criminal trial rule that its supreme court adopted to
apply to party witnesses in civil cases. The rule authorizes
the admission to impeach with the fact but not the name of
any felony conviction, except that the proponent can
identify by name that a conviction was for perjury. 15 4 The
implication of this rule is that for any non-party civil
witness, convictions of any crime, including misdemeanor
convictions, could be used to impeach without a balancing
evaluation. The inference to be drawn from the Virginia
Supreme Court decision is that even the name of the crime
underlying any conviction of such a witness could be
referenced.
Like the Florida, Nebraska, and Oregon standards,
the Virginia standard more liberally admits convictions to
impeach than does the federal rule because it admits,
against any witness, convictions for crimes solely because
the maximum punishment exceeds one year without
weighing its probative value as proof of a propensity to lie
against the exclusionary policies violated if the conviction
is admitted. The Virginia rule also more liberally admits
misdemeanor convictions to impeach than the federal rule
with respect to non-party civil witnesses. The Virginia rule
is almost as liberal as the rule shared by Florida and
Nebraska in admitting convictions to impeach. It is ranked
as being less liberal in this analysis because it prohibits
154 VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-269 (2004) (stating standard for criminal
trials, while Payne, 461 S.E.2d 837, states the standard for civil trials).
The Virginia code provision employs the word "felony" without
defining that term.
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reference to the specific name of the crime underlying the
conviction, unless the conviction was for perjury.
California, Colorado, Kentucky, and Nevada share
the ninth most liberal admission rule among those states
whose rules admit convictions to impeach more liberally
than the federal rule. 155 The one standard rule of these
states mandates admission to impeach any witness with
convictions for any crime punishable by more than one
year in prison.156  These states are categorized as more
liberally admitting convictions to impeach than the federal
rule because-while both the standard employed in these
four states and the federal rule exclude most misdemeanor
convictions to impeach-the standard of these four states
mandates the admission of any conviction for a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison against any
witness. The federal rule, in contrast, requires some form
of a balancing evaluation before such convictions are
admitted against the accused or all other witnesses. 157
However, the standards shared by these four states, place
more restrictions on the admission of convictions to
impeach overall than the Virginia rule ranked just above
them as more liberally admitting convictions to impeach.
While the standards of these four states and that of Virginia
are identical with regard to admitting convictions to
impeach the accused, criminal defense witnesses, and civil
155 CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
90-101 (West 2004); KY. R. EVID. 609; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
50.095 (LexisNexis 2004).
156 CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (West 2004) (making express reference to
the term "felony" rather than the functional and uniform length of
authorized punishment approach taken in the text of the rules in most
states); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-101 (2004) (referencing the
term "felony" and shortening the admissible period to the prior five
years in civil cases); KY. R. EVID. 609 (defining "felony" as in FED. R.
EvID. 609 and prohibiting the identification of the specific felony for
which the person was convicted, unless the witness denies the
conviction); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.095 (LexisNexis 2004)
(defining "felony" as it is defined in FED. R. EVID. 609).
M See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
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parties as witnesses, the Virginia rule sanctions the
admission of at least the fact of convictions for crimes
punishable by a year or less in prison against all other civil
witnesses.
Finally, New Hampshire has the tenth most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 5 8 Therefore, the New Hampshire rule, among the
rules of these seventeen states, has adopted standards that
are closest to the federal rule. The New Hampshire rule
authorizes the admission to impeach any witness, except
the "defendant," with a conviction for any crime punishable
by a maximum sentence of more than one year in prison
and of all convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement" against all witnesses. 159 This New Hampshire
rule continues the almost universal pattern of failing to
define "dishonesty" or "false statement." 60 Convictions
for crimes punishable by a maximum term of more than
one year can only be admitted against the accused if the
probative value of the conviction to prove propensity to lie
outweighs its prejudicial effect. 161
Like the federal rule, New Hampshire has adopted a
three standards rule. This rule more liberally admits
convictions to impeach than the federal rule because its
language is identical to that of the federal rule prior to
1990. The United States Supreme Court interpreted the old
federal rule to authorize admission of all "felony"
convictions to impeach any witness, except criminal
defendants, without requiring an evaluation that balances
the crime's probative value to prove a propensity to lie
against its prejudicial effect.' 62 The reporter's notes to the




162 Green, 490 U.S. 504. See discussion supra notes 22, 23 and
accompanying text.
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New Hampshire rule, however, make express reference to
its generic balancing standard, and imply that it is
applicable to the issue of admitting convictions to impeach
based solely on the fact the underlying crime is punishable
by more than a year in prison when the witness is anyone
other than the accused. 16 3 The rule, as modified by the
reporter's notes, would make the New Hampshire rule
similar to the current federal rule.
Overall, the New Hampshire rule does not admit
convictions to impeach as liberally as the rules of
California, Colorado, Kentucky, or Nevada. The New
Hampshire rule more liberally admits a small percentage of
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less in
prison against all witnesses, if the convictions are properly
characterized as involving crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement." However, it is much more restrictive than those
states with regard to admitting convictions to impeach the
accused, and the admission of convictions for crimes
punishable by more than a year in prison.
IV. Evaluation and Perspectives On Establishing
that Twenty-Eight Different Rule Standards
Regulate the Identical Issue in 2005 -The
Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
A. Significant Consequences of Twenty-
Eight State Rule Standards Regulating
the Admission of Convictions to Impeach
This section of the article begins by identifying two
significant consequences of the current reality that our
federalism has resulted in twenty-eight different state rule
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. This section next identifies possible reasons that
might account for and justify a different standard for every
163 N.H. R. EVID. 609, reporter's notes.
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1.9 of the fifty states. Thereafter, this section examines
whether any of the arguably evidence-based reasons among
those identified are reality, and even if true, justify one or
any of the array of current rules. The evaluation also
provides the basis for making recommendations for reform
which are identified and discussed in the final section of the
article.
The fact that there are twenty-eight different rule
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach has significant implications for lawyers and the
legal system. First, even among evidence experts, there is
confusion about the current state of the law on this issue. 164
For example, evidence experts assert that
only five states (unspecified) have identical
rules to FRE 609, while twenty-one other
states and the Texas Criminal Evidence
Rules have rules similar to FRE 609, while
ten states and Texas Civil Evidence Rules
are different or significantly modify FRE
609. Colorado is stated to have no Rule
comparable to FRE 609, while Montana is
asserted to have a rule "opposite" to that of
FRE 609. 165
Second, and even more significant, having twenty-
164 See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (John W. Strong ed.,
West 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (implying that
convictions of all types are widely available to impeach the accused in
a criminal case, and that convictions in any state or federal court can be
used to impeach); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE
AND FEDERAL RULES 167 (3d ed. 1997) ("Below is the current version
of F.R.E. 609(a) not identical to what is found in the states, even those
with F.R.E. based codes, because of recent Congressional changes, and
also because of the greater policy disagreement here than in some other
evidence areas."); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., LexisNexis 2d ed. 2006).
165 RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
187 (West 2000).
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eight different standards is an invitation for further
parochialism or for the "regression to the mean" principle
to operate when state supreme courts' interpretations of
these diverse standards are factored in to determine the
current array of standards being employed by state criminal
and civil trial judges each year. 166  The twenty-eight
standards lead to state supreme court decisions that further
balkanize the status of the law on this issue, and open the
door for state supreme courts to interpret these diverse
standards based on judicially crafted junk science
heuristics, with an apparent eye to sanctioning admission of
a vast array of convictions against persons accused of
crimes. 167
B. Identifying Possible Reasons for the
Twenty-Eight Standards
What are the possible reasons that account for this
highly balkanized federalism with regard to the use of
convictions to impeach, expert ignorance of this
phenomenon, and the risk of even greater atomization in
the wake of state supreme courts' interpretations of such
disparate rules? First, based on the collective legislative
histories of the state rules, it can be argued that in several
instances history prevailed, rather than policy evaluation,
when the current state standards continued to reflect
166 Approximately 150,000 trials are conducted each year in the United
States. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision-Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberation Groups, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 622 (2001) (explaining that "regression to the mean" is the statistical
principle that the more trials that test the outcome of a phenomena, the
more likely is it that overall trials that have produced the most extreme
results will be ameliorated by trials that converge the overall result of
all the trials to the mean). See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE
IN THE LAW: STANDARDS STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 141
(West 2002).
167 1 document that each of these very significant risks have in fact
occurred in the decisions of the state supreme courts in a pending
article. See Holley, supra note 2.
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historical assumptions or heuristics.' 68  State rule
proposers, enactors, and reviewers for the most part
followed the course of the federal rule enactors and stuck
with past policies. They demonstrated little concern for
study of the standards and policies of other states with an
eye toward achieving uniformity. 1
69
Second, state rule proposers, enactors, and
reviewers must have expressly or implicitly concluded that
no national or shared state constitutional provisions
prevented them from making any of the twenty-eight
choices they made. 170 In fact, state supreme courts during
the period of this study made decisions expressly, albeit for
the most part cursorily, holding that neither the
constitutional right of the accused to testify, nor the right of
the accused to an impartial jury, prevented adoption or
application of the standards to admit convictions to
impeach challenged in their respective states.
171
168 See supra notes 10, 128 and accompanying text.
169 With regard to the federal rule's adherence to current policy, see
supra notes 10, 11 and accompanying text. After the enactment of the
federal rule in 1975, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
abandoned their rule regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach and substituted the federal rule in the hope that this would
enhance the likelihood of a uniform standard in the states by
encouraging the states to adopt the standards of the federal rule. This
strategy, in light of the findings of the prior section, failed.
10 In Green, 490 U.S. 504, no member of the court made reference to
constitutional concerns in the enactment history of the federal rule. See
also MCCORMICK, supra note 164 § 42 ("The suggestion has been
made that impeachment of the accused by showing prior convictions is
unconstitutional, but to date, no federal or state court has embraced the
suggestion.").
171 State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 901 n.7 (Or. 1991). In this case, the
jury convicted the defendant of first degree sexual assault. However,
the defendant did not testify during the trial. On appeal, he alleged that
he did not testify because the trial judge had ruled he could be
impeached with his prior conviction for sexual assault. The defendant
argued that this ruling violated both his constitutional right to testify on
his own behalf and his right to an impartial jury. The Oregon Supreme
Court did make an evaluation of whether the defendant's right under
the state's constitutional provision assuring a right to an impartial jury
was violated. The court concluded that the jury did not hear about the
conviction for the same offense since the accused did not testify.
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Third, these same participants in the state rule-
making and review process must have assumed the
existence of, or actually were aware of, and relied upon
empirical or other evidence which proved that at least
conviction records for one or more specific crimes were
relevant to prove a propensity to lie. 172  Fourth, the
participants in the state rule-making and review process
must have been satisfied that the standard they adopted for
admitting convictions to impeach was consistent with other
related evidence rules, policies, and trends. 173  Finally,
participants in the state rule-making and review process
must have been unaware of or ignored empirical or other
evidence which would compel consensus with regard to the
appropriate standard for regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach. 1
74
While history and particularly history-based legal
rules are by definition not necessarily rational or
synonymous with policy, the four other reasons for the
existence of twenty-eight state standards can be evaluated
to determine if they are rational or at least supported by
empirical or other evidence. The next subsection
undertakes this evaluation.
Therefore, of course, it could not have been prejudiced by that
information. The court asserted that the accused's theory was that
anytime that a jury heard that the defendant was previously convicted
of sexual abuse, and he was currently charged with sexual abuse, it
would convict the accused. The court expressly declined to assume
that the accused was denied an impartial jury. See also State v. Ihnot,
575 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1998). In Ihnot, the Minnesota Supreme
Court sanctioned this outcome, even when a lower appellate court had
ruled that admitting a same crime conviction, which would prevent the
accused from testifying, violated the defendant's right to testify in his
own defense under both the national and state constitutions.
172 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
174 See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
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C. Evaluating the Projected Reasons for the
Existence of Twenty-Eight State
Standards Regulating the Admission of
Convictions to Impeach
1. Evaluating Possible Reason One
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: No National or State
Constitutional Rights Are
Threatened or Injured By the
Choices the States Have Made
The United States Supreme Court has held that the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is a right
incorporated into the basic protection provided by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
therefore is applicable to regulate state jury trial
procedures. 175  A critical element of this right is the
accused's right to an adequate voir dire that gives him a
chance to identify prospective jurors who are actually
partial to conviction or a capital sentence before they are
seated on the petite jury. 17 6  Significantly, given the
eventual findings in this article, the Court has held that the
presence of even a single juror on the petite jury, who
admits or is otherwise proven to be so partial to conviction
because of racial prejudice in a case significantly
implicating racial considerations or to imposing the death
penalty, once the accused is convicted in a capital
punishment case, that she can not decide guilt or innocence
or whether to impose capital punishment based on the
evidence and law presented during the trial, violates the
175 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509
(1971); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
176 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (authorizing only the trial judge to conduct
voir dire, but allowing the attorneys to request lines of inquiry).
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Due Process Clause. 177 The Court held that the accused
therefore has a right to devote at least a segment of voir
dire specifically to questions asking prospective jurors
about such actual partiality so that such a prospective juror
may be eliminated for cause.' 78 In the case of questioning
prospective jurors about how the introduction of conviction
evidence might influence their eventual verdict vote, voir
dire interrogation is, first, unlikely to result in accurate self-
assessments of the likely influence of conviction evidence,
and second, likely to prompt the very unfair prejudice it
would be designed to detect. 1
79
The Court has also held that the right to an impartial
jury requires courts to evaluate two situations in which the
potential for partial petite jurors is significantly increased:
(1) when pre-trial publicity makes it unlikely that the jury
pool will have enough persons who are impartial; and (2)
when the skewing of the jury panel from which the petite
jury is drawn by state law requires or results in the
exclusion of cognizable community groups, such as women
or racial minorities.' The Court has relied in part on
177 See infra notes 209-18 (identifying and discussing empirical studies
proving jurors are made partial towards conviction by the introduction
of conviction records ostensibly admitted for impeachment purpose
only); Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29, 734 n.8 (stating that the
constitutional measure of a jury is taken by reference to the impartiality
of each, individual juror). At the time of Morgan's trial, Illinois law
provided that the same jury which decided the guilt or innocence of the
accused would also decide whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at
721. See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188
(1981); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (concluding that
interracial conflict was a significant substantive element of the theory
of the case).
178 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733 (recognizing that with regard to qualifying
an impartial jury to decide whether the death penalty should be
imposed, it was constitutional for the government to be authorized to
make such a specific inquiry).
179 See infra note 211 (discussing studies documenting that jurors are
made partial towards convicting the accused in the current trial once
prior conviction evidence is introduced ostensibly only to impeach,
even though they often claim that the evidence did not influence their
decision).
180 Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (noting that pretrial
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empirical evidence from social science studies to find that
the risk of a difference in the deliberation process and
verdicts was real when these groups were excluded. 181 The
Court also relied upon statistical evidence to cast doubt on
the rationality of the state's key proffered policy reason for
systematically excluding women from its jury pools. 182 In
this context, the Court characterized the right to an
impartial jury as an essential and fundamental element of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a fair jury
trial. 183 The Court also held that this right prevents state
law from creating even certain types of significant risk of a
partial juror, and therefore jury. 184
The Court endorsed the idea that the constitutional
right to an impartial jury is violated whenever one or more
jurors are in fact warped by prejudice or biased by any
influence that poisoned their judgment.' 8 5 In a subsequent
section of this article, empirical evidence from social
science studies is presented and discussed to support the
publicity can possibly infect any jury pool, even if the crime charged is
only a misdemeanor). Therefore, the Court held that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's interpretation of its statute creating a per se merit bar
to a claim that pre-trial publicity in a misdemeanor prosecution was
unconstitutional because it created the likelihood that an impartial jury
could not be drawn from a community exposed to such publicity. See
also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (stating that women
jurors can be infected by pre-trial publicity); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972) (noting that "Negroes" can also be affected by pre-trial
publicity).
8 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12 (citing four studies which found that
women jurors make such differences).
82 Id. at 535 n.17 (explaining Louisiana's reality hypothesis that
women must opt into jury duty because most were needed to be the
center of family home life, including the rearing of young children).
The Court cited U.S. labor statistics in detail to demonstrate that most
women were in the workforce, and that even a significant minority of
woman with children under the age of three were working.
113 Id. at 528, 530.
114 Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion
because it did not require any showing that the state policy in fact had
produced a partial jury, or that the accused had been unfairly treated by
the actual jury or injured by unfair prejudice of an all male jury).
185 Groppi, 400 U.S. at 511 n.12.
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conclusion that conviction evidence creates a grave risk of
a difference in the deliberation process and verdicts, and
also casts grave doubt on the only asserted reality claim
used to justify the admission of convictions to impeach. 1
86
Almost all state constitutions have an express
provision guaranteeing a right to an impartial jury, and in
recent years, several state supreme courts have
characterized the right as fundamental, independent of the
national constitutional right, and an independent
component of minimal standards of due process.' 87 A state
supreme court asserted that a right as fundamental as the
right to an impartial jury cannot be compromised by even
the hint of possible bias or prejudice.188  Another state
supreme court recently held that the right to an impartial
jury is so essential to the state's conception of a fair trial
that its violation cannot be deemed harmless error. 189 That
state supreme court asserted that the presence of even one
partial juror on the petite jury violates the right. 190
In addition to the components of the right to an
impartial jury recognized in United States Supreme Court
decisions, recent state supreme court decisions have
recognized various elements of the right, including: (1) the
right to be free of partisan commentary by the trial judge
during the course of the trial; (2) the right to review
186 See infra notes 196-98, 209-18 and accompanying text.
187 State v. McDougal and Ruffm, 699 A.2d 872, 881 (Conn.1997)
(asserting that a state constitutional right was independent of a federal
constitutional right); People v. Olinger, 680 N.E.2d 321, 335 (Ill.
1997); Jenkins v. State, 825 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Md. 2003) (holding that
the right to an impartial jury is one of the most fundamental rights
under both the federal and Maryland constitutions); State v. Rhines,
548 N.W.2d 415, 430 (S.D. 1996); State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994
(Wash. 2000) (recognizing an independent due process component).
88 Jenkins, 825 A.2d at 1028-29 (explaining that an improper contact
by a single juror with a prosecution-police officer witness may
constitute unfair bias or prejudice).
189 State v. Herman, 70 P.3d 738, 742 (Mt. 2003).
190 Id. (evaluating whether the accused received ineffective assistance
of counsel by not adequately pursuing disqualifying potentially partial
jurors during voir dire).
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whether a prospective juror was partial and lied to prevent
disclosure of the basis of the partiality during voir dire; and
(3) the right to review whether there was deliberate,
prejudicial contact and conversations between a juror and a
prosecution witness. 191 In summation, the national and
state constitutions guarantee the right of the accused to an
impartial jury, a right that the national and state supreme
courts have characterized as fundamental.
Some of the current components of the right were
established by reliance in part on empirical evidence. The
right, as stated in the constitutions and restated by the
courts, does not contain an exception for persons who were
previously convicted of a crime prior to their current jury
trial. Hence, the first reason, of the possible four plausible
reasons for twenty-eight state standards-most of which
admit in some form convictions to impeach-is not reality.
At least two fundamental constitutional rights are arguably
injured by the willy-nilly admission of convictions to
impeach.
2. Evaluating Possible Reason Two
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: A Criminal
Conviction Record is Relevant
Proof of a Propensity to Lie
The fundamental admissibility requirement for all
evidence is that it must be relevant to prove or disprove the
191 State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1043 (Conn. 2003) (concluding
that commentary during trial deprives defendants of the very essence of
their constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and holding
that jury instructions were not partisan); Olinger, 680 N.E.2d at 335
(stating that a juror who lied during voir dire to avoid disclosure of
partiality, provides a basis for a new trial if the lie is revealed after the
trial); Jenkins, 825 A.2d at 1017-18 (criticizing juror and police
prosecution witness for attending retreat together and having multiple
conversations)
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issue for which the proponent offers it. 192  There is a
universal consensus that no legislature, court, or judge
should, by flat, be able to override this most fundamental of
evidence admissibility rules.' 93 The consensus is based on
the logic that admitting irrelevant evidence is irrational.
Consequently, the proponent of any item of evidence must
be able to first prove that the item has the probability of
being a fact, and second, that the fact has the probability of
actually helping prove her theory of the case, or disproving
her opponent's. A record of conviction of a crime is a
provable fact, but there is no evidence that it has the
probability of proving that the person whose credibility is
192 FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding all irrelevant evidence). Most states
have an express rule comparable to this federal rule. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90-402 (LexisNexis 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-2
(2004); HAW. R. EVID. 402; IND. R. EVID. 402 (2004); LA. CODE EvID.
ANN. art. 402 (2004); MD. R. EvID. 5-402.
193 FED. R. EVID 103 (requiring the proponent of evidence to prove its
admissibility by showing that there is at least a possibility that the
evidence is factually what the proponent purports it to be, and that there
is at least a possibility that the evidence assists her theory of the case or
hurts that of the opposing party). In Green v. Bock Laundry, the
Supreme Court asserted that Congress had the authority to abrogate the
presumptive applicability of the overall rule's general balancing
requirement prior to admission embodied in FED. R. EVID. 403. Hence,
exclusionary policies identified in that balancing rule need not be
considered. But what the United States Supreme Court did not and
could not assert is that Congress has authority to authorize the
admission of irrelevant evidence. First, Congress in FED. R. EvID. 402
expressly asserted that all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Even if
that provision was not adopted, however, no legislative authority has
the power to declare the world is flat, and hence all logical
consequences that flow there from when a litigant can show they could
help prove her case or disprove her opponent's case are admissible. In
other words, Congress has the authority to subordinate the generic
requirement of policy evaluation prior to admissibility, to a rule
requiring per se admission, but only of relevant evidence. In federal
rule terms, FED. R. EVID. 403 can be subordinated by Congress, but not
FED. R. EvID. 401 and FED. R. EVID. 402. Id. at 524-26. See also
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing And
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. & SOC. REv. 123, 156 (1980)
(stating that the legal system will better employ base line probabilities
and other empirical evidence to learn that truth is not merely anything a
court asserts).
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attacked has a greater propensity to lie.' 94 If, on the other
hand, there is proof that the conduct that was the basis for
the conviction included lying under oath, in legal
documents, or in other serious settings and is therefore
relevant to prove, if not propensity, at least demonstrated
willingness to lie in situations comparable to testifying,
there is still no rational reason to refer to the conviction,
and that conduct may be the basis for cross-examination. 1
95
The historical heuristic, which is the longest historical
proffered "proof' of this reality hypothesis-that
194 Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Krishenbaum, Some Empirical
Evidence on the Effect of S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an
Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 88-89 (1973). The section of the Canadian
Evidence Code refereed to in the title of this article was to that
country's version of a rule, which, like FED. R. EvID. 609, authorized
the admission of convictions to impeach. The article's authors
immediately noted that the first premise of such a provision is that
persons who commit crimes are more likely to have a propensity to lie.
Making reference to an article that reviewed thirty-five years of
research on this subject, the authors paraphrased the article's finding
that little or no evidence existed to support such an assumption. For
example, the authors asserted that the data indicated that a person who
would be likely to steal something in one situation would not be more
likely to tell lies in a second situation than would someone who would
not steal in the first instance. In the following discussion, infra notes
196-98, 209-17, this article documents that in the three decades since
this study, the empirical and other evidence continues to provide no
basis to establish that this assumption has a probability of being reality.
195 FED. R. EVID. 609, advisory committee's notes (beginning with the
acknowledgement that the fact of a conviction of a crime is itself
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie). The note asserts that the
conviction's actual function is proof. Id. But proof of what? Proof
that, in fact, the witness engaged in conduct with the requisite
culpability, under circumstances, and with possible results that which
by element analysis alone, or by reference to the specific facts is logical
evidence of propensity to lie. See also infra note 210 (reporting on
confirming empirical evidence of the intuition that jurors will be highly
skeptical of the truth of the testimony of any criminal defendant); infra
note 260 (demonstrating that while many jurisdictions, including the
federal rule, currently ban employment of extrinsic evidence to prove
such specific conduct, given the existence of record evidence, a rule
could be crafted to obtain a judicial admission of the conduct prior to
trial, which would only be admitted, if for some bizarre reason, the
witness on the stand denied the underlying conduct relevant to prove
propensity to lie).
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disobedience to law is logical evidence of a greater
propensity to lie-is "junk science" at its worst. 196 There is
not a shred of empirical evidence to support this inference,
and the evidence that does exist is to the contrary.
197
196 There are sociological empirical studies which have found, for
example, that over the course of several years, youths who self-report
that they drink excessively also report that they use contraband drugs,
engage in crime, and drive dangerously all more frequently than do
members of their peer group at the same time. D. Wayne Osgood et al.,
The Generality of Deviance in Late Adolescence and Early Adulthood,
53 AM. Soc. REV. 81 (1988). These studies did not even purport to link
such anti-social behavior to greater frequency of lying. Indeed, the
very premise of such a self-reporting study is that all subjects must be
deemed as equally as likely to be telling the truth when they self-report.
It is possible to find disciples of almost any "junk science" proposition
including this proposition. See SAMUEL YOCHELSON & STANTON E.
SAMENOW, la CRIMINAL PERSONALITY 348-57 (Aronson, Inc. 1976).
The authors were talking about their definition of "criminals." Their
definition was psychological, and broader than persons who were
convicted of crime. The authors began with a self-damming universal
assertion, that "without exception," lying is incorporated into every
criminal's basic make-up and is a nutrient of criminal patterns." Id. at
348. As authority for this proposition, the only authority cited was a
1915 publication, which was a study of pathological liars and could be
taken as supporting by inference that such persons also engaged in
other anti-social behavior. See WILLIAM HEALY & MARY T. HEALY,
PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION, AND SWINDLING (Little Brown
1915). The reciprocal, but obviously not necessarily logical inference,
that those who engage in anti-social behavior are therefore more likely
to be liars. Thereafter the authors make a multitude of universal
statements about criminals as liars.
197 J.A. BARNES, A PACK OF LIES 148, 165, 167 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1994) (explaining that lying in humans is ubiquitous, ancient, and
diverse, and that there is a lack of any empirical evidence proving that
any particular behaviors or character traits increase or decrease
propensity to lie). The author also calls for more empirical research on
lying. Id. See also Allen A. Bartholomew, Psychiatric Evaluation of
Lying, THE AUSTRALIAN J. OF FORENSIC SCI., 174, June, 1983, at 184-
185 (citing a lack of experts and a lack of empirical or other reliable
evidence to credibly identify personality traits or behaviors as
indicators of lying and liars). The article hypothesizes that law
provides no answers to a prove propensity to lie. Id. It also provides
that neither religious study, nor psychiatry proves a propensity to lie-
the kind of empirical research suggested in some of the reported
studies. One kind of study that is needed is that in which lying under
controlled experimental conditions is tested. See, e.g., Michael Lewis,
The Development of Deception, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saami eds., Guilford Press
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Judges, evidence rule writers, legal commentators, and
participants in empirical research have admitted that the
mere existence of a criminal record is irrelevant to prove a
propensity to lie. 198 The admission of convictions to prove
a propensity to lie, when records of a criminal conviction
are irrelevant to prove a propensity to lie, should also be
held to violate both the constitutional rights of an accused
to an impartial jury, as well as the right of all litigants to
due process. Legislatures and supreme courts lack a
rational basis to justify risking substantial injury to the
liberty and property interests of the accused and the
1993). Controlled studies reported in this anthology provide a basis for
gathering comparative demographic data on the subjects, and the
correlation of that data to whether the subject lied. The reported
controlled studies of lying by children, for example, indicated that.
children of lower IQ were significantly less likely to lie than children
with higher IQs. Such a finding is in conflict with the idea reflected in
the traditional rule allowing felony convictions to impeach that persons
convicted of a felony, a group with a lower average IQ than the
population as a whole, has a greater propensity to lie. Id. at 98. More
studies of adults are needed to determine if this pattern continues as
children mature. Studies that have been conducted on lying by adults,
have produced findings that some persons lie more easily and with
greater success, but most significantly for the rule that authorizes
convictions to impeach on the premise they prove propensity to lie, is
that these persons did not differ from other people on their scores on
objective personality tests. Hence, the studies indicate that there is no
evidence to support the rule's premise that measurable personality traits
or behaviors signal a greater likelihood of lying. Paul Ekman, & Mark
G. Frank, Lies that Fail, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE
188-89 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saami eds., Guilford Press 1993).
198 FED. R. EVID. 609, advisory committee note (beginning with the
acknowledgement that the fact of a conviction of a crime is itself
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie); Green, 490 U.S. at 509 n.4
(noting that for almost one hundred years, including after the enactment
of the federal rule in 1975, multiple commentators, including Justice
Holmes, questioned the relevance of a conviction as proof of a
propensity to lie. See also supra note 1 (discussing critical views of
commentators including those whose views included great skepticism
of whether there was any evidence that records of convictions generally
were relevant to prove propensity to lie); supra note 43 (endorsing the
Montana rules whose drafters expressly acknowledged that convictions
are irrelevant for this purpose); infra note 206 (discussing empirical
studies which have included findings that simulated jurors and juries do
not regard conviction records as proof of a propensity to lie).
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property interest of other litigants.' 
99
Because convictions are irrelevant to prove
propensity to lie, their admission for that purpose violates
this most basic evidence admissibility requirement.
Therefore, the second reason of the four evidence-based
199 See discussion supra note 185 and accompanying text. In making
an evaluation of an alleged injury to the right of an accused to an
impartial jury, the court evaluated the proffered rational basis of the
challenged statute. With regard to substantive due process, the
consensus of scholars and court opinions agree that even when
maximum respect is paid to the principal of judicial restraint,
legislation is reviewable to determine if it at least has a rational relation
to a legitimate governmental interest. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 447-59
(West 2004) (discussing the evolution of substantive due process);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court
noted:
Legislation whose only purpose is vindication of the particular
moral code, beliefs, or interests of a segment of the population
may not be a legitimate government goal, particularly when it
injures or significantly risk injury to the liberty interests of those
who are not members of that segment of the population ...
History and tradition are the starting point but not necessarily
ending point of substantive due process evaluations.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. For a recent state supreme court
decision endorsing the same standard for state as well as the federal
constitution's substantive due process protection, see Caviglia v. Royal
Tours of America, 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004). In Caviglia, the court
observed that
A legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and the
burden is on those challenging the legislation to show that it lacks
a rational basis. . . . The State, however, was not obligated to
present statistical evidence to prove the soundness of the
legislation. In the absence of a "sufficient showing" that the
legislature lacked factual support for its judgment, this Court will
assume that the statute is based on "some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the Legislature."
Id. at 134-35. With regard to the risk of substantial injury to property
interests that can result from the admission of convictions to impeach in
civil cases, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 227-32 for a more detailed argument that it is unconstitutional to
admit records of conviction to impeach.
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hypothesized reasons for the twenty-eight state standards-
most of which admit in some form convictions to
impeach-is not reality.
3. Evaluating Possible Reason
Three for The Twenty-Eight
Standards: Multiple Standards
are Consistent with Other
Evidence Rules, Policies, and
Trends
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that
judges should prohibit the use of so called "junk science"
as the basis for "authenticating" an expert, as well as the
methods, instrumentalities, and studies relied upon by
persons who do qualify as experts. 200  Hence, even an
200 Daubert v. Merrill Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (citing the relevance
rule, FED. R. EvID. 401, along with FED. R. EvID. 403 and FED. R.
EVID. 702). The Court held that this sequence of admission standards
gave judges sufficient discretion to determine if experts were experts,
and whether the scientific and technical innovation and "well
established" theories or methods warrant admission to assist the trier of
fact by looking at its likelihood of providing such assistance. The
Court noted that the exclusionary policies implicated must also be
evaluated. The degree to which the instrumentalities or methods
employed by the person as the basis of her expert opinion were
"established" in that person's field of expertise, particularly for the use
for which they were employed by the person testifying, was an element
in that evaluation. The Court went on to identify a non-exhaustive list
of factors to evaluate, under the rubric of the exclusionary policy of
reliability, but that exclusionary policy under the present evidence rule
scheme is the sole basis for excluding evidence when there is a
significant risk of evidence fabrication. The majority opinion in
Daubert pointed to the fundamental requirement to qualify as "science"
that the theory, hypotheses, instrumentality, or method and its use and
the resulting data is testable and has in fact been tested. In addition, the
Court identified whether the theory, instrumentality, or methodology
was previously published and peer reviewed in appropriate
publications. The Court also identified as an evaluation factor, if there
are required governmental or non-governmental reviewing agencies,
whether appropriate governmental and private agencies have conducted
such reviews, have reached favorable conclusions, and that the
instrumentality or methodology has successfully passed one or more
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acknowledged expert's basis for testifying must be proven
by the proponent of the expert to have the possibility of
being fact.2° 1 Commentators reflecting on the significance
of Daubert and its progeny, have viewed its primary
directive to judges is to take more care in determining that
the reality hypothesis and its basis offered by a person
seeking to testify as an expert are more likely fact than
fiction. Or, in basic evidence law policy terms, that the
reality hypotheses with regard to the expert and her
instrumentalities, as employed in the proponent's theory of
the case, have a realistic chance of being and doing what
the proponent of the evidence says they are and can do.
202
Thus understood, scrutinizing science to root out "junk
science" is not simply a mantra for well-heeled defense
attorneys working for well-heeled clients in tort litigation,
but simply a subset of the general evidence law core
concern that neither individual case decisions nor
eventually the policy reflected cumulatively in decisional
law be based on reality hypotheses-in legal profession
parlance-theory of the case-that are not provable as fact;
i.e., are contra to fact, or at odds with the empirical
steps towards approval by the appropriate regulatory agency.
20 1 Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, Biases and the Importance of
Gatekeeping, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 987, 990-91 (2003) (evaluating
the significance of Daubert with regard to the appropriate role of the
judge as gatekeeper). According to Beecher-Monas,
This framework for justice is the inspiration for the rules of
evidence, and a fundamental tenet is that only facts having
relevance-rational probative value should be admissible in the
search for truth. . . . Although the meanings of truth and
rationality are subject to debate in an open society, ultimately
truth is empirical, and what we understand as rationality consists
of structured reasoning process relating perception to an
explanation about how the world works.
Id. at 990-91.
202 Id. at 1001. See David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific
Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts
in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 661, 672-73
(2000).
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evidence required to establish as fact(s) the assumptions or
allegations contained therein.
2 03
Decades before Daubert, social scientists, working
with lawyers, produced empirical evidence whose import
was used as proof that several evidence rules were based
upon anti-science or "junk science"; their policy premises
204were not reality. At a recent national symposium
entitled "Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law," several
evidence scholars critiqued certain current exclusionary
rules by focusing on whether there was empirical or other
evidence to support the premise that the evidence targeted
for exclusion would prompt juror decision making on
203 Commentators reviewing aspects of the impact of Daubert and its
progeny on federal court decisions have concluded that it has resulted
in more frequent exclusions of at least certain experts and expert
evidence. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 202 at 667-68 (identifying
more frequent exclusion of prosecution proffered experts seeking to
qualify primarily on experience). These commentators' views,
however, were not apparently based on a systematic study of how these
experts and this expert evidence fared in all cases in all federal courts
since the Daubert decision. Studies of outcomes, based on federal and
state appellate decisions, concluded that there was not a significant
difference in the admission of expert testimony in criminal cases, in the
five and one-half years following the Daubert decision, when
compared to the five and one-half year period proceeding Daubert.
Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert On The Admissibility
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 339 345 (2002) ("basic rates of admission of expert
testimony at the trial and appellate court levels did not change
significantly after Daubert in criminal cases"). In addition, surveys of
federal trial judges indicated that more rather than fewer experts
testified per trial in 1998 than testified in 1991. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic
& Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert Testimony: Judging
the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 444
2003).
0 Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First
Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 12 (2002). This series of
articles included three which questioned the assumptions underlying
evidence rules regulating consciousness of guilt, competency of
witnesses, and spontaneous exclamations. Id. at n.73. Dr. Blumenthal
cited to other authors who had asserted that the collaborative effort of
these authors failed to have the impact that the authors apparently
sought-experimental testing of the assumptions underlying those rules
and possible reform in light of the results of that test. Id.
171
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 311
irrational bases.2 °5 With due respect to the conference
participants; however, the more fundamental rationality
issue with regard to evidence rules was not nearly as central
to the discussion. That issue is whether there is empirical
or other actual proof that current evidence rules that
authorize admission, including the rule authorizing
convictions to impeach, can pass this fundamental test.
20 6
Other commentators have endorsed the exclusion of
character evidence or any evidence based on predicting
litigation behavior by reference to prior supposedly similar
or analogous conduct as "junk science." 207 Surely in 2005,
state evidence rule makers and state supreme courts should
hold their own heuristic hunches, which serve as the sole
basis for asserting that an enactment authorizing admission
of evidence is relevant, to the same scrutiny; i.e., to
evaluate if that heuristic is simply "junk science".
20 8
205 Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law Symposium, 2003 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 837-1364. See also Eleanor Swift, Aspirational Optimism
About Evidence Law: An Implicit Theme of the Visions of Rationality
Symposium, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1337, 1348 (summarizing
elements of the symposium by categorizing seven of the articles
focused on evaluating the rationality of exclusionary evidence rules).
206 See discussion supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
207 Beecher-Monas, supra note 201, at 1003, 1004, 1017-19 (illustrating
how future dangerousness predictions should be carefully evaluated for
likelihood of accuracy before admission because irrelevant evidence
dilutes relevant evidence); Saks & Kidd, supra note 193, at 136
(observing that, based on the law of probabilities, evidence law is
correct in excluding character evidence as proof of the theories of a
party's case).
2 It should be noted, however, that in the fifteen year period of this
study, 1990-2004, while state supreme courts made over two hundred
decisions evaluating whether state legislation had a rational basis to
defeat a substantive due process challenge, in none of these decisions
did they refer to "empirical evidence" or "legislative facts," and only
one of these decisions made reference to the "Brandeis Brief."
Alabama Power Co. v. Citizens of State, 740 So. 2d 371, 382 n. 11 (Ala.
1999). Overall, during this period, only eighteen state supreme court
decisions made express reference to all three concepts: (1) rational
basis, (2) empirical evidence or data, and (3) legislative fact. With
regard to state constitutional substantive due process provisions, see
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131, 1136-38 (1999)
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Therefore, the third reason of the four possible reasons for
twenty-eight state standards, most of which admit in some
form convictions to impeach, is also invalid. This
admission rule is inconsistent with one of the most
significant evidence law trends--closer scrutiny of reality
hypotheses claims that serve as justification for admitting
or excluding evidence.
The constitutional and policy case against admitting
convictions to impeach is further strengthened if upon
review of the available empirical evidence, it is determined
that jurors and simulated jurors do regard conviction
records as irrelevant for credibility purposes. The case is
even stronger if the empirical evidence also supports a
finding that the admission of a conviction record to
impeach creates a significant risk that the subsequent civil
or criminal verdict will be the product of the deliberation
and vote of one or more partial jurors. This article next
examines this evidence as possible rational reason number
(discussing Thayer's view that a rationality review reflects a judicial
posture that the constitution does not impose a particular choice on the
legislature, but only that the choice reflected in the statute is rational).
But Professor Hershkoff also referred to Justice Stevens' comment that
rational basis standard has in effect no review at all. Id. at 1136.
Neither reference, however, included a consensus definition of the term
"rational" in this context. Id. at 1136-37. Professor Hershkoff
proposed that state supreme courts should provide closer scrutiny of
state legislative enactments to determine more than if they are just
rational under some possible scenario, but whether the enactments have
minimally protected express state rights. Id. at 1137. While Professor
Hershkoff s focus was on express state welfare rights, her advocacy
would equally apply to the fact that most state constitutions expressly
recognize a right to an impartial jury. Id. See also Randall T. Shepard,
A New Generation: The Maturing Nature of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 441 (1996) (identifying
fundamental differences between the states and the federal constitution
that justify closer state supreme court scrutiny of the rational basis and
reality hypotheses underlying state legislative enactments); Sandra J.
Ware, Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1996, 28 RUTGERS
L.J. 909, 1003 (1997) (identifying a state supreme court decision which
struck down a state drunk driving statute as violative of due process in
part because the statute's reality premise was faulty when it did not
require proof that the accused was intoxicated during the time he was
driving).
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four for admitting convictions to impeach, and for the
existence of twenty-eight different standards in the states,
all but one authorizing such admission.
4. Evaluating Possible Reason Four
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: No Empirical
Evidence Exists to Support
Consensus with Regard to the
Appropriate Standard for
Regulating the Admission of
Convictions to Impeach
Studies of actual jury behavior, as well as studies of
simulated juror reaction to the introduction of conviction
evidence of the accused, have almost universally reported
two findings highly relevant to this study. First, jurors
simply do not believe or act upon a belief that conviction
records, even perjury conviction records, are proof that
such convicted persons have a greater propensity to lie.2 °9
209 Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 Crim. L.Q.
235, 247 (1976) (noting that "juries" who were informed of the prior
conviction were not significantly more likely to even make reference to
the credibility of the accused). Ironically, in these studies, the only
time prior conviction disclosure influenced jurors to significantly doubt
the accused's credibility was when the conviction's specific purpose
admission was not for that purpose, but as substantive proof of guilt.
See also Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record
Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 75-76
(1995) (indicating when directly asked, mock jurors did not believe the
prior conviction evidence was probative on the only issue for which it
was admissible); Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard
Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 407, 415 (1995) (hypothesizing that the credibility of the
accused is not significantly negatively effected in the views of the
subjects of the study, even when the prior conviction was for perjury
and was admitted in one of four scenarios in the study); Roselle L.
Wissler & Michael L. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use Credibility Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & HuM.
BEHAV. 37, 41 (1985) (stating that although forty of one hundred sixty
subjects were told that accused has a prior conviction for pejury, and
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On the other hand, as most trial lawyers would agree based
on their experience and as an intelligent lay person might
surmise, jurors are inherently skeptical of the credibility of
the accused whether or not a prior conviction of the
accused is introduced to impeach him.210
Second, juror studies provide highly probative
evidence that jurors and juries do, whether they
acknowledge it or not, use prior conviction evidence to
prejudice their substantive evaluation of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.2 1' Each study's findings
that the conviction could be used only to evaluate the credibility of the
accused who testified, these subjects did not find the accused
significantly less credible than those subjects told he had been
convicted of two other crimes). Even more significantly, the subjects
with knowledge of a perjury conviction did not find the accused
significantly less credible than did those subjects who received no
information that the accused had been previously convicted of any
crime). Id.
210 Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 41. The subjects across all eight
conditions, including those control conditions when the subjects were
not informed of a prior conviction, rated the credibility of the accused
as significantly lower than that of all of the other witnesses. Id. The
strength of this across the board finding was more than enough to
satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance. Id. In fact, the
strength of this finding, when translated into evidence law proof
terminology, was that it had probative value well beyond the relevance
threshold in establishing that it is reality that jurors are inherently
skeptical of the likelihood an accused will tell the truth should he
testify in his own defense. Id.
211 Doob & Krishenbaum, supra note 194, at 93-94 (presenting seven
convictions, including five convictions for the identical crime as the
charge being currently tried, which were admitted to certain "cells" of
the entire test group). Some "cells" were control groups who did not
learn of the convictions. The strength of the findings of this study were
far more than enough to satisfy the basic evidence standard of
relevance-heightening the probability that in reality jurors learning of
convictions of the accused, ostensibly only to impeach the accused, are
much more likely to return guilty verdicts than jurors who do not learn
of convictions to impeach. See Greene & Dodge, supra note 209, at 67,
75-76 (explaining that individual simulated jurors were significantly
albeit unwittingly influenced to return a guilty verdict by exposure to a
prior conviction, when they were told it was substantively admissible
for a limited purpose). These jurors self-assessment was that they did
not allow the prior conviction to influence their verdict. The strength
of the study's key finding, however, was far more than enough to
satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance-heightening the
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sufficiently rejected the hypothesis that the admission of
conviction to impeach the accused would not influence
individual or collective juror verdicts to satisfy the basic
evidence standard of relevance-heightening the
probability that, in reality, jurors are unfairly prejudiced by
the admission of convictions, ostensibly only to impeach.
The studies prove that simulated and actual jurors provided
with prior conviction information will, at a rate of
difference fairly characterized as probative on this issue,
more frequently return guilty verdicts than jurors reviewing
exactly the same case under exactly the same conditions
who did not receive such information. 212 Several of these
studies either obtained data from jurors and other sources
of evidence after actual jury deliberation and verdicts, or
included simulation of the jury deliberation phase of the
trial.213 These studies lessen concern about "external
probability that in reality jurors learning of convictions of the accused
for this limited purpose were more likely to return a guilty verdict than
jurors who did not learn of the conviction, when all other circumstances
were identical); Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 242, 249 (explaining
again that study group members overwhelmingly agreed the prior
conviction had not influenced their evaluation of the evidence to prove
guilt or innocence, or their individual or collective verdicts). The
strength of the study's key finding, however, was far more than enough
to satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance-heightening the
probability that in reality jurors are unfairly prejudiced by the
admission of even a single same crime conviction, ostensibly only to
impeach. The study proved that such jurors will more frequently return
guilty verdicts than jurors reviewing exactly the same case who did not
receive information of convictions to impeach the accused. Id. at 242.
See also Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 36 (reviewing study of the
performance of actual juries and concluding that introduction of the
prior record of the accused for any purpose increased the likelihood of
conviction by 27%); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making
Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 L. & Soc. REv. 781, 792-93 (1978)
(studying over two hundred actual jury verdicts in criminal felony cases
and finding that defendants, who during their trial had multiple
convictions admitted were more likely to be convicted); Wissler and
Saks, supra note 209, at 41-42.
212 Doob & Krishenbaum supra note 194, at 93-94 (1973); Greene &
Dodge, supra note 209, at 67, 76; Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at
251; Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 42.
213 Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 242-43, 251. The study included a
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validity," and thereby enhance the probative value of the
studies collectively as proof that convictions cause
214prejudice. The simulation study found that the "fact that
the defendant has a record permeate[d] the entire discussion
of the case, and appeare[d] to affect the [jury's] perception
and interpretation of the evidence in the case.
'" 215
In one study, convictions for the same crime as that
for which the accused was on trial were found to even more
significantly influence subjects to find the defendant
total of thirty, four person juries, and forty individual simulated jurors.
This meant that fifteen groups and twenty individuals received
information about the prior conviction. The other half of the test
subjects, were given the exact same "transcript," except the prior
conviction was omitted. All thirty of the four person jury deliberation
discussions were tape recorded. While the prior record did not
significantly affect the verdicts reached by individuals, none of the
fifteen simulated juries who were not informed of the prior record of
the accused returned guilty verdicts, while six of the fifteen juries who
were given this information returned guilty verdicts. Kalven & Zeisel,
supra note 36; Myers, supra note 211, at 792-93. For a mega-study
purporting to identify and categorizing all jury deliberation studies
between 1955-1999, see Devine et al., supra note 166 (identifying and
describing over 200 empirical studies of various facets of jury
deliberation during this forty-five year period).
214 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 166, at 143-44 (identifying external
validity based on the ability to generalize the findings of a study, and
differences that could make generalization debatable). As shown in the
studies cited in this sub-section, this study also identified replication of
the same or similar findings by multiple studies, especially if the
studies employed multiple, sound methodologies. See also Nancy J.
King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63 (1993)
(commenting that there is little agreement about whether and how the
absence of a deliberation component, or other factors present in actual
jury decision making processes, actually skew results of jury studies
that do not include such components).
215 Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 244, 251 (showing that the
analysis of the taped deliberations revealed that the "juries" who were
informed of the prior conviction were significantly more likely to
characterize the identical evidence as strong proof of guilt, while the
"juries" who did not learn of the prior record were significantly more
likely to make more frequent disparaging statements about the case
against the accused). Hans and Doob note that "juries" who learned of
the prior conviction also made more references to those items of
evidence supporting a guilty verdict.
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guilty. 2 16 Subjects of these studies were less likely to use
information that the accused had a prior conviction of a
comparatively minor crime to increase the likelihood of
returning a guilty verdict for a much more serious crime,
such as murder.217 Convictions have the effect of creating
partial jurors and biasing the jury deliberation process, even
when the subjects of some of these studies knew it was not
to be used to decide the outcome, and in those studies in
which they were expressly told that such use was
impermissible.
218
216 Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 42 (noting that convictions for
murder and for auto theft in current murder and auto theft trials
significantly increased verdicts of guilty beyond the significant increase
that resulted when subjects were told of convictions for a dissimilar
crime or perjury).
217/d. at 44 (showing that subjects who were informed that a defendant
on trial for murder had a prior conviction for auto theft returned guilty
verdicts at a lesser rate than those subjects who evaluated the murder
prosecution without access to any prior record information). On the
other hand, Wissler and Saks acknowledge that when subjects
evaluating the merits of an auto theft prosecution were informed that
the accused had a prior conviction for murder, the percentage of guilty
verdicts doubled from the percentage of guilty verdicts returned when
the auto theft "jurors" received no prior record information.
218 Doob & Krishenbaum, supra note 194, at 94-95 (concluding that
despite being told in the very last instruction that the seven prior
convictions were to be used only to evaluate the credibility of the
accused who testified in the defense-case-in-chief, subjects were
significantly more likely to convict than those subjects who did not
know of the convictions, and just as likely to convict as those subjects
who knew of the convictions but were not given the limiting
instruction); Greene & Dodge, supra note 209, at 67, 76 (giving no
significance to the limiting instruction when the matter disclosed to
jurors was the conviction of the accused or the witness). Other studies
using simulated jurors also found that subjects often ignore a ruling that
evidence is inadmissible or a limiting instruction that certain evidence
should not be used to decide the merits, and still use such evidence as
part of their basis for reaching a verdict. See, e.g., Hans & Doob, supra
note 209, at 237, 240 (reflecting on a study in which one-half of the
study's subjects who received information about a single same crime
conviction were expressly instructed not to use the conviction of the
accused to determine guilt or innocence, and were also told that the
only permissible use of the conviction was to impeach the testimony of
the accused who did take the stand). Other studies, focusing more
broadly on the effect of inadmissible evidence have reached similar
conclusions. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 44 (noting
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The collective findings of these studies far exceed
the slight increase in probabilities that satisfies the law's
basic evidence relevance standard, which means that there
is empirical evidence that in fact supports two crucial
conclusions: first, lay persons eligible to serve as jurors
join the chorus that criminal conviction records are
irrelevant to prove propensity to lie; second, there is a
significant risk that individual jurors and the jury will be
partial if exposed to a prior conviction of the accused, and
will be more likely to convict such a person on a basis other
than the specific facts of the current prosecution. Hence,
this fourth possible reason for twenty-eight state standards,
almost all of which authorize in some form convictions to
impeach, is not reality based.
Is the quantitative and qualitative empirical
evidence, as discussed in this and previous subsections of
this article, sufficient to serve as a significant component of
the basis for finding that the admission of a prior conviction
to prove propensity to lie violates the right to an impartial
jury and due process? This article returns to and completes
this evaluation in the next subsection.
that all subjects who received information that the accused had a prior
conviction were all instructed to use that information only to evaluate
the credibility of the accused, but a majority of the subjects admitted
that the conviction influenced their verdict); Sharon Wolf and David
Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial
Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205 (1977). These and several other studies
are noted and their most crucial findings discussed in the literature
review section of Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding
The Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations
for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard and Pretrial Publicity and
Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 686-88
(2000). These authors summarize their review of prior studies on the
effect of limiting instructions with regard to both substantive
admissibility use restrictions, and use for impeachment purposes only
instructions, by concluding "that with few exceptions, empirical
research has repeatedly demonstrated that both types of limiting
instructions are unsuccessful at controlling juror cognitive processes."
Id. at 686.
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5. If There is No Valid Reason for
Admitting Convictions to
Impeach, Is the Contra
Evidence, Especially the Contra
Empirical Evidence, and the
Law's Heightened Scrutiny of
Admitting Evidence Based on
Junk Science Enough to Support
a Finding that the Admission of
Records of Convictions to
Impeach is Both Poor Policy and
Unconstitutional?
For the better part of the last one hundred years, the
United States Supreme Court has intermittently relied upon
empirical evidence as a significant component of its basis
for recognizing, expanding, or even devolving several
constitutional rights, or to evaluate whether there was a
rational basis for legislation which arguably infringed upon
a constitutional right. 219 The Court has also sanctioned the
219 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730 (1997) (finding
complete ban on assisting suicides to be rational because of statistical
evidence that suicides are a serious public health problem, and that a
large proportion of suicides are suffering from a serious mental illness
at the time they take their lives); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
412 (1997) (characterizing Fourth Amendment liberty interests of all
people who are passengers in motor vehicles as de minimis and
subordinate to the interests of the government in protecting police who
legally stop such vehicles). The Court established significant state
interests by relying on statistics of number about the number of injuries
to police officers inflicted during such stops, despite the express
acknowledgement by the majority that the empirical data on such
injuries was fairly characterized as "sparse." Id. at 413, n.2. See Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (interpreting the First
Amendment Establishment Clause to protect junior and senior high
school children from choosing between their religious beliefs and
participation while attending graduation ceremonies in which the state
authorized prayer and requested participation of all attendees). In Lee,
the Court relied on three social science studies to support its evaluation
that teens who did not want to participate in the state prayer would feel
pressured to do so by their peers. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
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use of empirical evidence to evaluate if a proffered rational
basis for legislation is reality, and hence can survive a
claim that the legislation is irrational, or even if rational, is
not protective of so strong a state interest that it can justify
the injury it inflicts or threatens to a national constitutional
right. 220 The Court has also established and restated
several times the principle that when legislation infringes
upon a specific right recognized in the Constitution, or
specific liberty interests identified by the Court in its
substantive due process jurisprudence, the quantum of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of such an enactment will vary up or down with
the novelty and plausibility of the justifications offered in
support of the legislation.22I As documented earlier in this
483, 494 n. 11 (1954) (citing seven empirical, including ethnographic
studies, as a partial basis to conclude that there was unjustified racial
discrimination inherent in de jure segregation in the public schools).
Included among the studies was a psychological study in which black
children expressed an apparent preference for looking like white
children. Id. A second study, an opinion survey in which the subjects
were social science investigators, was also cited by the court because
the consensus sentiment of those surveyed was that segregation was
harmful. Id. For source of the name "Brandeis Brief," see Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (naming the appellate brief which
contained the use of empirical evidence drafted by eventual Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis to defend Oregon legislation that limited
the hours women could work). The brief that he filed contained a large
volume of study and statistical data, compiled by others, which
purported to show that in fact excessive work hours were detrimental to
the health of women. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute, and made reference to the data in the brief as a part
of the basis for doing so. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419-23.
220 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 200-01 (1976) (rejecting statistics demonstrating that the arrest of
males between eighteen and twenty for driving while under the
influence substantially exceeded that of females of the same age as an
adequate basis for upholding a statute which prohibited the sale of a
mild form of beer to males but not females of that age). The Court
found that study of additional statistics demonstrated that the gender
differential in arrest rates for driving while under the influence
persisted throughout adulthood. Id. Hence, even if the differential
existed, it was not a rational basis for a differential treatment of only
the youngest age group of males.
221 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comn'n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003)
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article, the Court has employed empirical evidence for both
these purposes, in its recognition and development of the
components of the constitutional right to an impartial
jury.
2 2 2
On the other hand, for the better part of the last one
hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has
intermittently and erroneously relied on empirical research
fairly characterized as junk science, rejected reliance on
empirical evidence as a significant component of its basis
for recognizing or expanding several constitutional rights,
and has held legislative enactments rational or irrational by
distorting the relevance, probative value, or reliability of
existing studies, or by ignoring empirical evidence to the
223contrary. State supreme courts have also used empirical
(restating the "novelty and plausibility" evaluation standard);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) (recognizing
that regardless of procedural fairness use to implement certain
enactments, due process prevents infringements on specific rights
protected by the Bill of Rights as well as certain specific components of
liberty, unless narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests).
222 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
223 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435-36
(2001) (holding that the city could rely on a single study which
attributed crime rate increases to adult book store concentrations, even
though the study lacked any data on the specific issue before the Court,
and the Court failed to make any reference to whether the study
contained base rates, controls, and definitional integrity which would
make it minimally plausible as a basis upon which to make such an
attribution); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the
mandatory indefinite civil commitment of "sexual predators" despite
express acknowledgement that mandatory constraint by the government
of physical being of a person was at the core of liberty interests that the
state could not violate without offering compelling justification,
including the support of empirical evidence or data, which by definition
means more than just a mere chance of being reality). All the Justices,
without citation to a single empirical study to support their conclusion,
and despite the fact that the Kansas legislature had premised the statute
on a finding that such sexual predators did not suffer from a mental
illness, nevertheless found that the appellee suffered from a "mental
disease," and authorized the possibility that Kansas and other states
could deprive the appellee and those similarly situated of their liberty
for the remainder of their lives. The case is an excellent example of
how there can be multiple discipline decisions to ignore or failure to
develop empirical evidence. This decision characterizing a sexual
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evidence to evaluate alleged violations of state
constitutional rights, and have critically examined the
empirical evidence offered by a state government in
defense of its legislation or legislative classification
scheme.224
predator as mentally ill was based mostly on the fact that the American
Psychiatric Association had included pedophilia, and other sexual anti-
social behavior, as a psychiatric disorder despite the absence of
evidence to support finding that such persons suffered from any or
similar physical symptoms, causes, or that there was an actual
treatment protocol. In its amicus brief filed in Hendricks, the APA
argued that lawyers should not necessarily use their categorization of
anti-social behavior as a mental disorder to find that it was such a
disorder or disease for purposes of the legal standard under scrutiny.
Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae for
Leroy Hendricks, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-
1649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 469200. See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 169-73 (1986) (citing death penalty cases re-qualifying death
penalty jury). In this case, the defendant cited fifteen studies in support
of his contention that the death penalty qualified process resulted in
petite juries which were more likely to determine that the accused was
guilty at the guilt-innocence phase of a trial when the state's system
provided that the same jury would also determine punishment. The
majority found that the plaintiffs claim was one which did not seek to
have studies found relevant or even having probative value, but that the
study results by themselves were the primary basis for satisfying some
unspecified burden of persuasion to establish a per se constitutional
rule. Id. at 171. The Court, without analysis and apparently in conflict
with the apparent subject and nature of many of these studies as well as
the finding of the trial judge, characterized eight of those studies as
only marginally relevant. Id. at 169. This characterization and lack of
evidence of careful evaluation occurred despite the fact that the Court
strongly hinted that it had authority to carefully review and critically
analyze these studies, notwithstanding the lower court finding. Id. at
170. The Court failed to note, comment upon, or integrate or synthesis
the fact that two of the studies it broadly cast as at best only marginally
relevant, were authored by the same core of authors as a study the court
cast as potentially more probative, even though all three were published
in the same volume of the same social science journal. Id.
224 Affronti v. Crosson, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052-53 (N.Y. 2001)
(holding that legislative facts can be submitted as evidence to the
state's highest court for the first time on appeal). When offered by the
government to justify the legislation, the court will evaluate the facts
for their accuracy and if they provide a factual basis for finding that the
legislative classification scheme is rational. On the other hand, those
challenging the legislation have the burden to prove there are no facts
to justify the legislation. See also Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors v.
Central State Univ., 699 N.E. 2d 463, 469-70 (Ohio 1998) (determining
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Given the random opportunities these courts have
had to evaluate the validity and significance of empirical
evidence, it is not surprising that their handling of it has
been criticized. Nor is it surprising that they have not
developed an express conceptual scheme (hereafter "a
protocol") for evaluating or a standard for determining
when the quantity and quality of empirical evidence merits
its use as a significant evaluation component of the rational
basis for legislation, or as the basis for recognizing,
expanding, or even devolving a constitutional right.
Such a protocol could be at least under construction if the
state supreme courts kept better track of their prior
evaluations of empirical evidence across doctrines and
advocates. Furthermore, they must recognize the
implications of decisions such as Daubert for their
that evidence of multiple studies and a data compilation in defense of
legislation that made university professors the only state employees not
able to collectively bargain with regard to workload provided no facts
to support the government's conclusion that workload was causing the
decline in the time university faculty devoted to teaching activities, and
therefore there was no reality basis for the legislation). See also supra
note 208 and accompanying text (discussing what should be the
appropriate review standards employed by state supreme courts in
deciding upon the merit of constitutional challenges to statelegislation).
22' For example, of the hundreds of cases the United States Supreme
Court decided during the period of this study, 1990-2004, the court
only made reference to the terms "rational basis" and "empirical
evidence" or "data" in the same decision fourteen times. See, e.g.,
David N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not So Weisman: The Supreme
Courts Continuous Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 281, 295-96 (1995) (criticizing the failure of
the Court to make reference to or explain why it rejected findings in
social science studies which were in conflict with the Court's
sanctioning of state incursions on the liberty of adolescents seeking
abortions). Despite the social science findings, the court agreed with
the reality hypotheses that there was a factual need for such
intervention because there was a difference that mattered in adolescent
decision-making ability. Id. See also Blumenthal, supra note 204, at 6
(noting judicial reluctance to consistently accept the findings of social
science studies, more specifically psychological studies, as the basis for
law reform); Faigman, supra note 202, at 661, 678; Henry F. Fradella,
A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science
"Researcher's BlackArts," 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 105-06 (2003).
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assessment of empirical evidence when offered by any
party. Law trained statisticians, scientists, and scholars
need to work together to assist these courts by developing
and proposing a protocol that reflects mutually respectful,
accurate, precise, discipline-appropriate components.
226
226 See discussion supra notes 200-03, 214, 216-18, and accompanying
text (suggesting the elements for a sound protocol). For an article
which urges such mutual respect and makes a series of
recommendations to improve the interplay of the expertise of social
scientists and lawyers in evaluating and improving social policy, see
Blumenthal, supra note 204, at 4-6, 24, 33-35 (providing multiple
examples of failures of both law trained and social science experts to
adequately appreciate the other's doctrines and methodologies). One of
the Blumenthal's core recommendations was more production of meta-
analytical studies of existing social science studies with the same or
related null hypotheses by social scientists, and more reliance by
lawyers and judges on quality meta-analysis. Id. at 39-42. In his
article, Blumenthal also recommends more interdisciplinary training,
and more joint studies by social scientists and lawyers to ensure
accurate social science studies and proper use of social science studies
by the legal profession. Id. at 37. However, Blumenthal did not make
express reference to one of the most crucial element of a quality jointly
created protocol that would follow from this line of analysis. A
lawyer's and social scientist's most important collaborative work
should occur at the time the former is fashioning her theory of the case,
and the latter is formulating her null hypotheses. See, e.g., E. Gil Clary
& David R. Schaffer, Effects of Evidence Withholding and a
Defendant's Prior Record on Juridic Decisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
237 (1980). In researching their article, Clary and Schaffer should have
collaborated with a lawyer familiar with criminal procedure and
evidence because their null hypotheses omitted a crucial jury
instruction, admitted an inadmissible juvenile crime record, and
allowed an accused to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
during his trial when, under the circumstances, he had waived the
privilege. Cf Bersoff & Glass, supra note 225, at 289 (suggesting that
law-trained persons recognize that almost all well-done social science
studies have a literature review section carefully examining each
study). Study and evaluation of these literature review sections should
be undertaken to determine if there were prior studies, acknowledged
by the current researchers that made findings contra to the relevant
findings ultimately reported by the current researchers); Faigman,
supra note 202, at 673-78 (recommending that research psychologists
in particular, and social scientists and scientists more generally, remain
faithful to the scientific method and disdain claims that a study or even
a handful of studies can by the basis for a policy change); D.H. Kaye, Is
Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333,
1342-46 (1986) (recommending that researchers and experts testifying
with regard to whether a null hypotheses was disproved, avoid focus
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Absent such an existing protocol, and driven by the
necessity for some guideline to evaluate whether the
empirical evidence identified in this article is sufficient to
prove that conviction records should be banned as evidence
of propensity to lie, this subsection attempts to be faithful
to the protocol construction principles just outlined. This
article next compares the quantity and quality of that
evidence to the quantity and quality of empirical evidence
used expressly or implicitly by courts to decide whether
legislation is rational, whether a specific constitutional right
exists, its dimension if it exists, and whether legislation
which threatens such a right is not only rational, but has
adequate evidentiary support to justify the threat or injury
to a specific constitutional right.
This article has established that no credible
empirical evidence supports the contention that criminal
conviction records are relevant to a prove propensity to lie.
The quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in
this article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant or
irrational to prove a propensity to lie greatly exceeds or is
of the same magnitude of that relied upon in part by the
United States Supreme Court to conclude that legislation
was rational.227 Moreover, the quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article to prove that
conviction records are irrelevant or irrational to prove a
propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions is of a greater
solely on whether a finding(s) was statistically significant, and provide
precise explanations of specific P-value findings). In addition, Kaye
recommended reporting P-values as an incremental scale, conceptually
similar to the evidence law evaluation sliding scale of relevant-
probative value-prima facie case.
7 See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 730 (relying in part on four to five statistical studies
establishing the frequency of suicides, and concluding that a large
percentage of suicide victims are suffering from a serious mental illness
at the time they take their lives).
186
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 326
magnitude than the quantity and quality of statistical
empirical evidence relied upon in part by the United States
Supreme Court to conclude that a legislation classification
was not rational because its premise was not reality, and
therefore unjustifiably threatened to injure the right to an
impartial jury trial.22 8  The quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article is more than the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence uncritically
relied upon by the United States Supreme Court as a
component of the basis to find an injury to a specific
constitutional right.229 The quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article to prove that
conviction records are irrelevant as proof of a propensity to
lie, and to establish that the specific constitutional right of
an accused to an impartial jury is very seriously threatened
by such admissions is of a greater magnitude than the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence uncritically
relied upon in part by the United States Supreme Court to
conclude that a legislation classification was not rational
because its premise was not reality, and therefore
perpetuated a racial caste system.23 °  Moreover, the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in this
article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant as
proof of a propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions is of a greater
magnitude than the quantity and quality of empirical
evidence proffered by state governments, but rejected by
228 See supra notes 181-82, 196-98, 209-18 and accompanying text.
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n. 12.
229 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, 209-18 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical evidence). See also discussion supra note 219.
The Court's uncritical reliance on these studies and failure to
acknowledge empirical studies which had made findings, and based on
those findings, reached ambiguous or conflicting conclusions to those
cited and relied upon by the Court. See Bersoff & Glass, supra note
225, at 286-91.
230 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, 209-18 and accompanying text.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
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the United States Supreme Court and a state supreme court
as proving a factual, and therefore rational basis which
justified state legislative classification schemes. 231' Finally,
the quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in
this article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant to
prove a propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions, is far greater
than the quantity and quality of empirical evidence
uncritically relied upon by the United States Supreme Court
to find that legislation which threatened to injure a specific
constitutional right was rational and arguably trumped the
threatened injury to that right.232
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
This national study of an important evidence and
criminal justice issue-the existing state rule standards for
the admission of convictions to impeach-has proven that a
wholly random and widely disparate pattern of federalism
can emerge when states' rules regulating the same issue
were adopted and retained, reflecting history more that
policy, even after a recent national opportunity for policy
231 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1976). See also discussion
supra note 220; discussion supra note 224; Am. Assoc. Univ.
Professors, 699 N.E. 2d at 469-70.
232 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, and 209-18 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical evidence). Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 435-
36 (relying on single twenty year old study to not only find that the
legislation was rational but that it might be adequate evidence to justify
subordinating first amendment right of a commercial entity). The
Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the data did not even
address the specific multiple purpose adult books combined with video
arcade same cite issue litigated in the case. The Court also reached this
conclusion despite fact that it was willing to project, based on that
research, a cause and effect relationship between multiple,
geographically proximate adult book stores and an increase in crime,
and decline in that area's property values, and without making
reference to whether that study included implementation of or the
nature of "controls."
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reflection had occurred. Some federalism outcomes are not
desirable-twenty-eight different standards in the fifty
states with regard to admitting convictions to impeach is
such an undesirable outcome-unless there is at least a
plausible policy reason that can account for this much
diversity. The article identified and evaluated the four
plausible policy reasons for this pattern, and found that they
were either not reality, and if reality, did not explain or
justify this pattern of federalism with respect to admitting
convictions to impeach.
Part I of this article examined the standards of the
federal rule on this issue. In light of this examination and
what has happened to state rules since its adoption, the
federal rule can now be viewed as a national opportunity
lost. 2 33 Only nine states' rules mimic the current federal
standard.234 This article found, however, that as a matter of
policy analysis, the fact that so few states chose to adopt
the federal standards was possibly an appropriate
federalism policy outcome, because the federal rule and its
evolution was as much based on history and mere mimicry
of available enacted standards as it was even the attempt at
sound policy identification, evaluation, and decision-
making.
Part II presented the primary research and analysis
findings of this article, an identification and ranking of state
evidence rules regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. The conceptual premises of the rankings of each
state's admission of convictions to impeach standard(s)
236were explained. The rules of the fifty states were each
evaluated to determine the nature and number of standards
they embodied, their appropriate ranking, and the rankings
were organized into three categories based on whether a
state's standard or standards were overall identical to, more
233 See supra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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liberal than, or more restrictive than the three standards of
the federal rule. The most significant overall finding of this
part of the article is that at the end of 2004, nine of every
ten of the fifty states' rules still authorize the possible
admission of records of conviction to impeach most
witnesses, including the accused, which, by element
analysis, cannot satisfy the same states' fundamental
admissions requirement-that the conviction record is
relevant proof of a propensity to lie.237 The second most
significant overall finding of this part of the article is that
even when state rules expressly or implicitly recognize that
conviction records must be relevant to prove a propensity
to lie to be admissible on that issue, almost all of them, like
the federal rule, negate that recognition by failing to define
such limiting concepts as "dishonesty" or "false
statement., 238 Failure to define such terms opens the door
to the possibility of broad interpretations of the terms-
eliminating any rational argument that conviction records
for crimes qualified by these characterizations constitute
logical proof of propensity to lie.239  Blame for this
fundamental failure must be shared by the drafters of the
federal rule, who in the legislative history discussed much
more express and policy based meanings of these concepts,
yet failed to so define the concepts in the federal rule.24 °
Part III of this article began by identifying two
major consequences of twenty-eight different state
legislative standards regulating the issue of admitting
conviction records to impeach. Both of these consequences
most heavily impact members of the legal profession.
First, even evidence experts do not necessary know the
237 See supra notes 39, 51, 65, 70, 79, 81, 88, 95, 100, 110, 114-115,
123, 127, 130, 133, 138 140, 142, 148-150, 152, 154, 156, 159 and
accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 45, 50, 53, 56, 61, 66, 73, 78, 92, 109, 114, 116,
125, 139, 147, 153, 160 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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current national state of the law on this important issue, and
more importantly, the practicing bar is faced with the
possibility of further variance in these standards by state
supreme courts' interpretations, and the possibility of
hundreds of variants at the trial level.24' Part III found that
ultimately these consequences fall most heavily on the
rights, including constitutional rights, of litigants,
particularly the accused in criminal cases, and secondly, all
civil party litigants, particularly individual persons as civil
parties.
Part III reached this ultimate conclusion by next
identifying four possible reasons for twenty-eight state
legislative standards regulating the issue of the admission
of convictions to impeach.243 Once history was dismissed
as an adequate substitute for justice or policy analysis, four
reasons remained that would arguably justify the federal
system's current pattern of twenty-eight state legislative
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. 244
Part III next evaluated each of these four reasons.
The most significant overall finding of this section is that
none of these reasons were found to be reality, and
therefore, cannot serve as reality-based policy justifications
for this pattern of federalism. 245 An element of this finding
was disproof of the hypothesis that no constitutional rights
are implicated by any or only a few of the current twenty-
eight state standards, authorizing the admission of
convictions to impeach.246 Injury to the accused's specific
constitutional right to an impartial jury, and the right of the
accused and parties who testify in civil cases to minimal
241 See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 175-91, 199, 219-32 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
244 As Justice Kennedy commented in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at
572, history and tradition are the starting point but not necessarily
ending point of substantive due process evaluations.
245 See supra notes 175-218 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 170-71 and accompanying text.
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substantive due process protection, are both threatened by
most of the states' standards.
247
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that there is empirical or any form of reality
based evidence that a record of criminal conviction is
relevant-i.e., makes it logically more likely-to prove a
propensity to lie.248 No credible evidence supports this
hypothesis, the existing empirical evidence supports the
conclusion that the hypothesized reason is false, and there
is widespread agreement by lawyers and other experts that
a record of conviction is not relevant to prove a propensity
to lie. 249 Admitting irrelevant evidence violates the most
basic evidence admission rule and the most basic
substantive constitutional protection.25°
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that most or all of these twenty-eight current
state standards authorizing the admission of convictions to
impeach are consistent with current major evidence trends,
such as the Daubert doctrine. 2 51 The analysis in Part III
concluded that most of these standards are inconsistent with
the call of Daubert and its progeny for critical evaluation
and even re-examination of the basis for admission of
expert testimony. The article argued that Daubert's
premise that reliance on hunch and heuristics by experts in
other fields, in fairness, should be seen as a general call for
a reality check on the basis of admission of all admission
standards, even those favored by the hunch and heuristics
of the legal community. 252  As such, Daubert's basic
concerns are a subset and supportive of the basic evidence
admissibility requirement of relevance.253 There is more
247 See supra notes 175-91,199 and accompanying text.
248 See supra notes 172 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 191, 199 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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than just the appearance of intellectual hubris on the part of
lawyers and judges participating in drafting and
interpreting evidence rules in continuing to rely on an
unproven historical heuristic, when at the same time
ignoring empirical research supporting conclusions that
conviction records, while irrelevant to prove a propensity to
lie, lead to biased jurors and juries.254
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that most or all of these twenty-eight current
state standards which do authorize or mandate the
admission of convictions to impeach are consistent with the
reality that there is either no or inadequate empirical
evidence that admitting conviction records ostensibly only
to impeach testimony will result in, or create, a substantial
risk of partial juror(s) and juries. 2 55 Also, in Part III of this
article, multiple empirical studies were identified and their
consistent and consensus findings reported. Those findings
were that jurors and juries are prejudiced in deciding the
merits of cases by misusing conviction evidence for that
purpose, while disdaining use of such conviction records
ostensibly for its only authorized use as impeachment
evidence.
256
Finally, the article identified a crucial consequence
of this finding disproving all hypothesized reasons for the
twenty-eight state standards; nine out of every ten state
standards violate or threaten to violate national and state
constitutional rights to substantive due process and the right
of an accused to an impartial jury. 257 Now is the time for
reform.
In 2005, all fifty states and the federal rule should
abolish the admission of conviction records to impeach,
especially where the unfair prejudice that results is likely to
be greatest-when the accused or civil parties take the
254 See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
255 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
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stand as witnesses. Hence, all references to conviction
records as a basis for impeachment should be eliminated.
Montana has adopted this ban for all witnesses, and that
ban demonstrates that such a ban can be implemented
now. 258 In fairness, enhancing the likelihood of convicting
persons with records, and taking their property in civil
cases, are not adequate counterweights to the admission of
irrelevant evidence that injures these person's constitutional
rights. Nothing in substance will be injured by the ban
when the focus is upon the primary goal of trials-the
search for truth-because jurors will always be skeptical of
the veracity of the accused, civil parties, and any witness
who stands to gain or lose as a result of the outcome of the
trial. 259 Furthermore, when it is appropriate and necessary,
i.e., when a witness refuses to admit that he has previously
lied under oath, and there is a judicial determination that he
has so lied, the trial judge can instruct the jury of the fact
that the person has previously lied under oath. There is
never a justification for reference to a record of criminal
conviction, and such a conviction record need not be the
only basis for a judicial determination that the witness has
previously lied under oath.260 Federalism is one of the
258 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. See also supra notes
44, 52, 102 (discussing the fact that Hawaii, Kansas, and Georgia all
ban the offensive introduction of any conviction to impeach the
accused). All states should immediately abandon qualifying which
convictions can be admitted to impeach on the ground that the crime
charged was punishable by more than one year in jail. States should
also immediately abandon which qualifying convictions can be
admitted to impeach by reference to common law concepts such as
"moral turpitude" or any generic and undefined concepts such as
crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." These common law and
generic concepts open the door to potential distortion to accomplish an
admission goal.259 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
260 Pre-trial notice and a pre-trial hearing provide a procedural avenue
for proving a previously unadjudicated lie under oath. Eliminating any
reference to a record of criminal conviction means that the new national
standard becomes simply a very limited procedural exception to FED.
R. EVID. 608 and comparable state rules, which allow questioning but
not extrinsic evidence to prove specific incidents of behavior relevant
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greatest strengths of our system; it is not, however, an
excuse for ignoring our most basic constitutional and
evidentiary policies.
to prove propensity to lie.
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In the summer of 2003, Representative Charles
Norwood (GA) first introduced the controversial house bill
titled the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal Act (hereinafter "the CLEAR Act").' Though the
original Act expired with the 108th Congress,
Representative Norwood reintroduced the bill in the
2summer of 2005. The CLEAR Act was designed to
address "the growing U.S. criminal alien crisis." 3  In
particular, the Act focuses on perceived inadequacies in the
current system of enforcing immigration laws. 4 It seeks to
improve immigration enforcement by incorporating the
help of state and local police in applying stricter penalties
to those who violate immigration laws.
The present legislation grew largely out of concerns
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. While
there had been a perceived crisis of illegal immigration
' Clear Law Enforcement For Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act
of 2003, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c108:H.R.2671: (last visited May
24, 2006); See Press Release, Congressman Charlie Norwood,
Norwood Introduces the CLEAR Act (July 9, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09_norwood/CLEARAct.html
!last visited May 24, 2006).
Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of
2005, H.R. 3137, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.3137: (last visited May
24, 2006). See Press release, Congressman Charlie Norwood, CLEAR
Act 2005 Introduced in U.S. House (June 30, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09-norwood/CLEAR05.html
last visited May 24, 2006).
Press Release, Norwood, July 9, 2003, supra note 1.
4 Id. (referring to "[tioday's broken enforcement system").
197
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 337
predating this time,5 the horrifying and unexpected attacks
of 2001 drew national attention to immigration issues
because all nineteen hijackers were foreign nationals.
6
After news broke just days later that at least sixteen of the
hijackers entered the country on legal visas, and that some
remained in violation of their visas, many began to feel
uneasy about terrorists taking "advantage of America's
open society.",7 In the months following the attacks, many
people blamed the inefficiencies on the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the federal agency charged
with regulating immigration. 8 Furthermore, news that three
of the hijackers had encounters with local police officers in
the weeks preceding the attacks led many to question
whether increased communication and cooperation between
various law enforcement agencies could have foiled the
terrorist plot. 9 The CLEAR Act addresses this latter issue
by affirming the authority of state and local law
5 See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003
(CLEAR Act): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Sec., and Claims of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1
(2003) [hereinafter CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing] (statement by Rep.
Hostetler, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border See.,
and Claims) (referring to the "illegal immigration crisis of epic
proportions" and citing INS illegal immigrant statistics from 1996); see
also discussion infra Part II.B.
6 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 22 (prepared statement of
Kris W. Kobach, Assoc. Professor of Law).
7 See Peter Slevin & Mary Beth Sheridan, Suspects Entered U.S. on
Legal Visas, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A6; see also Donna
Leinwand, Foreigners Linked to Terror Tricked INS, Report Says, USA
TODAY, May 22, 2002, at 8A (reporting that at least half of forty-eight
terrorism suspects since 1993 "manipulated or violated immigration
laws").
8 Leinwand, supra note 7 (citing report's "unflattering portrayal of the
INS").
9 See State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law:
Evaluating a Unified Approach for Stopping Terrorists, Testimony
before the United States Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., and Citizenship (Apr. 22, 2004) (prepared
statement by Michelle Malkin), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=l 156 (last visited May 24,
2006).
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enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws;' 0
by providing states and local agencies with incentives to
enforce immigration laws;" and by establishing a system
to facilitate communication about immigration violators
among federal, state, and local agencies. 12 In addition, the
CLEAR Act amends existing immigration laws by creating
and increasing criminal and civil penalties for immigration
violations. 13
Supporters of the CLEAR Act applaud it as a
solution to the limited resources of federal immigration
officials and as a measure to stop the growing number of
"illegal aliens."' 14  On the other hand, immigration
advocates and many others oppose the measure, fearing
that it represents a growing assault on immigration, has
negative civil rights repercussions, and frustrates current
police objectives. 15  To be sure, the CLEAR Act has
'0 H.R. 3137 § 2.
" Id. §§ 3, 7.
12 Id. §§ 5-6.
13 Id. § 4.
14 See, e.g., NumbersUSA, HOT TOPIC: State and Local Police in
Immigration Law Enforcement,
http://numbersusa.com/hottopic/clearact.html (last visited May 24,
2006). Many immigrant advocates object to the categorization of
certain non-citizens as "illegal." See Ruben J. Garcia, Comment,
Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of
Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 118, 118 n.1 (1995);
Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of Identities: A Narrative
Analysis of Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 138, 202-03 (2004). While I prefer using the
phrase "undocumented immigrants" to refer to non-citizens in the
country without authorization of federal immigration officials, I also
use the terms "illegal alien" and "illegal immigrant" when referring to
specific provisions of legislation and to public debate. It should be
noted, however, that the terms "alien" and "immigrant" have different
legal meanings. See generally 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens §
901 (2005).
15 See ACLU Statement on H.R. 2671, the "Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003" before the House
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. and Claims (Oct. 1, 2003),
available at
http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=138
81&c=22 (last visited May 24, 2006).
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provided another avenue of discussion in the highly
debated field of immigration policy. Although this debate
preceded the 9/11 attacks, it has gained strength in its
aftermath.
This comment will briefly review the development
of relevant immigration law, focusing particularly on
legislation aimed at solving the "illegal immigration
problem." It will also discuss how the 9/11 attacks
impacted immigration policy by framing the immigration
debate in the language of national security. As a result,
immigration policy has become inextricably linked with
anti-terrorism policy and no longer has "an independent
policy agenda."'1 6  The CLEAR Act exemplifies this
intertwining; it represents the combination of post-9/11
terrorism concerns and pre-9/11 anti-immigration
sentiment. Although the legislation is promoted as a
measure to increase the security and welfare of America's
citizens, it has the potential to promote racial and ethnic
profiling and to actually frustrate local law enforcement
efforts. This comment does not address the important legal
question of whether local and state law enforcement
agencies do indeed have the authority to enforce federal
immigration laws, as the CLEAR Act maintains. 17 Rather,
it focuses on the CLEAR Act's policy implications. This
comment attempts to show that not only is the CLEAR Act
potentially dangerous legislation in and of itself, but
16 Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is
Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1228 (2004).
17 For information on whether federal law preempts local and state
authorities from enforcing immigration law, see generally Jill Keblawi,
Comment, Immigration Arrests by Local Police: Inherent Authority or
Inherently Preempted?, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 817 (2004); see also,
April McKenzie, Comment, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of
Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws
Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1151-55 (2004); Craig B. Mousin, A
Clear View from the Prairie: Harold Washington & the People of
Illinois Respond to Federal Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 285, 305-06 (2005); Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The
Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of
Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323 (2005).
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perhaps more importantly, it is premised on bad policy-
the policy of equating immigrants with terrorists and
criminals.
II. Historical and Legal Development
A. Federal Government's Broad Exclusion
Powers
Immigration has been an area of law governed
almost exclusively by federal legislation and executive
regulations.18 In fact, courts have taken a decisively hands-
off approach to most immigration matters through the use
of the plenary power doctrine, which limits judicial
oversight. 19 Viewed as a nation's right to control who
enters and remains within its territory, immigration laws
have long been perceived as intimately related to the
sovereign powers of the federal government. 20 In addition,
18 But see Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration
Laws: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1627-28 (1992) (noting that in recent years the
judiciary has been involved in an increasing number of cases involving
immigrants, particularly cases related to equal protection of the laws
and freedom from detention).
19 Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform
Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 840
1997); Motomura, supra note 18, at 1626.
o See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (finding the
power of Congress to control immigration to be "very broad, touching
as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our
foreign relations and the national security"); Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) ("Courts have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political
departments largely immune from judicial control."); Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("[E]very sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe."); Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (reasserting "the power of the government to
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immigration laws are often seen as inextricably linked to
and impacting the nation's foreign relations.
2 1
At the most fundamental level, illegal immigration
has existed since legal immigration has been restricted, and
has existed since groups of non-citizens have been
excluded from legal entry into, or continued residence
within, the United States. Early immigration enactments
in the United States sought to restrict immigration by
certain ethnic or national groups. 23  In the nineteenth
century, for example, lawmakers enacted the "Chinese
exclusion laws," which placed a moratorium on entry by
Chinese laborers.24 In 1924, Congress passed a
comprehensive immigration policy based on a national
origins quota system,25 which apparently was intended to
regulate the ethnic composition of immigrants. 2' This
national quota system remained the underlying principle of
U.S. immigration law until 1965.
exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the
ublic interests require such exclusion").
See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530; see also Victor Romero, Race,
Immigration, & the Department of Homeland Security, 19 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 51, 53-54 (2004) (noting that immigration issues
have been ruled political matters in part because of "the extent that the
migration of noncitizens impacts foreign relations").
22 Illegal immigrants fall into two general categories: those who enter
the country without passing through inspection and being granted
permission from federal authorities and those who lawfully enter the
country on legal visas but remain in violation of their visas.
23 For a discussion of the historic role of race in U.S. immigration law,
see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988-94 (2002);
Romero, supra note 21, at 54.
21 See Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Ping, 130 U.S. 581.
The Supreme Court found such exclusion, which was based on the
presence of "foreigners of a different race" whose lack of assimilation
presented a danger to peace and security, to be within the sovereign
? owers of the national government. Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.43 Stat. 153 (1924), repealed by INA Amendments of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
26 Cole, supra note 23, at 991 (recounting statement of the
Commissioner of Immigration in 1925 that "virtually all immigrants
now 'looked' like Americans") (citing THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALIENIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 165 (4th ed. 1998)).
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Early immigration laws also sought to prevent
alleged politically subversive foreigners from infiltrating
society. Many scholars argue that immigration laws were
constructed, and groups of immigrants excluded, in
response to domestic social change and international
28conflict. For example, Congress responded to the
assassination of President McKinlei in 1902 with
immigration laws excluding anarchists. 9 Anarchists were
also the target of legislation in the early twentieth century
in response to such events as the Haymarket Square rally in
Chicago and the rise of the Wobblies. 30 By the 1940s and
1950s, immigration legislation focused on deporting and
excluding Communists. 31
In 1952, Congress passed the comprehensive
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which continues to
be the foundation of U.S. immigration law today. 32 The
INA originally retained the "national origins formula" that
was established in 1924 for regulating immigration and
included earlier acts governing the exclusion and
deportation of certain immigrants. In 1965, Congress
amended the INA to exclude discrimination based on such
criteria as race and national origins.
33
27The earliest examples of laws limiting "politically undesirable
persons" may have been the Alien and Sedition Acts of the late-
eighteenth century. Johnson, supra note 19, at 834.
28/d.
29 Cole, supra note 23, at 994.
30 Johnson, supra note 19, at 845-47.
31 Id. at 850-51.
32 Immigration & Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2003)).
31 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
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B. Tackling the "Illegal Immigration
Problem"
1. Development of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act
Until the 1970s, legislation dealing with illegal
immigration focused primarily on enforcing penalties
against those who smuggled and harbored illegal
immigrants. Under the INA, it was a felony to willfully
import, transport, or harbor an undocumented immigrant,
though it specifically exempted employers from penalties.
34
Over time, lawmakers increasingly focused on the growing
number of undocumented immigrants in the country, the
majority of whom came from Mexico. 35  Legislative
activity in this area increased, and in 1971, the ninety-
second Congress began holding hearings on the issue.
3 6
Much attention was given to the effects of immigration,
particularly undocumented immigration, on the nation's
labor market. 37  The common understanding was that
immigrant laborers from economically deprived countries
depressed the American labor market and increased
unemployment among low-skill citizens by taking low-
wage jobs. 38  Thus, lawmakers decided that legislation
14 H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51-52 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5655-56 (citing INA (1952) §§ 274, 287(a)(3)).
35 See Barry R. Chiswick, The Illegal Immigration Policy Dilemma, in
ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 73, 75 (Susan Pozo ed.,
W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Employment Research 1986). But see Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., Conference Paper, America 's Schizophrenic Immigration
Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV. 755, 767 (2000)
("While the stereotypical image of an illegal immigrant is of a Latino
crossing the U.S. border at night, more than 40% of illegal immigrants
are actually people who entered the country legally but overstayed their
visas.").
36 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 52.
37 See generally George J. Borjas, Immigrants and the U.S. Labor
Market, in ESSAYS ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 7 (Susan
Pozo ed., W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 1986).
38 But see Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigration to the
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aimed at decreasing the flow of illegal immigration was
necessary "both to protect U.S. labor and economy, and to
assure the orderly entry of immigrants into this country."
39
Various bills dealing with illegal immigration were
introduced in the House and Senate throughout the 1970s
and into the 1980s.4 ° Little headway was made, however,
often because the two branches of the legislature could not
agree on final resolutions.41 One law that did pass was the
Act of October 5, 1978.42 This Act created the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to study
the current state of immigration law and to report its
findings and recommendations for reform to the President
and Congress.
43
In March 1981, the Commission published its final
report, an which affirmed the notion that undocumented
immigrants are attracted primarily by employment
opportunities.45 It discussed the "pernicious effects" of
undocumented immigration on society, which it argued led
to the creation of an underclass of workers who are "at the
mercy of unscrupulous employers and coyotes who
smuggle them across the border. 4 6 The Commission saw
the most devastating impact of widespread undocumented
United States, 21 ANN. REv. Soc. 195, 210 (1995) (arguing that
undocumented immigrants actually "help generate employment for
others through their work and consumption" and that studies show
undocumented immigrants to have contributed to federal budgetary
surpluses, rather than deficits).
39 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 52 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-506, at 3
11975)).
o See id. at 52-55.
41 Id.
42 Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978).
43 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 53.
44 SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NAT'L INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY WITH SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMM'RS (U.S.
Gov't Printing Office 1980).451 Id. at 41.46 Id. at 41-42.
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immigration to be "the disregard it breeds for other U.S.
laws," including minimum wage, occupational safety, and
anti-smuggling laws.47 To counter this perceived problem,
the Commission recommended a three-part program that
included enhanced border and interior enforcement,
economic deterrents-specifically employer sanctions, and
a program for legalizing certain undocumented
immigrants.48
The Commission's recommendations and the
previous attempts at passing legislation culminated in the
enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA). 49 This Act emphasized employer sanctions
as a mechanism for decreasing illegal immigration. It made
the knowing employment of undocumented immigrants
unlawful, required employers to check certain documents
verifying legal status, and authorized a system of graduated
penalties for employers who violate the Act.5" This Act
also added an anti-discrimination provision to the INA, 51 in
order to prevent employers from discriminating on the basis
of national origin or citizenship (except for undocumented
immigrants) out of fear of liability. 52 IRCA further
established an amnesty program for certain undocumented
immigrants who had continuously resided in the United
States since January 1, 1982. 53 In passing this provision,
Congress reasoned that many undocumented immigrants,
who have resided in the country for several years and have
become beneficial members of society, continue to live in
47 Id. at 42.
481 Id. at 45.
49 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-603, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3359. Upon signing the law,
President Reagan called it "the product of one of the longest and most
difficult legislative undertakings in recent memory." Statement by
President Reagan upon signing S.1200, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856-1,
5856-4.
50 IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
51 Id. § 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b).
52 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 68.
53 IRCA § 201 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a).
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fear due to their undocumented status. 54  Granting legal
status to such immigrants would allow the INS to focus on
curbing the current flow of illegal arrivals.
55
2. Immigration Policy in the 1990s
Significant legislation dealing with illegal
immigration did not surface again until the mid-1990s.
Many people refer to this time as a period of emerging anti-
immigration and nativist sentiment, 56 as the tone of the
immigration debate dramatically changed in the decade
after the enactment of the IRCA. California Proposition
187, which was voted into law by a large margin of the
state's citizens in 1994, was of national significance.
57
This law was based on the assumption that California's
undocumented immigrant community caused economic
hardship to citizens and threatened the public through
criminal conduct. 58  Proposition 187 denied publicly
funded social 59 and health care services 60 and public
education to undocumented immigrants. 61 The law also
required the state's law enforcement agencies to "fully
cooperate" with the INS in its efforts to arrest
undocumented immigrants. 62
54 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49.
55 Id. While immigrant advocates generally favor amnesty programs,
some fault the IRCA for constructing "the contemporary illegal
identity" by distinguishing the category of immigrants whose status
could be legalized from others. See Mendelson, supra note 14, at 203.
56 See generally, Leo R. Chavez, Immigration Reform and Nativism:
The Nationalist Response to the Transnationalist Challenge, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRATION
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (Juan F. Perea ed., New York Univ.
Press 1997); Stephen H. Legomsky, E Pluribus Unum: Immigration,
Race, and Other Deep Divides, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101 (1996).
57 Cal. Prop. 187 (1994).
58 Id. § 1.59 Id. § 5.60 Id. § 6.
61 Id. § 7.
62 Id. § 4. Subsequent court decisions found that some of the provisions
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While Proposition 187 was not a piece of federal
legislation, its passage was important in shaping the
national immigration dialogue, 63  especially because
California has one of the nation's largest immigrant
communities. In fact, Proposition 187 likely influenced the
passage of certain provisions in the Personal Responsibility
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, which limited
federal public benefits for legal immigrants and excluded
undocumented immigrants from federal benefits
programs. 64  Furthermore, Proposition 187 was passed by
such a large margin that it "sent a powerful message to
Congress regarding immigration as a powerful national
political issue. ' ' 65  Proving that they were "tough on
immigrants" 66  became a politically wise move for
lawmakers. Whereas a decade earlier legislators presented
an image of undocumented immigrants as victims of
merciless employers and smugglers, public discourse
shifted to accuse undocumented immigrants of being
dangerous elements of society who leached public
resources. In addition, the discourse surrounding
Proposition 187 and similar enactments carried disturbing
racial, particularly anti-Latino, undertones.
67
of Proposition 187 were unconstitutional or preempted by federal law.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995), appeal dismissed in part, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir.
1997).
63 See Chavez, supra note 56, at 65.
64 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, Title IV (1996).
65 Barbara Hines, So Near Yet So Far Away: The Effect of September
11th on Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 8 TEX. HisP. J.L. &
POL'Y 37, 39-40 (2002).
66 Id. at 40.
67 Statements made by supporters of Proposition 187 demonstrated fear
that the increasing Latino immigrant population threatened the majority
status of the region's white population. For instance, Glenn Spencer,
founder of the anti-immigrant group, Voice of Citizens Together,
feared that immigrants were "part of a reconquest of the American
Southwest by foreign Hispanics." Chavez, supra note 56, at 68
(quoting Gabe Martinez & Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Forces
Rely on Message-Not Strategy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at A1). See
generally Garcia, supra note 14.
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In 1996, the 104th Congress, feeding off the anti-
immigration sentiment present throughout the country,
enacted multiple pieces of legislation affecting immigrants.
This legislation reflected not only the growing concerns
about illegal immigration, but also the growing concerns
about terrorism and crime. By 1996, America had
experienced two terrorist attacks: the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In
response to growing concerns about terrorism and crime,
Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (hereinafter "AEDPA") in April 1996.68 Title
IV of the AEDPA focuses exclusively on immigrants, in
particular on the removal and exclusion of "alien terrorists"
and "criminal aliens." 69  Section 439 of the AEDPA
authorizes state and local law enforcement officials to
arrest and detain immigrants who had previously been
convicted of a felony in the United States. Interestingly,
while the AEDPA focuses largely on excluding and
detaining immigrants who pose a potential terrorist threat,
an American citizen perpetrated the Oklahoma City
bombing-the most devastating terrorist attack the country
had suffered by this time.
Also in 1996, Congress signed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(hereinafter "IIRIRA") into law as Division C of the
Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act of 1996.71 The
IIRIRA was the most significant piece of legislation
dealing with illegal immigration since the IRCA. This Act
used a system of tougher border patrol 72 and interior
68 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N (110 Stat.) 1214.
69 1d. §§ 401-43.
70 Id. § 439.
71 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3009.
72Id. §§ 101-12.
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enforcement 73 to deal with both illegal entry and expired
visas. Instead of attempting to deter the employment of
undocumented immigrants as the IRCA did, the IIRIRA
focused directly on deterring and punishing immigrants
through the use of civil, and in some limited instances
criminal, penalties against the immigrants themselves.
74
The IIRIRA also instructed the Attorney General to set up
an "automated entry and exit control system" to determine
whether temporary residents overstayed their visas.75
While the AEDPA discussed local law
enforcement's involvement in apprehending and detaining
criminal aliens, the IIRIRA went a step further by
discussing local law enforcement's involvement in
apprehending violators of civil immigration laws. The
IIRIRA adds a provision to the INA permitting the
Attorney General to enter into written agreements with
state or local officials to perform the functions of
immigration officers. 76 This provision requires, however,
that state or local officers "be qualified to perform" the
relevant functions of immigration officers, which includes
that they have had "adequate training." 77 The IIRIRA also
makes it clear that no agreement is necessary for a state or
local officer to report information to the Attorney General
with regard to someone's immigration status or to
cooperate with the Attorney General in identifying,
apprehending, detaining, or removing immigrants "not
lawfully present." 78 The first state to take advantage of this
731Id. §§ 131-34.
74 Id. §§ 105, 108 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 758). Section 105
places fines upon "any alien who is apprehended while entering (or
attempting to enter) the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers . . . ." Id. § 105. Section 108
imposes criminal penalties on "high speed flight[s] from . . .
immigration checkpoint[s]." Id. § 108.75 Id. § 110 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1221).
76 Id. § 133 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)).
77 
Id.
78 Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)).
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provision was Florida, six years after the IIRIRA passed. 79
Many immigration scholars and immigrant
advocates criticize the 1996 laws for being overly inclusive
and unnecessarily harsh on immigrants when the primary
aim was to prevent terrorism and crime.80  In the
legislators' drive to tackle "criminal aliens," they created
laws which severely penalized immigrants for crimes
committed years ago by making certain offenses automatic
grounds for deportation, regardless of when the offenses
occurred. 8I The 1996 legislation represents what many
refer to as the increasing "criminalization" of immigration
law, as the fields of criminal law and immigration law
became increasingly intertwined8 2  It also represents the
growing tendency to equate illegal immigration with
criminality and terrorism.
III. Immigration Policy at the Turn of the
Millennium
Despite the growing hostility toward immigrants in
the mid- 1990s, or perhaps because of it, immigrant
advocates appeared to be successful in changing the tone of
immigration policy by the end of the twentieth century.
The "draconian" 1996 legislation prompted immigrant
advocates to increase efforts to liberalize the nation's
immigration policy. 83 Many lawmakers also began to
79 McKenzie, supra note 17, at 1156.
80 In fact, upon signing the AEDPA into law, President Clinton himself
acknowledged the over-inclusiveness of the Act. Johnson, supra note
19, at 878 (citing Statement of the President on Signing the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 17 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996) (stating that the AEDPA
"makes a number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws
having nothing to do with fighting terrorism")).
81 Id.
82 See generally Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of
Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 669 (1997).
83 Hines, supra note 65, at 39, 40.
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second-guess the wisdom of the 1996 laws. 14  In the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court
struck down some of the provisions of the IIRIRA as
invalid.8 5  Also important, public attitudes toward
immigrants improved by 2000.86
Barbara Hines and Michael Welch credit two
factors for influencing attitudes toward immigrants. In the
late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the Hispanic
population was growing and it became increasingly clear
that this group would constitute an important political
constituency. 87  Second, the nation's economic condition
improved toward the end of the 1990s, which made
immigrants appear as less of an economic threat.88 More
people saw low-wage immigrant workers as necessary for
filling labor shortages, rather than as workers who were
taking away citizens' jobs. 89 Moves were being made to
develop more temporary worker programs for Mexican
migratory workers, and as late as September 9, 2001,
bilateral talks between Mexico and the United States made
a new legalization program for undocumented immigrants
seem like a very real possibility. 9° By the fall of 2001,
immigrant advocates had high hopes that they would have
much success in reversing the tide of anti-immigration
legislation and policy.
84 Id. at 40; see also MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS
AND THE EXPANDING INS JAIL COMPLEX 180 (2002).
85 Hines, supra note 65, at 40 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
t2001); Zadvydas v. INS, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
6 WELCH, supra note 84, at 180.
87 Id.; see also Hines, supra note 65, at 41.
88 WELCH, supra note 84, at 180 (discussing the shift in public opinion
polls which showed that in 1994, 63% of the public saw immigrants as
"an economic drain on the country," and that in 2000, only 38% held
similar views); see also Hines, supra note 65, at 41.
89 Hines, supra note 65, at 41.
90 Id. at 42.
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IV. Immigration Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11
Whatever the hopes of immigrant activists before
September 11, 2001, everything changed afterwards. Soon
afterward, President Bush announced that the nation would
be engaged in an unconventional "war" aimed at defeating
"the global terror network." 91  Part of the domestic
manifestation of this conflict was an immediate targeting of
immigrants and harshening of immigration laws. The 9/11
criminal investigations immediately focused on
immigrants, primarily men from predominantly Muslim
countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Although
none of the immigrants detained in the initial FBI
investigations were charged with connections to terrorism,
the INS, working with the FBI, used civil immigration laws
to detain, investigate, and deport aliens.92  In addition,
Congress immediately reacted with legislation aimed at
deterring and punishing "terrorist attacks in the United
States and around the world" and enhancing "law
enforcement investigatory tools." 93  The USA PATRIOT
Act dramatically increased the federal government's
surveillance and investigative powers and also contained
many provisions affecting immigrants. For instance, it
expanded the ability to detain and deport non-citizens who
are deemed a "security risk.
'" 94
91 President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html).
92 See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF
THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER I I
ATTACKS (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf [hereinafter OIG
Report].
93 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
94 See Patricia Medige, Immigration Issues in a Security-Minded
America, 33 COLO. LAW. 11, 19 (2004).
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While federal policy continued to apply increased
scrutiny to Arab and Muslim immigrants, 95 it appeared that
all immigrants came under scrutiny in post-9/1 1 America.
As news reports surfaced suggesting that improved
immigration enforcement and communication could have
provided clues to the hijackers and their plot,9 6 immigration
reform became an important battlefront in the "war on
terrorism." 97 The AEDPA indicated that policymakers had
already drawn a link between terrorism and immigration,
but this link was furthered after 9/11. The conceptual link
between immigration and terrorism is perhaps made most
clear by the abolishment of the INS and the reorganization
of its functions in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), whose primary mission is preventing terrorist
attacks and reducing the country's vulnerability to
terrorism. 98 Furthermore, public opinion seemed to support
measures aimed at reducing immigration and more strictly
enforcing immigration laws.99  Legislators soon began to
95 For example, the INS created a system of "special registration" in
2002 for male visa-holders from predominantly Muslim countries. 67
Fed. Reg. 52,584 (Aug. 12, 2002).
96 See, e.g., Philip Shenon & David Johnston, Two Agencies Say
Silence Prevented Pair's Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, at A17.
97 Newspaper headlines and story placement reveal the popular
association between immigration and the war on terrorism. See, e.g.,
Matthew L. Wald, Officials Arrest 104 Airport Workers in Washington
Area, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A13 (discussing the arrests of
undocumented immigrant airport employees). Although this story did
not indicate that any of the employees were tied to terrorism, it
appeared in a feature section titled "A Nation Challenged."
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 111 (Nov.
25, 2002). The INS was dissolved, and its functions were replaced by
three DHS bureaus: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), which handles immigration services; the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcements, which oversees the interior
enforcement functions; and the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, which polices the nation's borders. See Medige, supra note
94, at 11. Some immigration scholars, while alarmed by the placement
of immigration powers in the DHS, believe that the separation of
immigration service and enforcement functions into different agencies
is a positive change. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 21, at 51, 52.
99 See Hines, supra note 65, at 45 (discussing two public opinion polls
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attack any measures aimed at relaxing immigration laws as
potential threats to national security. 
00
V. The Proposed Legislation
In some ways, the CLEAR Act is a continuation of
the IIRIRA. The CLEAR Act seeks to punish immigration
violators by increasing the civil and criminal penalties
provided in the IIRIRA. 0' The 2005 bill goes even further
by completely criminalizing the unlawful presence of
immigrants; under the CLEAR Act of 2005, it is a felony to
be in the country in violation of the INA. 1
02
This Act, however, handles the problem of limited
resources in a different way from its predecessors.
Whereas earlier legislation appropriated increased spending
for federal immigration enforcement, particularly border
patrol, 103 the new legislation seeks to incorporate resources
from outside federal immigration agencies. By authorizing
state and local agencies to carry out the functions of
immigration officers, hundreds of thousands of police
officers would be able to fill the large gaps left by the
limited number of federal immigration investigators.1
0 4
The bill does not stop at merely affirming the
authority of state and local law enforcement agencies to
enforce immigration laws; it establishes a program to
provide incentives for local police to enforce immigration
laws. Under the CLEAR Act, any state that has a statute,
conducted in aftermath of September 11 th).
100 Id.
101H.R. 3137 § 4(b), (c).
102 H.R. 3137 § 4(a). The "felony" language is an addition to the initial
CLEAR Act of 2003, H.R. 2671.
'03 See IRCA § 111; IIRIRA §§ 101-103.
104 See Press Release, Norwood, June 30, 2005, supra note 2; see also
CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 30 (prepared statement of
James R. Edwards, Ph.D.) (noting that 2,000 immigration investigators
currently cover the entire nation and that funding for interior
enforcement is only one-fifth the amount used for border enforcement).
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policy, or practice prohibiting law enforcement from
enforcing immigration laws will have certain federal funds
withheld from it. 105  Any withheld funds would be
reallocated to states that do comply with the Act's
provisions.1° 6 Furthermore, the bill requires state and local
law enforcement agencies to provide the Department of
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security with
information on detained immigration violators via the
National Crime Information Center database.' °7  The
CLEAR Act also requires that the DHS produce a training
manual, a "pocket guide," and training programs for use by
local law enforcement agencies.' 8 It does not, however,
require that state or local officers have any special trainin§
before assisting in federal immigration enforcement.'
0
Under the Act, state and local officers are given personal
and agency immunity for any liability arising out of the
enforcement of federal immigration law. 110
The CLEAR Act was first introduced in the House
of Representatives in 2003 and was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee where a hearing on it was held before
the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims. III Four witnesses were present at the hearing, with
all but one testifying in favor of the CLEAR Act.' 12 Still,
the hearing was far from being one-sided, as several
committee members spoke fervently against the Act. 
"3
The CLEAR Act stalled in Congress and died despite
105 H.R. 3137 § 3(a).
1 6 Id. § 3(c).
10 7 Id. § 5.
108 id. § 10.
109 Id. § 10(e)(3).
1'0 Id. § 110.
111 Cong. Index 35,038 (2003-2004) v.2.
112 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5.
113 See, e.g., id. at 3-6 (statements by Rep. Lee, Member, H. Subcomm.
on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims), 6-8 (statements by Rep.
Sanchez, Member, H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and
Claims), 9 (statements by Rep. Lofgren, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims).
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having 125 co-sponsors. 114  However, it was quickly
reintroduced in June 2005. The new legislation includes
changes that reflect some of the previous concerns
expressed about the Act,' 15 as well as provisions that
strengthen its impact. 116 At this writing, the CLEAR Act
has seventy-four co-sponsors. 11
7
The CLEAR Act's parallel in the Senate is the
Homeland Security Enhancement Act (hereinafter
"HSEA"). 1 8  The HSEA is also a carry-over from the
108th Congress. It was first introduced by Senator Jeff
Sessions (AL) on November 20, 2003,119 and reintroduced
in June 2005.120 The HSEA is substantially similar to the
CLEAR Act; in fact, the CLEAR Act of 2005 appears to
have been amended to more closely follow the HSEA.
12 1
At present, the HSEA has three sponsors.122
114 Bill Status & Summary for the 108th Congress, H.R. 2671,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d 108:HR02671 :@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited May
26, 2006).
115 For example, apparently to address concerns that the legislation
would overburden police, the 2005 Act was amended to require the
DHS to pay training costs, H.R. 3137 § 10(d), while the 2003 Act
allowed for a fee to be charged, H.R. 2671 § 109(b)(1).
116 See supra note 104.
117 Bill Summary & Status for the 109th Congress, H.R. 3137,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.02671 (last visited
May 26, 2006).
118 Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) of 2003, S. 1906,
108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://www.theorator.com/bills108/sl906.html (last visited July 6,
2006); Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) of 2005, S. 1362,
109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c 109:S. 1362: (last visited July 6, 2006).
119 Bill Status & Summary for the 108th Congress, S. 1906,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 08 :s.01906: (last visited
May 26, 2006).
120 Bill Summary & Status for the 109th Congress, S.1362,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:s.01362: (last visited
May 26, 2006).
121 One key difference is the HSEA makes "unlawful presence" a
misdemeanor offense, while the CLEAR Act makes it a felony offense.
S. 1362 § 5(a); H.R. 3137 § 4(a).
122 Bill Status & Summary, S. 1906, supra note 119.
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VI. Potential Dangers of the Legislation
Opponents of the CLEAR Act have many
complaints and concerns about it. 123  Two of the most
frequently cited reasons for opposing the CLEAR Act as
bad policy are (1) that the Act would have the danger of
impairing the jobs of police; and (2) that the legislation
would likely lead to the abuse of non-citizens and ethnic
minorities.
A. Implications for Law Enforcement
Even those who support stricter penalties on
undocumented immigrants and strict enforcement of
immigration laws should recognize that the CLEAR Act
has the potential to do more harm than good. In particular,
the CLEAR Act could have a damaging impact upon state
and local law enforcement agencies by placing unnecessary
burdens upon them. The new law is unnecessary because
earlier legislation allowed room for local police to
cooperate with and assist federal immigration agents. 24 In
addition, local police are authorized to enforce criminal
laws against anyone, including undocumented immigrants,
and courts have held that local police are not precluded
from enforcing laws against immigrants. 125 The primary
job of state and local law enforcement, however, is
123 See, e.g., CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 35-37
(statement of Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tern, Houston, TX); ACLU
Statement, supra note 15; People for the American Way, State and
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Law: What Are the Issues?
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=13338 (last visited
May 26, 2006).
124 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) (2006).
125 See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that federal immigration law does not preempt every state
activity involving aliens); Zapeda v. U.S. Immigration &
Nationalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the INS is not prohibited from obtaining assistance from local
police agencies).
218
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 358
protecting the public from criminal activity, not getting rid
of undocumented immigrants who are not committing
crimes.
Thus, the CLEAR Act would unnecessarily add an
extra burden to already taxed local agencies.' l 6 Not only
does it ask local officers to assist with federal immigration
investigations, it essentially authorizes them to act as
immigration agents. Furthermore, the Act would penalize
states and agencies by cutting funds if they chose not to
enforce immigration laws. 127 This essentially amounts to
coercing states to carry out supposedly voluntary
functions. 128 Since 9/11, police officers have been asked to
be the "first responders" to acts of terrorism. 129 Placing an
extra burden on them would make it increasingly difficult
for them both to be "first responders" and to continue the
normal duties of their work.
The CLEAR Act may further frustrate the efforts of
police by making their criminal investigation tasks more
difficult. In particular, many police departments fear that
by becoming quasi-immigration agents, they will lose trust
and respect within immigrant communities.' 30  As earlier
126 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 38-39 (prepared
statement by Gordon Quan) (discussing the financial burdens state and
local police already face).
127 H.R. 3137 § 3(a).
128 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Hostetler, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec.,
and Claims) (discussing the discretion retained by police under the
Act); see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
(IACP), Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State, Tribal and
Local Law Enforcement 5 (Nov. 30, 2004),
http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnfor
cementconf/o2Epdf (stating the position of the IACP that any
legislation enlisting the assistance of local police in immigration
enforcement "be based on completely voluntary cooperation" and not
"seek to coerce cooperation through the use of sanction mechanisms
that would withhold federal assistance funds").
129 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 4 (statements by Rep.
Lee).
130 See Laura Parker, Police Departments Balk at Idea of Becoming
"Quasi-INS Agents, "USA TODAY, May 7, 2002, at 8A.
219
2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 359
reports on illegal immigration noted, undocumented
immigrants are often afraid to approach police.131 Many
local law enforcement agencies have worked hard, and
continue to work hard, to gain the trust of immigrant
communities. 132 This is true even when local police do not
actively enforce immigration laws. Undocumented
immigrants will become even more hesitant to inform
officers of crimes if they know that these officers routinely
interrogate people about their immigration status. This
would not only put victims at greater risk, but it would also
decrease the likelihood of apprehending many criminal
offenders. 133  For example, some police fear that the
CLEAR Act would make battered immigrant women less
likely to report domestic abuse. 134
The 2005 bill was amended to address some of
these concerns by clarifying that police are not required to
report or arrest crime victims or witnesses.135 It still,
however, gives police the freedom to do so, in part because
agencies concerned with preserving their federal funding
will want to prove that they are complying with the Act's
provisions. Furthermore, even if police do not report
victims or witnesses, the reputation of police as
immigration enforcers in other contexts likely will be
sufficient to deter immigrants from wanting any contact
with police. Being seen as immigration officers not only
has the potential to damage the police's relationship with
undocumented immigrants, but legal immigrants and
131 See H.R. REP. No. 99-682, at 49.
132 See CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 185 (letter from Ray
Samuels, Chief of Police, Newark, CA).
133 See id. at 179-180 (letter from Ellen T. Hanson, Chief of Police,
Lenexa, KY).
134 IACP, supra note 128, at 5; see also Karin Almjeld, CLEAR Act
Threatens Immigrant Women Victims of Violence, NAT'L NOW TIMES
(Winter 2003-04), http://www.now.org/nnt/winter-2004/clear.html
(arguing that the CLEAR Act "would undermine the Violence Against
Women Act" and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention
Act).
135 H.R. 3137 § 3(b).
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citizens may also lose their trust in the police upon hearing
the experiences of people they know being apprehended for
immigration offenses.
For such reasons, many police departments and law
enforcement organizations throughout the country oppose
the CLEAR Act. According to the Chief of Police of
Newark, California, "the CLEAR Act would make state
and local law enforcement officers' jobs nearly impossible
and move us further from the goal we all share of making
our communities safer."' 
36
B. Civil Rights Implications
Another key concern about the CLEAR Act is that
it could lead to widespread civil rights violations and ethnic
profiling. Presumably, one of the goals of the legislation's
supporters is to put local police officers in a position to
discover illegal immigrants during the course of their work.
Supporters of the Act appear to support the proposition that
police officers could detain and question people based on a
suspicion of illegal immigration status. 37 What qualifies,
then, as justifiable or reasonable suspicion? Immigrants
today are identified largely by their race and ethnicity.
Professor Victor Romero explains that immigration in
America has been historically intertwined with race, and a
presumption remains that citizens are either white or black,
131 CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at 185 (letter from Ray
Samuels).
137 See id. at 40-45 (statements by Gordon Quan and Rep. Hostetler).
Rep. Hostetler asked Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tern and City Council
Member of Houston, a series of questions regarding Houston Police
Department policy. Rep. Hostetler seemed unsatisfied with Quan's
answers that officers are not permitted to ask about citizenship status,
detain, or arrest someone based solely on a suspicion of illegal status,
though they can contact INS regarding someone known to be an illegal
immigrant who is arrested on separate criminal charges. Hostetler
seems to prefer a policy of questioning, and perhaps even detaining,
people based on suspicion.
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while non-citizens are Latino or Asian. ' 38 To be sure, since
the elimination of the national origins quota system in
1965, most immigrants have come from Latin America and
Asia.
139
The CLEAR Act's authorization thus presents the
danger that officers, who are under pressure by the Act to
uncover immigration violators, may question and even
detain people based solely on their ethnicity or assumed
ethnicity. 140 Because the Act immunizes local officers and
agencies from any civil liability arising from their
enforcement of immigration laws, 14 1  it provides a
convenient way to bypass judicial limitations on race and
ethnicity-based immigration enforcement.' 42
Proponents of the CLEAR Act and related measures
argue that police are already trained to avoid racial
profiling. 143 It is true that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, law
enforcement agencies around the country appeared
increasingly concerned with the problems of racial
profiling.144 It is also true, however, that racial profiling
has long been practiced by law enforcement. 145
Furthermore, attitudes toward racial and ethnic profiling
138 Romero, supra note 21, at 52-54.
139 Id. at 54.
140 There is evidence that the INS itself often used ethnic profiling it its
immigration enforcement. See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration,
Enforcement, and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial
Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REv. 1185, 1194 (2002)
(discussing a study by NYU School of Law Immigrant Rights Clinic,
which revealed that INS agents targeted people playing "Spanish
music" and having "Hispanic appearance" in its immigration
enforcement).
141 H.R. 2671 § 110.
142 See United States v. Brignon-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975)
(holding that while border patrol may take into account a number of
factors in deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop a car,
suspicion is not reasonable when it is based on ethnicity alone).
143 See Sessions & Hayden, supra note 17, at 340.
144 Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The
Department of Justice Guidelines, 50 LOY. L. REv. 67, 67 (2004).
145 See Ashar, supra note 140, at 1193-94.
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changed drastically after 9/11. Prior to 9/11, polls showed
that most Americans believed racial profiling should be
eliminated. 146 Public opinion changed after 9/11, however,
to accept profiling "based on race, national origin,
nationality, and religion."' 147  The federal government's
own policies show that in the post-9/ll world, it is
acceptable, even expected and desirable, to use ethnicity as
the primary cause for suspicion.1
48
Furthermore, the lack of training that officers would
receive under the CLEAR Act is alarming. The CLEAR
Act and HSEA provide for the creation of a "training
manual" and "pocket guide" for law enforcement agencies
and call for the DHS to make training sessions available
through various means. 149 Both acts, however, make clear
that these provisions "shall not be construed as making any
immigration-related training a requirement for, or
prerequisite to" immigration enforcement. 150 Thus, the acts
would authorize local police to act in the same capacity as
immigration officers, although providing little or no
training. Immigration law is one of the most complicated
and oft-changing areas of American law. 151 It even can be
difficult for immigration attorneys and federal immigration
agents to keep track of the various nuances that are
continually changing in the field of immigration law. How,
then, are local and state police officers, whose jobs are not
to specialize in immigration matters, to adequately
understand the complex laws?
146 Sharon L. Davies, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System after
September 11: Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 46 n.5
(citing Gallup poll in which 81% of respondents revealed a disapproval
of profiling practices).
147 Johnson, Racial Profiling, supra note 144, at 68; see also Davies,
supra note 146, at 45 n.6.
48 See Ashar, supra note 140, at 1191-96.
' 49 H.R. 3137 § 10; S. 1362 § 9.
"50 H.R. 3137 § 10(e)(3); S. 1362 § 9(c).
151 See Medige, supra note 94, at 11 (discussing the "steady stream of
federal and state legislation [that] has changed aspects of immigration
law and the rights of immigrants over the past several years").
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The lack of adequate training increases the very real
potential for mistreatment and civil rights violations. The
immunity provisions of the CLEAR Act' 52 make the
rectification of such problems unlikely. Indeed, supporters
of the CLEAR Act are right to worry about the potential
liability that local police face when they engage in
immigration enforcement. In just one of many prior
instances, police officers in Katy, Texas, faced lawsuits in
1994 stemming from the detentions of over eighty Latinos
suspected of being illegal immigrants, but who were, in
fact, either United States citizens or legal residents. 153
Such examples also prove that opponents of the CLEAR
Act have a basis for their concerns about the potential for
abuse at the hands of poorly trained police who are charged
with the difficult task of enforcing immigration laws along
with their many other duties.
V. The Policy Behind the CLEAR Act
A. The False Presumption that Illegal
Immigrants are Terrorists and Criminals
The CLEAR Act also should be rejected because it
is premised on bad policy: the equation of illegal
immigrants to terrorists and criminals. The presumption
that illegal immigrants are dangerous criminals is clear
from the title of the legislation: the Clear Law
Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act. The
presumption is also clear from the rhetoric of the Act's
supporters. Representative Norwood, the main sponsor of
the CLEAR Act, contends that drastic measures are
necessary to stop "the hordes of vicious foreign criminals
invading our country to murder, rape, and molest
'5 2 H.R. 3137 § 11.
153 IACP, supra note 128, at 4.
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Americans."' 54 Indeed, proponents of the CLEAR Act and
HSEA come to press conferences and legislative sessions
equipped with stories of undocumented immigrants who
had committed heinous crimes against Americans.
155
Proponents also carry with them the stories of the nineteen
foreign hijackers who terrorized America and the three
hijackers who had previous encounters with police.
156
Measures like the CLEAR Act, we are to assume, would
prevent such terrorists and criminals from infiltrating
America.
Little besides anecdotal evidence exists, however,
that tackling illegal immigration and removing
undocumented immigrants will make the country any safer.
Very seldom is any proof presented that immigrants,
documented or undocumented, are more likely than others
to commit violent crimes. 157  The construction of the
debate, though, leads one to believe that undocumented
immigrants are by nature terrorists or violent criminals of
some kind. Such rhetoric ignores proof that the majority of
154 Representative Charlie Norwood, A Five-Minute Address to the
U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/ga09_norwood/CLEARspeech.
html.
155 See Prepared Statement of Michelle Malkin, supra note 9
(discussing gang rape of a Queens, NY mother by illegal aliens with
long criminal records and an illegal alien accused of kidnapping and
raping a nine-year old girl); CLEAR Act 2003 Hearing, supra note 5, at
2 (statements by Rep. Hostetler) (recounting the same stories of Queens
mother and nine-year old girl); Press Release, Norwood, June 30, 2005,
supra note 2 (telling story of "an illegal alien and convicted criminal
being sought for the . . .kidnapping, molestation, and murder" of a
young girl in Georgia).
56 See Prepared Statement of Sen. Saxby Chambliss, State and Local
Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a Unified
Approach for Stopping Terrorists, Testimony before the U.S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and
Citizenship (Apr. 22, 2004), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id= 1156&witid=2
624.
157 See Legomsky, supra note 56, at 109 (noting that "[i]mmigrants...
are neither more nor less law-abiding than the native-born U.S.
population").
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undocumented immigrants come to America seeking
work, 158 not to wreak havoc. 159 Under the CLEAR Act,
even a young child brought to the country by his or her
parents could be considered a "criminal." Furthermore, a
large percentage of those considered "illegal immigrants"
are actually people who entered the country on legal visas,
but who overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their
visas. 160 This could include, for example, those who
mistakenly believe they do not need to renew their
temporary visas while in the process of having their status
adjusted. Under the CLEAR Act, a person would have to
prove that "an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
or physical illness" caused his or her visa violation in order
to not be charged with a felony offense.
Furthermore, by perpetuating the myth of
immigrants as terrorists and criminals, legislation like the
CLEAR Act has the potential to increase racial tensions. 
161
As noted earlier, race and immigration are closely linked in
the minds of most Americans.1 62 People of certain races
and ethnicities are generally presumed to be immigrants.
The CLEAR Act, by painting the picture of immigrants in a
dangerous light, will possibly lead to increased stereotyping
and marginalization of certain races and ethnicities.
158 See Espenshade, supra note 38, at 211.
159 See Immigration & Naturalization Services (INS) Interior
Enforcement Strategy: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 2 (2002) (statement of Rep. Gekas, Chairman of the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims).
160 Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants
& the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REv. 555, 594 n.95 (1996).
161 Romero, supra note 21, at 52.
162 Supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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B. The Consequences of Co-opting
Immigration Policy into Anti-Terrorism
Policy
It is clear that immigration policy is inextricably
linked with anti-terrorism policy. 163  As a result, it has
become impossible to discuss immigration without
reference to national security concerns. The fact that
immigration policy is shaped in the context of other policy
is not new. Immigration has often been an area of law
highly vulnerable to changes in other areas that have little
to do with immigration. For example, immigration became
a key issue during the heated welfare debate of the mid-
1990s. California's Proposition 187 reflects this attitude
because the legislation was aimed at denying public
benefits to "undeserving" aliens.' 64 Congress also included
provisions excluding immigrants from public benefits in its
anti-welfare legislation, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Reconciliation Act of 1996. 165 In the mid-i 990s,
immigration policy was co-opted by economic and welfare
policy; in post-9/11 America, immigration policy has been
co-opted by anti-terrorism policy.
When legislators view immigration exclusively in
terms of national security, they lose sight of what really is
appropriate immigration policy. 166 Consider that
immediately preceding the 9/11 attacks, lawmakers were on
the verge of enacting measures that would liberalize
immigration policy. 167  Immediately after the attacks,
however, the direction of immigration policy abruptly
changed. This was, more than anything, a reactionary
move. The nation was justifiably shaken by the attacks and
163 See supra Part II.D.
64 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
165 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
166 See Tumlin, supra note 16, at 1228 (stating that "immigration policy
has lost its independent policy agenda").
167 See generally, Hines, supra note 65.
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was left feeling very vulnerable. New immigration
proposals were evaluated, first-and-foremost, on the basis
of national security policy.168 Even those legislators who
generally support liberalized immigration reform are
understandably hesitant to oppose any measure
characterized as "necessary" for national security.
At the same time, the CLEAR Act and other
immigration legislation in its vein are not merely reactions
to the threat of terrorism. Rather, the emergence of what
some label a "new nativist" movement, which is
characterized by harsh immigration laws, predated 9/11,169
although the movement lost some steam at the turn of the
millennium. 170 The 9/11 attacks created a new incentive to
fight illegal immigration, and, for many, the attacks
justified disdain toward immigrants. Linking immigration
with terrorism, however, merely masks those factors that
initially led to the anti-immigration reaction of the previous
century.171 Supporters of new, stricter immigration
measures now feel justified in arguing that lax immigration
enforcement can, and has, produced disastrous effects on
the country. It becomes easier for the nation to invoke
harsher immigration reform under this guise of national
security.
VII. Conclusion
Given the history of United States immigration law
and policy, that immigration is playing such a key role in a
national security-minded America comes as no surprise.
168 Tumlin, supra note 16, at 1228.
169 See generally, IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIvISM AND THE
ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea ed.,
New York Univ. Press 1997).
170 See supra Part II.C.
171 See Chavez, supra note 56, at 69 (listing as factors related to
increasing anti-immigration sentiment xenophobia as a result of an
increasing number of non-white immigrants, economic recession, the
failure of previous laws, and emerging nationalism).
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As immigration attorney Ash Bali points out, "periods of
national crisis have revealed the vulnerability of
immigrants' rights to hysteria and repression." 7 2 In many
ways, the current "war on terrorism" has manifested itself
in the domestic front as a "war on immigration." The
CLEAR Act is one example of the anti-immigration and
anti-terrorism forces colliding, because the Act is justified
on the grounds of protecting America from both the
"criminal" aliens and the potential terrorists coming across
our borders. The Act, however, seems to rely on the false
presumption that undocumented immigrants are inherently
dangerous. Moreover, by coercing local and state police to
act as immigration agents, the CLEAR Act has the potential
to prevent effective community policing while increasing
the potential for abuse of ethnic minorities at the hands of
police. Hopefully, the language of national security will
not cloud these very real concerns from the view of the
lawmakers currently considering the Act. Lawmakers
should recognize that, more than anything, the CLEAR Act
is unnecessary anti-immigration legislation, and as such, it
should be opposed.
172 Ash U. Bali, Changes in Immigration Law and Practice After
September 11: A Practitioner's Perspective, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 161 (2003).
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STATE V. PIERCE: REFINING THE STANDARD FOR THE
ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
Anton L. Jackson
I. Introduction
Although the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence
in the course of a criminal trial has been well-established
law in Tennessee for almost fifty years, the quandary
presented itself two years ago in State v. Pierce.' This case
forced the Tennessee Supreme Court to balance the need to
protect state citizens against sexual predators with the well-
established rules of evidence which hold that "polygraph
evidence is inherently unreliable, and therefore irrelevant
and inadmissible. ' 2 In Pierce, the issue before the court
was whether polygraph test results, which were performed
as part of a sex offender risk assessment and encouraged by
leading psychosexual analysts and researchers, were
admissible in the non-capital sentencing hearing of a
convicted sex offender.3
By refusing to admit polygraph evidence in
sentencing hearings, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
drawn the proverbial line in the sand and refuses to breach
well-established rules of evidence in favor of additional
proposed safeguards against sexual predators. As our
society attempts to combat the seemingly growing
occurrence of sex crimes, especially those committed
against children, we must not let our fear of this devious
behavior circumvent the fair application of our laws. We
must recognize that manipulation and perversion of legal
' 138 S.W.3d 820 (Tenn. 2004).
2 State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Torres, 82
S.W.3d 236, 252 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 127
(Tenn. 1988).
3 Pierce, 138 S.W.3d at 823.
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principles-in this case, the attempt to introduce polygraph
evidence in violation of the rules of evidence-lends itself
only to the invalidation of these rules, and ultimately, the
legal institution itself.
This note provides support for the Tennessee
Supreme Court's holding in Pierce. First, it evaluates the
reliability of polygraph examinations and the rationale for
their widespread inadmissibility as evidence. Secondly, it
examines the use of polygraphs on sexual offenders and
weighs the positive and negative contributions they lend to
preventing recidivism. This note concludes by re-enforcing
the notion that it is the responsibility of the judiciary to
establish and affirm well-established principles, here, the
rules of evidence and the inadmissibility of polygraph
evidence, even if the goal in violating these principles is to
provide assistance in preventing vile and despicable
behavior.
II. The Process by Which Pierce was Sentenced
Gregory Pierce was indicted for the rape of a twelve
year-old girl after it was discovered that he had
impregnated her.4 He pled guilty to the lesser charge of
attempted rape of a child and received an eight-year
sentence. 5 It remained in the discretion of the trial court to
determine the manner in which he would serve the sentence
upon the completion of a risk assessment analysis to be
performed by the Counseling and Clinical Services
(hereinafter "CSS"). 6 The purpose of such an analysis is to
evaluate the offender's risk of re-offending, and provide a
sentencing recommendation to the court based on the
results of the risk assessment.7
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Adler, clinical director of CCS, detailed Pierce's personal
history, including his work history, an assessment of his
social and emotional skills, and statements by Pierce
detailing his crime and history of sexual offense. 8 Pierce
stated that he had not committed any sexual offenses prior
to the offense for which he was being sentenced. 9 The
report also included the results of a Penile Plethysmograph
(hereinafter "PPG"), a test administered to measure sexual
responsiveness to a variety of stimuli across variables such
as gender, age, and sexual activity.' 0 Pierce's PPG showed
arousal responses to females from infants to age seventeen,
male infants, males from age two to five, and males from
age twelve to seventeen." Dr. Adler's report stated that
Pierce's statements and his PPG were inconsistent and
suggested that the court administer a polygraph
examination to verify Pierce's stated criminal history. 12
Thereafter, the court ordered Pierce to complete the
polygraph before it rendered a sentencing decision.13 The
results of the exam indicated that Pierce's claims that he
had not committed any prior sexual offenses were
untruthful. As a consequence, the trial court decided to
consider the examination in sentencing Pierce stating,
"[T]he Court can only conclude I've got a... person that
sexually is going to act out with children."' 14 Based in part
on the results of the polygraph examination, the trial court
denied Pierce's request for probation or another alternative
form of sentencing. 15
Pierce appealed, and the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that because he had failed to object
8id.
9Id.
10 In re Care and Treatment of Tucker, 578 S.E.2d 719, 721 (S.C.
2003).
"1 Pierce, 138 S.W.3d at 822.
12 id.
13 id.
14 Id. at 823.
15 Id.
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to consideration of the polygraph results during his
sentencing hearing, he had waived his right to appeal that
issue. 16  However, the court nonetheless noted Pierce's
argument and stated that they could not address this issue
because it was not within the scope of their review.
17
Pierce appealed the finding of the Court of Criminal
Appeals to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which granted
his application for permission to appeal.18 In considering
whether this evidence should have been excluded, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that "the trial court erred by
considering the results of Pierce's polygraph examination"
in sentencing him. 1
9
Reaffirming prior decisions which held that
polygraph examinations were unreliable, the Tennessee
Supreme Court ruled that "polygraph examination results,
testimony on such results, [and] testimony on a defendant's
willingness or refusal to submit to a polygraph
examination" were inadmissible in all sentencing
hearings.
2 0
III. The Development of the Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence
In Tennessee, as in most states, long-standing
precedent holds that the results of a polygraph are
"inherently unreliable" and, as consequence, irrelevant and
inadmissible. 2 1  The Tennessee Supreme Court's 1958
16 Id. at 823-24.
17 Id. at 824.
18Id.
19 Id. at 826.
20 Id. However, the court did conclude under de novo review that
"Pierce was not a suitable candidate for probation," even after
excluding the polygraph evidence. Id. at 827.
21 See Torres, 82 S.W.3d at 252 n.20; State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d
608, 614-15 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 60 (Tenn.
2001); Irick, 762 S.W.2d at 127; Grant v. State, 374 S.W.2d 391, 392
(Tenn. 1964); Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 458 (Tenn. 1958).
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decision in Marable v. State laid the framework for the
inadmissibility of polygraph examinations and lie detector
tests in this state.22 In Marable, the court held that "[t]he
unquestioned and unanimous weight of authority and
general rule is that the results of a lie detector test are
inadmissible in evidence., 23 The issue in Marable was
whether it was reversible error for a witness to testify that a
defendant, upon request to take a polygraph examination,
asked to speak to a lawyer. After discussion with that
lawyer, the defendant refused to take the polygraph.24 The
court reiterated the inadmissibility of the polygraph
examination, but declined to find reversible error, noting
that the objectionable testimony was subject to cross-
examination by defendant's counsel.25 Six years later, the
Court expanded the scope of Marable in Grant v. State.26
Grant involved a contempt of court conviction
against an attorney for "suborning perjury." 27  Four men
were indicted for illegally possessing, transporting, and
selling whiskey. 28 The men testified on their own behalf,
and the court found they perjured themselves under the
instruction of their attorney, Leo Grant.29 In Grant's trial,
defendant Grant attempted to introduce evidence of a
polygraph examination he had been given. The trial court
held that the results of the polygraph were inadmissible, but
did allow evidence of the "circumstances" surrounding the
polygraph examination-specifically questions and
answers surrounding the examination. 0 In finding that the
lower court had erred, the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the established precedent that polygraph
22 313 S.W.2d 451.
23 Id. at 458.
24 i.
25 Id. at 455-56, 458-59.
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examinations are inadmissible. 3 1 Moreover, by excluding
the circumstances surrounding the examination and the
willingness of the defendant to take or refuse the test, the
court further broadened the scope of Marable. 
32
While most cases involving the introduction of
polygraph evidence involve the examination of a defense
witness, the Tennessee Supreme Court has also ruled on the
admissibility of polygraph evidence as it relates to
witnesses who testify for the state. 33 In State v. Irick, the
court found no distinction between the polygraph evidence
of a state's witness and polygraph evidence of a
defendant's witness, holding both inadmissible. 
34
In Irick, Billy Ray Irick was indicted for common
law murder, felony murder, aggravated rape by vaginal
penetration, and aggravated rape by anal penetration of a
seven-year-old child.35 The jury found Irick guilty of first
degree murder during the perpetration of a felony and two
counts of aggravated rape. 36 The relevant issue in Irick
was whether a defendant can introduce polygraph
examination evidence of a state's witness.
37
Prior to Irick, most cases involving polygraph
evidence dealt with the state attempting to introduce
evidence gathered during a polygraph examination of the
defendant himself or of a defense witness. In Irick,
however, the defense wished to introduce the polygraph
examination of the victim's step-father, whose polygraph
revealed "deception to a relevant question" regarding his
answer to whether he had anything to do with the death of
31 Id.
32 m
31 See Irick, 762 S.W.2d at 127 (preventing capital defendant from
impeaching the state's witness with a polygraph examination which
stated that the witness exhibited signs of deception during the exam).34 Id. at 127.
31 Id. at 124.
36 id.
" Id. at 127.
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his step-daughter. 38  The court found no distinction
between the admissibility of a polygraph examination for a
state's witness compared to that of a defense witness and
further stated that no existing precedent distinguished the
two.
39
The new sphere of litigation in the area of the
admissibility polygraph evidence is the issue of whether to
allow the introduction of polygraph evidence during
sentencing proceedings. The Tennessee Supreme Court
first addressed this issue in State v. Hartman.40  In
Hartman, the court upheld the lower court's refusal to
allow the introduction of the defendant's polygraph
examination results as mitigating evidence in his capital
sentencing hearing. 41 The defendant argued that the rules
of evidence should not be strictly applied "as to infringe a
defendant's constitutional right to present mitigating
evidence at a capital sentencing procedure. 42 While the
court agreed with the defendant's assertion that the rules of
evidence should not be strictly applied in capital sentencing
hearings as to preclude relevant, mitigating evidence, the
court stated that the inherent unreliability of the polygraph
rendered the examination irrelevant. 43  As a result, the




40 42 S.W.3d 44 (Tenn. 2001).
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IV. State v. Pierce Refines the Standard for the
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence
A. Applying the Rules of Evidence to Non-
Capital Sentencing Hearings
The issue now presented in Pierce is whether the
rules of evidence should be strictly applied in a non-capital
sentencing hearing, or more specifically, whether
polygraph examinations are admissible in such hearings.45
This issue has become increasingly important as our society
wrestles with combating the seemingly endless stream of
sexual offenses and re-offenses. It has become virtually
impossible to identify first-time sexual offenders prior to
their initial acts. Therefore, the focus has shifted to
identifying those convicted offenders who demonstrate a
high probability of recidivism. 
46
Tennessee has adopted legislation intended to
identify sexual offenders who may have a high risk of re-
offending.47  Under this legislation, a convicted sex
offender who is seeking probation or an alternative
sentence must submit to an assessment to determine the
offender's risk of recidivism. 48  Polygraph examinations
are encouraged as useful tools in identifying and evaluating
those offenders who have a high risk of re-offending.
49
45 Pierce, 138 S.W.3d at 826.
46 Risk Assessment, 4 (2005), Association for the Treatment of Sexual
Abuse, available at http://www.atsa.com/ppAssessment.html (last
visited July 8, 2006).
47 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-705 (2003).
48 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-704(d)(2) (2003) (establishing
standardized procedures for evaluating sexual offenders as developed
and prescribed by the Sex Offender Treatment Board).
49 Pierce, 138 S.W.2d at 825 (noting the Sex Offender Treatment
Board's use of the publication, PRE-SENTENCE PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION: ADULT SEXUAL OFFENDERS during its annual training).
The manual encourages the use of "polygraph and physiological
measures within [the] report." Id. at 825 n.9 (citing PSYCHOSEXUAL
EVALUATION MANUAL, PRE-SENTENCE PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION:
ADULT SEXUAL OFFENDERS 6).
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The psychology community has wholly accepted polygraph
examinations as a reliable resource in its assessment of
sexual offenders. The Pierce court decided, however,
that these examinations were not sufficiently reliable to be
introduced in the court proceedings.
51
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court erred by considering the Pierce's polygraph
examination in determining his sentence.52 In so ruling, the
court followed Tennessee's well-established precedent and
relied on the Marable, Grant, and Irick decisions.53 Citing
Hartman, the court reasoned that since the introduction of
polygraph evidence to mitigate a sentence in favor of the
defense was impermissible, the introduction of polygraph
evidence to enhance a sentence in favor of the state was
also impermissible.
54
As previously mentioned, the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled Pierce had failed to object to the
consideration of the polygraph results in his sentencing,
and therefore, had waived his right to appeal the issue.55
The intermediate court found that there was still sufficient
evidence in the risk assessment report without the
polygraph examination to deny Pierce's request for
56probation. The Supreme Court, while holding that the
trial court was clearly in error in admitting the polygraph
evidence, agreed with the Court of Appeals and upheld the
denial of probation because of the other information
contained in the risk assessment report.
57
50 Id.
"' Id. at 828.521 Id. at 826.
53 id.
54 Id. at 826.
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B. The Relevance Standard as Applied to
Polygraph Evidence
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402 provides evidence
that is not relevant is not admissible. 58 Relevant evidence
is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." 59 The unreliable
nature of the polygraph is due to the "extreme polarization"
within the scientific community about polygraph
techniques.60  Therefore, the potential unreliability of
polygraph evidence is often cited as the reason for its
exclusion.
A number of factors have been presented as
possibly having an affect on polygraph results, including
fatigue, amnesia, pathological lying, and the lack of fear of
being caught in a lie.61 Herein lies the inherent problem of
polygraph examinations; they are simply scientifically
imperfect. The "lack of any indicia of reliability [of
polygraph evidence] means it is not probative."6 2 It is the
probative factor that renders polygraph evidence
inadmissible as a matter of law. 63 "Probative" is defined as
"serving to establish or prove the truth." 64  The very
essence of state and federal rules of evidence is to establish
this truth. Because polygraph evidence can neither
establish nor prove truth, there is no justification in using
58 TENN. R. EVID. 402.
59 TENN. R. EvID. 401.
60 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
61 People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1981) (noting other
factors such as emotional upset of the subject, drunkenness, subjection
to drugs, bad physical or emotional condition, high blood pressure,
hardening of the arteries, obesity, feeble-mindedness, psychotic
condition, high blood pressure, use of antiperspirant, etc.).62 Hartman, 42 S.W.3d at 60.
63 TENN. R. EVID. 402.
64 GILBERT'S LAW SUMMARIES: POCKET SIZE LAW DICTIONARY 258
(West Group 1997).
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such technology to determine the fate of an individual,
regardless of the gravity of the crime.
C. Tennessee Supreme Court Acknowledges
Societal Concerns in Reaching Its
Decision
Our society has become increasingly concerned
with addressing sexual offenders, particularly those who
prey upon children. Legislatures have established Sex
Offender Registries, and courts have upheld their
constitutionality. 6 5 Society has enacted stronger legislation
for the punishment of sex crimes. In our haste to combat
this terror, however, we must be certain that we do not
abridge the protections that the judicial system seeks to
afford all citizens.
The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
established protections of the judicial system despite
pressures from a fearful society. The easy remedy would
have been to allow polygraph examinations in sentencing
hearings for sex offenders and to dispense sentences based
on the results of such tests. Then, if a polygraph
examination indicated that a convicted sex offender was
lying, a court would institute a harsher sentence, thus
ensuring that the system works. Utilizing such a system
would allow the masses to express a collective sigh of relief
knowing that the world is a safer place.
However, consider a second alternative to this
scenario in which a convicted sex offender is to be
sentenced for his transgression. He claims that he no
longer has deviant tendencies, after which he is
administered a polygraph examination. The test determines
that he is telling the truth. The court then gives the
convicted sex offender a reduced sentence, and he is
65 See, e.g., Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233 (Md. 2002); Jane Doe I v.
Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. 2006); Commonwealth v. Howe, 842
A.2d 436 (Pa. 2004).
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reintroduced to society after serving less time in prison.
Unfortunately, the offender deceived the lie detector and
quickly re-offends. Had the court relied upon human
evaluation and reliable evidence, then the offender would
have been subjected to more intense scrutiny.
Finally, consider a third alternative. In this
scenario, an offender is falsely assessed by the polygraph,
and his freedom is stripped due to his nervousness or a
change in his body temperature. He serves a longer
sentence despite a lower actual risk of recidivism than the
offender in the second scenario.
In all three scenarios, the polygraph, which assesses
the offender's alleged credibility, fails due to the offender's
psychological or physical makeup. 66 The rules of evidence
are established to prevent such discrepancies and exclude
evidence which is not completely reliable. By excluding
evidence that is known to be unreliable, such as polygraph
evidence, we can more confidently ensure the release of
those who are least likely to re-offend while separating
those with a greater chance of recidivism from their
potential victims. In Pierce, the Tennessee Supreme Court
refused to submit to the pressure of societal fears and
adhered to well-established evidentiary principles.
V. Conclusion
Polygraph examinations carry no evidentiary weight
in Tennessee. They are inherently unreliable and,
therefore, inadmissible. 67  The court is charged with
protecting the integrity of its decisions. Therefore, only
relevant and reliable evidence can be introduced to support
or impeach the credibility of a witness. The Tennessee
Supreme Court took a stand in Pierce v. State to ensure that
66 David C. Raskin & Charles R. Hones, The Comparison Question
Test, in HANDBOOK OF POLYGRAPH TESTING 1 (Murray Kleiner ed.,
Academic Press 2002).67 Pierce, 138 S.W.2d at 826.
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only the most reliable evidence would be considered in all
sentencing hearings, whether for capital or non-capital
offenses, and to ensure that courts would render fair and
equal decisions based on that evidence.
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